GHSA-7G7C-H8RR-7P6Q
Angular SSR: Path Traversal to Sibling Directories in CommonEngine on Windows
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 20.3.36 | @angular/ssr · -33 d desde divulgación | |
| Remediación | Parche 21.2.23 | @angular/ssr · -33 d desde divulgación | |
| Remediación | Parche 22.1.7 | @angular/ssr · -33 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-7G7C-H8RR-7P6Q divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.
The vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:
- A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.
- The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\app-admin`.
- The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\app-admin\index.html`).
- The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(publicPath))`) performs a prefix match without a trailing path delimiter. Because the sibling folder name starts with the configured public folder name (e.g., `dist\app-admin` starts with `dist\app`), the check erroneously succeeds.
- If the target file exists and contains the Angular SSG marker (`ng-server-context="...ssg..."`), `CommonEngine` reads and serves the sibling page instead of rendering the requested route.
Impact
This vulnerability allows unauthorized access to prerendered static pages from adjacent applications or build outputs:
- Information Disclosure: Prerendered HTML pages located in sibling directories sharing the same name prefix as the public directory (e.g., an internal administration app `app-admin` adjacent to `app`) can be accessed by unauthorized users.
- Limited Scope: Only HTML files matching the Angular SSG marker regex are served. Arbitrary non-Angular files, secrets, or configuration files without the SSG context attribute cannot be read through this mechanism.
Attack Preconditions
- The application must use `CommonEngine` from `@angular/ssr/node` (or `@angular/ssr` in v17–v18).
- The application must be hosted on Windows (where Node's `path.join` resolves `\` as a path separator).
- The application passes a relative request URL (such as `req.url` or `req.originalUrl` without origin) into `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.
- A sibling directory exists whose name starts with the same prefix as the configured `publicPath` directory (e.g., `dist\app-admin` alongside `dist\app`).
- The targeted sibling directory contains prerendered HTML output containing the Angular SSG marker.
Affected Versions
- `>= 22.0.0, < 22.1.7`
- `>= 21.0.0, < 21.2.23`
- `>= 20.0.0, < 20.3.36`
- `<= 19.2.27`
Patches
- `22.1.7`
- `21.2.23`
- `20.3.36`
> Versions `<= 19.2.27` have reached End of Support / LTS expiration and will not be patched.
Workarounds
Until a patch is applied, developers using `CommonEngine` on Windows can sanitize request URLs in `server.ts` before passing them to `CommonEngine.render`, ensuring backslashes are replaced or that an absolute HTTP URL is constructed:
server.use((req, res, next) => {
const { protocol, originalUrl, headers } = req;
// Normalize backslashes or construct a full HTTP URL (which forces WHATWG URL normalization)
const sanitizedUrl = `${protocol}://${headers.host}${originalUrl.replace(/\\/g, '/')}`;
commonEngine
.render({
bootstrap,
documentFilePath: indexHtml,
url: sanitizedUrl,
publicPath: distFolder,
})
.then((html) => res.send(html))
.catch((err) => next(err));
});Alternatively, migrate from the deprecated `CommonEngine` to `AngularNodeAppEngine`, which relies on manifest-based route matching rather than direct filesystem path resolution.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npm@angular/ssr |
Corregida | 20.3.36, 21.2.23, 22.1.7 | -33 d · -33 d · -33 d | 22.2.7 no afectada |
20.3.3621.2.2322.1.7Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104871https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6qhttps://github.com/angular/angular-cli/commit/645e41a47d21b7651837a4250de99af0509626e2https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/commit/70748ca8e76fe4b42798719410336119d943e755https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/commit/bb72145f9ab45aee29f523236b3a25cd0813a841https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/commit/c3e5982e49705f0f6a913cb94622b4c555d2d914https://github.com/angular/angular-clihttps://github.com/angular/angular-cli/releases/tag/v20.3.36https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/releases/tag/v21.2.23https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/releases/tag/v22.1.7Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
