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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nukeviet/nukeviet

GHSA-7F2F-2H5V-CQ8P

Cross-Site Request Forgery in admin delete handlers accepting GET requests

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición50 dDesde la divulgación, 1 oct 2026, 7:11 p. m.
Detección48 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Paso a paso, como subiendo al Cotopaxi.Nivel de alerta: llama mascando hierba.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
2 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
2 oct 26
14 oct 26
27 oct 26
8 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-7F2F-2H5V-CQ8P divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Several NukeViet CMS administration handlers performed state-changing database operations in response to `GET` requests without carrying a per-request anti-CSRF token. Because the framework's cross-site origin check applies to `POST` — the correct design, since `GET` is defined as a safe method by RFC 9110 §9.2.1 — handlers that violated that contract were left outside every CSRF control.

The contact module deletion handler was the most severe instance: a single `GET` request truncated all stored contact submissions and replies. An attacker who persuaded an authenticated contact administrator to follow a link could destroy all contact data without holding any account of their own.

Details

The affected handlers read their action trigger from the query string and executed destructive SQL with no token check:

| Handler | Input source | Operation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `modules/contact/admin/del.php` | `t` from `get` | `t=3` → `TRUNCATE` of `*_contact_send` and `*_contact_reply`; `t=1&id=N` → single-row `DELETE` |
| `modules/comment/admin/del.php` | `list` from `post,get` | `DELETE` of comments by `cid` |
| `modules/news/admin/topicdelnews.php` | `list` from `post,get` | `UPDATE ... SET topicid=0`, unassigning articles from a topic |

For the contact handler, `GET` was the intended transport — the administration UI triggered it through `window.location`. For the comment and news handlers the UI already used `POST`; accepting `post,get` widened them unnecessarily and discarded the framework's protection.

The root cause is a violation of HTTP safe-method semantics in application code, not a gap in the framework. `vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php` behaves as intended and is not modified by this fix: cross-origin `POST` is covered by its `Origin`/`Referer` check, and every method beyond `GET`/`HEAD`/`POST` is covered by the browser-enforced CORS preflight.

Exploitation. The session cookie ships with `SameSite=Lax` by default. `Lax` blocks cross-site sub-resource requests, so an `<img>`-based forgery does not work against a default installation; it does, by design, send cookies on top-level `GET` navigation. A plain link, a `meta refresh`, or an HTTP redirect was therefore sufficient. The `str_referer_blocker` setting is disabled by default and, when enabled, only rejects requests that carry a foreign `Referer` — an attacker suppressing the header with `rel="noreferrer"` bypassed it. Administrative session validation (`nv_admin_checkip`, `nv_admin_checkfirewall`, `nv_admin_checkdata`) verifies the client IP, user agent, and session check number, all of which match because the request originates from the victim's own browser.

Impact

An attacker with no account on the target site could cause an authenticated administrator's browser to perform destructive actions:

  • Contact module — complete and irreversible loss of all stored contact submissions and replies.
  • Comment module — deletion of comments by identifier.
  • News module — articles unassigned from a topic.

Exploitation requires the victim to be signed in with administrative access to the affected module and to follow an attacker-supplied link. There is no confidentiality impact; no data is disclosed to the attacker.

Affected Versions
  • NukeViet CMS 4.6.x — 4.6.01 and earlier
  • NukeViet CMS 4.5.x — 4.5.11 and earlier
Patched Versions
  • NukeViet CMS 4.6.02
  • NukeViet CMS 4.5.12
Remediation

Update to a patched release. The fix moves the affected actions to `POST` and adds token validation:

  • `modules/contact/admin/del.php` now requires `POST`, validates a `csrf_check()` token, and restricts `t` to a known set of actions.
  • `modules/comment/admin/del.php` and `modules/news/admin/topicdelnews.php` now read their input from `POST` only.

Workaround. Administrators who cannot update immediately can set the session cookie policy to `Strict` (Settings → Configuration → `cookie SameSite`). Unlike the default `Lax`, `Strict` withholds the session cookie on cross-site top-level navigation, so a forged link arrives unauthenticated. The trade-off is that any legitimate inbound link from an external site — search results, e-mail, chat — also arrives signed out until the user navigates within the site.

Restricting the administration area by IP does not mitigate this issue: the forged request originates from the victim administrator's own browser and therefore from an already-permitted address.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nukeviet/nukeviet≤ 4.6.01
4.6.01
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnukeviet/nukeviet
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/security/advisories/GHSA-7f2f-2h5v-cq8p

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.