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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · langflow

GHSA-8C4J-F57C-35CF

Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -211 d de la divulgación
Exposición237 dDesde la divulgación, 27 mar 2026, 2:36 p. m.
Detección234 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.5.1 +1
Monitoreo
Detectada
28 ago 25
27 mar 26
13 jul 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
28 ago 25
18 dic 25
9 abr 26
30 jul 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 1.5.1 langflow · -211 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 0.5.1 langflow-base · -211 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8C4J-F57C-35CF divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Vulnerability

IDOR in `GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/flow/{flow_id}`

The `_read_flow` helper in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py` branched on the `AUTO_LOGIN` setting to decide whether to filter by `user_id`. When `AUTO_LOGIN` was `False` (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check — the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it.

This exposed any authenticated user to:

  • Read any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys
  • Modify the logic of another user's AI agents
  • Delete flows belonging to other users

The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to accommodate public/example flows (those with `user_id = NULL`) under auto-login mode, but inadvertently left the authenticated path without an ownership filter.

---

Fix (PR #8956)

The fix removes the `AUTO_LOGIN` conditional entirely and unconditionally scopes the query to the requesting user:

-    auth_settings = settings_service.auth_settings
-    stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.id == flow_id)
-    if auth_settings.AUTO_LOGIN:
-        stmt = stmt.where(
-            (Flow.user_id == user_id) | (Flow.user_id == None)  # noqa: E711
-        )
+    stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.id == flow_id).where(Flow.user_id == user_id)

All three operations — read, update, and delete — route through `_read_flow`, so the single change covers the full attack surface. A cross-user isolation test (`test_read_flows_user_isolation`) was added to prevent regression.

---

Acknowledgements

Langflow thanks the security researcher who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability:

  • @chximn-dt https://github.com/chximn-dt
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
langflow-base< 0.5.1
langflow< 1.5.1
0.5.1
1.5.1
1.13.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypilangflow
Corregida 1.5.1 -211 d 1.13.2 no afectada
pypilangflow-base
Corregida 0.5.1 -211 d 1.13.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.5.11.5.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34046
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-8c4j-f57c-35cf
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/8956
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow

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