GHSA-7C8P-946Q-CM7C
CSRF via missing Origin check in @appium/base-driver
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-7C8P-946Q-CM7C divulgada · CVSS 5.4 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The Appium HTTP server performs no `Origin`, `Sec-Fetch-Site`, `Referer`, or `Host` validation on command requests. A malicious web page the victim visits while a local/intranet Appium server is running can send a cross-origin `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` "simple request" — which browsers deliver with NO CORS preflight — that the server parses into nested W3C capabilities and routes to `createSession`. The default `--allow-cors=false` only blocks READING the response; it does not block the session-creation side effect.
Details
Affected package: `@appium/base-driver@10.8.2` (`appium@3.9.0`). Verified at commit
`2c2820242ffdbc450025d4963cff7b17a7e5a7d3`.
Missing control: there is no Origin/Sec-Fetch/Host check on the HTTP path. The only origin check is
WebSocket-only at `express/middleware.ts:126-127` (added by `e967b60`). The warning at
`appium/lib/bootstrap/appium-main-runner.ts:107-114` fires only when CORS is ENABLED, encoding the
incorrect assumption that CORS-off protects the HTTP path.
Root cause: the server relies on the browser Same-Origin Policy / `--allow-cors` as its only
cross-origin defense. SOP/CORS gate response READS, not state-changing request side effects. With no
CSRF token and no Origin/Sec-Fetch/Host validation, a cross-origin "simple request" POST executes.
Impact
Who is impacted: anyone running Appium in its default config on a machine whose user also browses the
web — typical dev workstations and CI nodes — and multi-tenant/ intranet deployments.
Any website the victim visits can force Appium to create sessions with attacker-chosen
capabilities, with no authentication, in the default configuration — shown via `curl` and a real
headless browser. The response is not cross-origin readable (blind CSRF), so confidentiality is unchanged.
Workarounds
The vulnerability relies on the attacker being aware of the URL, port and base path on which the Appium server is running.
Server hosts can set non-default values for the server URL (`--address`), port (`--port`), and/or base path (`--base-path`) in order to reduce the risk of being affected.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npm@appium/base-driver |
Sin parche | — | — | 10.8.3 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/appium/appium/security/advisories/GHSA-7c8p-946q-cm7cLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
