GHSA-7QJX-GP9H-65QJ
Dex: Token-exchange endpoint is missing AllowedConnectors enforcement
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-7QJX-GP9H-65QJ divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
`server/handlers.go::handleTokenExchange` (lines 1804-1893) does not call `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` before issuing tokens, while sibling handlers do. This is a per-client connector ACL gap on the token-exchange endpoint; the redirect-flow paths enforce the same field correctly.
Affected code path
`handleTokenExchange` reads `connector_id` from the request body at `server/handlers.go:1822`. Validators called between read and token issuance:
- `s.getConnector(ctx, connID)` at line 1836 - confirms connector exists
- `GrantTypeAllowed(conn.GrantTypes, grantTypeTokenExchange)` at line 1842 - confirms connector permits this grant
- (missing) `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` - never called
Tokens are issued at lines 1887 / 1889, bound to `client.ID` carrying claims derived from `connID`.
Sibling handlers DO enforce the check:
- `server/handlers.go::handleConnectorLogin:377` - calls `isConnectorAllowed`, returns HTTP 403 "Connector not allowed for this client." (line 380).
- `server/oauth2.go::parseAuthorizationRequest:535` - same enforcement for the authorization-code flow.
The doc-string at `storage/storage.go:192-194` reads:
> *AllowedConnectors is a list of connector IDs that the client is allowed to use for authentication. If empty, all connectors are allowed.*
The phrasing is unconditional - a permission ACL, not a UX filter.
Impact (concrete scenario)
- Connector `corp-okta` - high-trust, gates production access
- Connector `dev-google` - low-trust, internal Gmail
- Client `dev-app` configured with `allowedConnectors: ["dev-google"]` (admin intent: dev-app only sees dev-google identities)
- `dev-app`s client secret leaks (CI artifact, env file, breached service-account secret store)
Without the bug, the leaked secret would only allow the attacker to mint tokens via `dev-google` - blast radius bounded by what any dev-google user can already do.
With the bug, an attacker holding their own legitimate `corp-okta` ID token sends:
POST /token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange
&client_id=dev-app
&client_secret=<leaked>
&connector_id=corp-okta
&subject_token=<attackers own corp-okta id token>
&subject_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token
&scope=openid+groupsDex returns an ID token signed by Dex, `aud=dev-app`, carrying the attackers `corp-okta` groups. Downstream services trusting tokens issued for `dev-app` see the attacker as a `corp-okta` user - a combination the admins policy explicitly forbade.
Severity (self-assessed)
CVSS 3.1 vector: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N` -> 8.7 HIGH.
The `PR:H` precondition is a real reduction (requires leaked confidential client_secret PLUS attacker holding a `subject_token` from a forbidden connector that has token-exchange enabled). Defer to your scoring - HIGH and MEDIUM are both defensible.
Affected version
`master` only - not yet in any released tag. Latest release `v2.45.1` (2026-03-03) predates PR #4610 (commit `f80a89d`, 2026-03-11) which introduced `AllowedConnectors`. Production deployments on stable releases are NOT affected; deployments pulling from master / nightly images are. A fix can be merged ahead of the next release without an embargo for past versions.
Precedent / lineage
- PR #4610 (commit `f80a89d`, 2026-03-11) - added the `AllowedConnectors` field, `isConnectorAllowed`, `filterConnectors`, and the redirect-flow check sites (`handleConnectorLogin:377`, `parseAuthorizationRequest:535`). Did not modify `handleTokenExchange`.
- PR #4619 (commit `7777773`, 2026-03-11, same author, one day earlier) - added `GrantTypeAllowed(conn.GrantTypes, grantTypeTokenExchange)` to `handleTokenExchange`. Added a connector-side grant-type gate but did not add the symmetric client-side connector ACL.
Suggested fix
Insert `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` between the existing `getConnector` / `GrantTypeAllowed` checks and the connector cast at line 1847, returning HTTP 403 via the token-endpoint error helper. Mirror the existing patterns at `handlers.go:377-380` and `oauth2.go:535`. One-block addition.
Verification methodology
Two-stage verification per IRIS / XBOW pattern (LLM-assisted research with non-LLM verifier as last stage):
- Code-mechanics - independent cold-read of `server/handlers.go`, `server/oauth2.go`, `storage/storage.go` confirmed the missing check at `handleTokenExchange` and the present checks at the two siblings; cross-checked diffs of PR #4610 (`f80a89d`) and PR #4619 (`7777773`).
- External grounding - cross-checked `docs/configuration/customization`, `docs/guides/token-exchange/`, RFC 8693 (which defers per-client policy to implementations), `.github/SECURITY.md`, GHSA dashboard, huntr.com, and existing issues including #3546 (different mechanism: connector-level disable list, orthogonal to this finding). No prior public report of this gap was found.
`semgrep` (`p/golang` + `p/security-audit`) on `server/` returned no ERROR-severity findings - the static tool cannot detect missing-validator gaps; evidence rests on file:line grep + sibling-handler comparison above.
Reporter
Matteo Panzeri (GitHub: @matte1782, contact: matteo1782@gmail.com). Please credit as Matteo Panzeri if a CVE is requested.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/dexidp/dex |
Corregida | commit 204dbb2 | — | v2.13.0+incompatible no afectada |
commit 204dbb2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/dexidp/dex/security/advisories/GHSA-7qjx-gp9h-65qjhttps://github.com/dexidp/dex/commit/204dbb2e3ff7692af3b7ca4362b1ee46fb43c227https://github.com/dexidp/dexLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
