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Advisory · GitHub · npm · capgo

GHSA-83F5-439G-PWMJ

Login CSRF / Session Fixation: console.capgo.app/login accepts access_token + refresh_token in URL query and auto-authenticates

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión12.128.2
Exposición261 dDesde la divulgación, 3 mar 2026, 8:31 a. m.
Detección260 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
3 mar 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
3 mar 26
7 may 26
12 jul 26
15 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-83F5-439G-PWMJ divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
https://console.capgo.app/login automatically authenticates a user when access_token and refresh_token are provided in the URL query string. Opening a crafted link in a fresh/incognito browser profile results in immediate login without user interaction. This enables login CSRF / session fixation (forcing a victim into an attacker-controlled session) and increases the risk of token exposure because tokens are accepted in query parameters.

### Details
In the webapp code, the login route parses tokens directly from the URL query parameters and sets the Supabase session:

- File: src/pages/login.vue
- Function: checkLogin()
- Logic:
_Reads access_token / refresh_token from new URLSearchParams(parsedUrl.search)
Calls supabase.auth.setSession({ access_token, refresh_token })
Proceeds to nextLogin()_

Because this happens automatically, any user who clicks a crafted link can be logged into the session represented by those tokens.
### PoC
1. Obtain valid access_token and refresh_token for a test account (my own session).
2. Open this URL in an incognito/new browser profile (no existing session/localStorage):

https://console.capgo.app/login?access_token=<ACCESS_TOKEN>&refresh_token=<REFRESH_TOKEN>
  1. Result: the browser auto-logs in as the token owner (no prompt/confirmation).
Impact

- Login CSRF / session fixation: attacker can force a victim to adopt an attacker-controlled authenticated session by sending a crafted link.
- Token exposure risk: query-string tokens are more likely to be logged/stored (reverse proxies, analytics, browser history, screenshots) than URL fragments.
- Can lead to user confusion and actions performed under attacker session context.
### Recommended remediation
- Do not accept auth tokens via query parameters.
- Rely on standard provider flows (URL fragment only) and clear any fragment immediately after handling (history.replaceState).
- Bind token processing to an unguessable state/nonce and require explicit user confirmation before setting a session from URL-provided tokens.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
capgo< 12.128.2
12.128.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmcapgo
Corregida 12.128.2 — —
Versiones corregidas12.128.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisories/GHSA-83f5-439g-pwmj

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.