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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

GHSA-7PJW-6V4G-F837

2FA-removal endpoint lacks brute-force lockout (residual gap, incomplete fix of CVE-2026-76213)

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CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión4.2.0
Exposición48 dDesde la divulgación, 3 oct 2026, 6:28 a. m.
Detección48 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
3 oct 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
3 oct 26
15 oct 26
27 oct 26
8 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-7PJW-6V4G-F837 divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

CVE-2026-76213's fix (commit `59593a013`) added proper brute-force lockout
(`isTwoFactorLockedOut()` / `twoFactorFailure()`) to three login-flow 2FA verification entry
points:

  • `Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php` (`/check`)
  • `Controller/Administration/AuthenticationController.php`
  • `Controller/Frontend/Api/WebAuthnController.php`

A fourth endpoint that also calls `TwoFactor::validateToken()` —
`Controller/Frontend/Api/UserController.php::removeTwofactorConfig()`
(`POST /api/user/remove-twofactor`) — was not included in that hardening. It has no lockout at
all: an already-authenticated session can submit an unlimited number of guesses for the 2FA
code and permanently disable the account's 2FA once the correct one is found.

This endpoint's `validateToken()` call was itself only added later (commit `9d31dd73`, fixing
GHSA-h96g-59xp-7r5m's "no code verification at all"), which is why the July lockout hardening
never touched it — the code check this report is about didn't exist yet when that hardening
landed.

Affected / Environment
  • Component: `Controller/Frontend/Api/UserController.php::removeTwofactorConfig()`,
  • Affected versions: verified on `main`, HEAD `e623c505` (2026-09-20), i.e. post-dating
  • Reproduced against a fresh install built from the project's own `docker-compose.yml`
Root cause

`removeTwofactorConfig()`:

if ((int) $this->currentUser->getUserData('twofactor_enabled') === 1) {
    $code = trim(Filter::filterVar($data->code ?? null, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS, ''));
    if (!$twoFactor->validateToken($code, $this->currentUser->getUserId())) {
        return $this->json(['error' => ...], Response::HTTP_FORBIDDEN);
    }
    // ... disables 2FA
}

`validateToken()` (post the Sept-13 hardening) only rejects a code already accepted in the
same 30-second time slice (replay prevention) — it has no attempt counter and no lockout:

if (!$this->twoFactorAuth->verifyCode($secret, $token, self::VERIFY_DISCREPANCY)) {
    return false;
}
$slice = intdiv(time(), self::PERIOD);
if ($slice <= $this->lastAcceptedSlice($userId)) {
    return false;
}
return $this->rememberAcceptedSlice($userId, $slice);

Neither this method nor its caller ever calls `isTwoFactorLockedOut()` / `twoFactorFailure()`,
the mechanism the three sibling endpoints use.

We also checked whether a generic layer covers this gap: `EventListener/ApiRateLimiterListener.php`
explicitly exempts any route whose name starts with `api.private.`, and
`removeTwofactorConfig()`'s route is named `api.private.user.remove-twofactor` — so it is
structurally excluded from the one rate limiter this codebase has.

Reproduction (fresh install, verified 2026-09-21)
  1. Installed phpMyFAQ from a clean clone via the real setup wizard
  2. Enabled real TOTP 2FA on the admin account (RFC 6238 secret), logged in with the correct
  3. Control group — reset the failure counter, then sent 7 consecutive wrong-code

```
attempt 1-6: Location: ./token?user-id=1 (login_attempts incrementing 1→6 in the DB)
attempt 7: Location: ./login (lockout fired — MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS=5 exceeded)
```

  1. Target — logged back in successfully (correct password + correct TOTP), fetched the

```
$ for i in 1..20: POST /api/user/remove-twofactor {"csrfToken":"<real>","code":"<random 6 digits>"}
→ every single one: HTTP 403 {"error":"You entered a wrong code!"}
```

No lockout, no throttling, no degradation across all 20 attempts — direct contrast with
the control group's 6-attempt lockout above.

  1. Rate-limiter liveness check — hammered a public API route
  1. Endgame — computed the real TOTP code for the current 30-second slice and submitted

```
$ POST /api/user/remove-twofactor {"csrfToken":"<real>","code":"<real TOTP>"}
→ HTTP 200 {"success":"The deletion of the current 2-factor configuration was successful."}
```

Confirmed via direct DB query that `faquserdata.twofactor_enabled` flipped `1 → 0`. A
subsequent password-only login (`POST /authenticate`) went straight to `Location: ./`
with no 2FA prompt at all — full, persistent 2FA downgrade, reproduced end-to-end on a
brand-new install, not inferred from code reading.

Impact

Threat model, stated explicitly: this is not an unauthenticated bypass. It requires
`isLoggedIn()` — an already-authenticated victim session — plus the `remove-twofactor` CSRF
token (obtainable by an attacker who already has that session, e.g. via XSS or a stolen
cookie). Given that precondition, it is a persistence / downgrade attack: an attacker with
a temporary foothold can permanently strip 2FA from the account with no rate limit on the
guess, converting a transient session compromise into a durable one that survives password
resets and outlasts the original session. The vendor's own commit history shows this class of
attack (brute-forcing a 2FA code) is already treated as worth guarding against — it was simply
missed on this one call site. This is also not an opt-in/insecure-configuration issue: 2FA is
a security feature the account owner turns *on*, and the gap reproduces on a fresh install
with default settings (rate limiter included).

Suggested patch

Reuse the existing `isTwoFactorLockedOut()` / `twoFactorFailure()` mechanism (already present
in `AuthenticationController.php` and `WebAuthnController.php`) in
`removeTwofactorConfig()`, keyed the same way (per-user or per-session, matching whatever the
sibling endpoints use) before calling `validateToken()`:

 if ((int) $this->currentUser->getUserData('twofactor_enabled') === 1) {
+    if ($this->currentUser->isTwoFactorLockedOut()) {
+        return $this->json(['error' => Translation::get(key: 'msgTwofactorLockedOut')],
+            Response::HTTP_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
     $code = trim(Filter::filterVar($data->code ?? null, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS, ''));
     if (!$twoFactor->validateToken($code, $this->currentUser->getUserId())) {
+        $this->currentUser->twoFactorFailure();
         return $this->json(['error' => ...], Response::HTTP_FORBIDDEN);
     }
Related history
GHSA-h96g-59xp-7r5m   removeTwofactorConfig() required no code verification at all
     ↓ fixed by (9d31dd73, Aug 15)
                      required a validateToken() call before disabling 2FA
CVE-2026-76213        login-flow 2FA verification had a session-scoped, easily-reset
                      brute-force counter
     ↓ fixed by (59593a013, Jul 31)
                      proper isTwoFactorLockedOut()/twoFactorFailure() lockout added to
                      3 login-flow entry points — predates 9d31dd73, so this 4th call
                      site didn't exist yet when the lockout logic was written
     ↓ this report
                      removeTwofactorConfig() still has zero lockout on validateToken()
Disclosure

Happy to follow your coordinated-disclosure process (90-day default per your policy).

Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).

AI Use Disclosure

AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and
script development. I reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq≥ 4.1.0 < 4.2.0
4.1.0
4.2.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistphpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
Corregida 4.2.0 — —
Versiones corregidas4.2.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-7pjw-6v4g-f837

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.