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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/dexidp/dex

GHSA-7QJX-GP9H-65QJ

Dex: Token-exchange endpoint is missing AllowedConnectors enforcement

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versióncommit 204dbb2
Exposición163 dDesde la divulgación, 9 jun 2026, 4:59 p. m.
Detección160 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
9 jun 26
25 jun 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
9 jun 26
20 jul 26
30 ago 26
10 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-7QJX-GP9H-65QJ divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`server/handlers.go::handleTokenExchange` (lines 1804-1893) does not call `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` before issuing tokens, while sibling handlers do. This is a per-client connector ACL gap on the token-exchange endpoint; the redirect-flow paths enforce the same field correctly.

Affected code path

`handleTokenExchange` reads `connector_id` from the request body at `server/handlers.go:1822`. Validators called between read and token issuance:

  • `s.getConnector(ctx, connID)` at line 1836 - confirms connector exists
  • `GrantTypeAllowed(conn.GrantTypes, grantTypeTokenExchange)` at line 1842 - confirms connector permits this grant
  • (missing) `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` - never called

Tokens are issued at lines 1887 / 1889, bound to `client.ID` carrying claims derived from `connID`.

Sibling handlers DO enforce the check:

  • `server/handlers.go::handleConnectorLogin:377` - calls `isConnectorAllowed`, returns HTTP 403 "Connector not allowed for this client." (line 380).
  • `server/oauth2.go::parseAuthorizationRequest:535` - same enforcement for the authorization-code flow.

The doc-string at `storage/storage.go:192-194` reads:

> *AllowedConnectors is a list of connector IDs that the client is allowed to use for authentication. If empty, all connectors are allowed.*

The phrasing is unconditional - a permission ACL, not a UX filter.

Impact (concrete scenario)

  • Connector `corp-okta` - high-trust, gates production access
  • Connector `dev-google` - low-trust, internal Gmail
  • Client `dev-app` configured with `allowedConnectors: ["dev-google"]` (admin intent: dev-app only sees dev-google identities)
  • `dev-app`s client secret leaks (CI artifact, env file, breached service-account secret store)

Without the bug, the leaked secret would only allow the attacker to mint tokens via `dev-google` - blast radius bounded by what any dev-google user can already do.

With the bug, an attacker holding their own legitimate `corp-okta` ID token sends:

POST /token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange
&client_id=dev-app
&client_secret=<leaked>
&connector_id=corp-okta
&subject_token=<attackers own corp-okta id token>
&subject_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token
&scope=openid+groups

Dex returns an ID token signed by Dex, `aud=dev-app`, carrying the attackers `corp-okta` groups. Downstream services trusting tokens issued for `dev-app` see the attacker as a `corp-okta` user - a combination the admins policy explicitly forbade.

Severity (self-assessed)

CVSS 3.1 vector: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N` -> 8.7 HIGH.

The `PR:H` precondition is a real reduction (requires leaked confidential client_secret PLUS attacker holding a `subject_token` from a forbidden connector that has token-exchange enabled). Defer to your scoring - HIGH and MEDIUM are both defensible.

Affected version

`master` only - not yet in any released tag. Latest release `v2.45.1` (2026-03-03) predates PR #4610 (commit `f80a89d`, 2026-03-11) which introduced `AllowedConnectors`. Production deployments on stable releases are NOT affected; deployments pulling from master / nightly images are. A fix can be merged ahead of the next release without an embargo for past versions.

Precedent / lineage

  • PR #4610 (commit `f80a89d`, 2026-03-11) - added the `AllowedConnectors` field, `isConnectorAllowed`, `filterConnectors`, and the redirect-flow check sites (`handleConnectorLogin:377`, `parseAuthorizationRequest:535`). Did not modify `handleTokenExchange`.
  • PR #4619 (commit `7777773`, 2026-03-11, same author, one day earlier) - added `GrantTypeAllowed(conn.GrantTypes, grantTypeTokenExchange)` to `handleTokenExchange`. Added a connector-side grant-type gate but did not add the symmetric client-side connector ACL.

Suggested fix

Insert `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` between the existing `getConnector` / `GrantTypeAllowed` checks and the connector cast at line 1847, returning HTTP 403 via the token-endpoint error helper. Mirror the existing patterns at `handlers.go:377-380` and `oauth2.go:535`. One-block addition.

Verification methodology

Two-stage verification per IRIS / XBOW pattern (LLM-assisted research with non-LLM verifier as last stage):

  1. Code-mechanics - independent cold-read of `server/handlers.go`, `server/oauth2.go`, `storage/storage.go` confirmed the missing check at `handleTokenExchange` and the present checks at the two siblings; cross-checked diffs of PR #4610 (`f80a89d`) and PR #4619 (`7777773`).
  2. External grounding - cross-checked `docs/configuration/customization`, `docs/guides/token-exchange/`, RFC 8693 (which defers per-client policy to implementations), `.github/SECURITY.md`, GHSA dashboard, huntr.com, and existing issues including #3546 (different mechanism: connector-level disable list, orthogonal to this finding). No prior public report of this gap was found.

`semgrep` (`p/golang` + `p/security-audit`) on `server/` returned no ERROR-severity findings - the static tool cannot detect missing-validator gaps; evidence rests on file:line grep + sibling-handler comparison above.

Reporter

Matteo Panzeri (GitHub: @matte1782, contact: matteo1782@gmail.com). Please credit as Matteo Panzeri if a CVE is requested.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/dexidp/dex< 0.0.0-20260303131938-204dbb2e3ff7
0.0.0-20260303131938-204dbb2e3ff7
v2.13.0+incompatible
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/dexidp/dex
Corregida commit 204dbb2 — v2.13.0+incompatible no afectada
Versiones corregidascommit 204dbb2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/dexidp/dex/security/advisories/GHSA-7qjx-gp9h-65qj
Otrahttps://github.com/dexidp/dex/commit/204dbb2e3ff7692af3b7ca4362b1ee46fb43c227
Otrahttps://github.com/dexidp/dex

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