llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-8FG2-3GPC-X8M7

Multiple stored cross-site scripting vulnerabilities across the web UI, API and log tables

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
9.3
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.2.0.3
Exposición88 dDesde la divulgación, 24 ago 2026, 12:58 p. m.
Detección86 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Esto en un informe de auditoría se ve feísimo.Que no te agarre el lunes sin parchear.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
24 ago 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
24 ago 26
15 sept 26
8 oct 26
30 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8FG2-3GPC-X8M7 divulgada · CVSS 9.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Sixteen stored cross-site scripting vulnerabilities affect TeamPass releases before 3.2.0.3. They
share five root causes: a client-side purifier that could be bypassed, log tables serialised by
string concatenation instead of `json_encode()`, client-side code that reversed the server's own
output escaping, user-controlled values concatenated into HTML strings, and a session value echoed
into a JavaScript comment.

Most require an authenticated account with item, folder, role or import access. One does not: an
unauthenticated attacker can seed a payload into the failed-login log through a proxy header.

Impact

A stored payload executes in the browser of another user — in several cases specifically an
administrator or manager, since the affected screens are the administration, log and user-rights
views. Execution happens in the TeamPass origin, which for a password manager means the victim's
authenticated session and everything reachable from it.

Details

1. Client-side purifier bypass — 3 issues

`prepareExchangedData(…, 'decode', …)` routes every AJAX response through `purifyData()` →
`simplePurifier()`. That function decoded HTML entities and then skipped DOMPurify entirely
whenever the decoded string contained the substring `img`, handing the decoded markup back to the
caller. Every screen inserting the result with jQuery `.html()` / `.append()` rendered it as live
markup.

Reached through the item-description preview in the folder item list, the item search results
(`label`, `description`, `folder`), and the per-user visible-folders view (`folder.title`).

*Fix:* the `includes("img")` clause was removed, so DOMPurify is always applied.

2. Log tables built by manual JSON concatenation — 4 issues

Several `sources/logs.datatables.php` responses were assembled by string concatenation rather than
`json_encode()`. HTML escaping (`htmlspecialchars()` / `secureOutput()`) does not make a value safe
in a JSON string context and leaves backslashes untouched, so a stored value carrying a literal
`<img src=x onerror=…>` sequence survives storage, is turned into real `<` and `>` by the
browser's JSON parser, and is then rendered as HTML by DataTables. No literal angle bracket ever
exists for the HTML encoder to catch.

Reached through background-task display values, `send_email` task recipient names
(`receiver_name`, `login`, `email`, `receivers` — the last one settable through item email sharing)
and item labels in the finished-task and log tables.

*Fix:* a `tpDatatableJsonCell()` helper (`json_encode` with the `JSON_HEX_*` flags) is applied to
every user-controlled cell.

3. Client-side reversal of server-side escaping — 2 issues

`app/pages/utilities.logs.js.php` ran `decodeHtmlEntities()` over columns that the server had
deliberately escaped with `htmlspecialchars()`, then returned the result as DataTables HTML cell
content — undoing the server's output encoding immediately before insertion.

Reached through the Connections log (user `name`, `lastname`, `login`, which LDAP/OAuth
provisioning can supply) and the failed-login log's IP column.

The IP column is the most severe of the batch. Failed logins call `logEvents()` with an empty
actor, which falls back to `getClientIpServer()`; that helper trusted proxy headers such as
`X-Forwarded-For` without validating that the value was an IP address. An unauthenticated
attacker could therefore store markup by sending one failed login attempt, and it executed when a
privileged user opened the failed-login log.

*Fix:* the renderers now decode for readability and re-escape before insertion
(`$('<div/>').text(decodeHtmlEntities(data)).html()`), and `getClientIpServer()` validates every
proxy-header candidate with `FILTER_VALIDATE_IP` before accepting it, falling back to
`REMOTE_ADDR`.

4. User-controlled values concatenated into HTML strings — 6 issues

Six screens built markup by concatenation and inserted it with `.html()` / `.append()`, or passed
it to Toastr (which treats messages as HTML by default), with no escaping:

| Screen | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Subfolder list in the items view | `folder.title` |
| Per-user folder-rights role badges | `role.title` |
| Admin transparent-recovery statistics modal | `event.login` |
| Item-deleted WebSocket toast | `data.label` |
| Backup administration list | `tp_files_version`, read verbatim from a `.meta.json` sidecar |
| Item list | `fa_icon`, settable through the API `icon` parameter and rendered inside a `class` attribute |

*Fix:* escaping at the sink (`htmlEncode()` / `escapeHtml()` / `escapeAttribute()`), plus
server-side allow-listing of `fa_icon` in `ItemModel` on both create and update, and a
version-format check on backup metadata. The same change also corrected the `item_deleted`
WebSocket event to target the item's real `id_tree` instead of the caller-supplied `folder_id`.

5. Session language echoed into a JavaScript comment — 1 issue

`app/pages/items.js.php` echoed the session language into a `//` comment, encoded with
`htmlspecialchars()` — an HTML-context encoder that does not escape JavaScript line terminators. A
stored `user_language` containing a newline terminated the comment and injected executable
JavaScript into the page.

*Fix:* the comment is static, and the inline `user_language` update is constrained to an
allow-list built from the `languages` table.

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.0.3 by commit `34b1316d7` ("Fix stored XSS across web UI, API and log tables"),
which touches `app/includes/js/functions.js`, `app/includes/js/teampass-websocket-init.js`,
`app/pages/{admin,backups,items,users,utilities.logs}.js.php`,
`app/sources/{backup.functions,backups.queries,items.queries,logs.datatables,main.functions,users.queries}.php`,
`app/api/Model/ItemModel.php` and the served copies under `public/assets/js/`.

Upgrade to the latest release.

Workarounds

None. The affected code paths are core UI and logging; the only remedy is to upgrade.

Relationship to other advisories

Distinct from GHSA-r298-6mxv-j9hc (raw item labels stored by the API and rendered in the
recycle-bin listing, fixed in 3.2.1.0) and from GHSA-9g8h-6qg5-cmhx (residual encoding defects
still live in 3.2.1.5, fixed in 3.2.1.6). The version ranges do not overlap and the affected sinks
are different.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass< 3.2.0.3
3.2.0.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Corregida 3.2.0.3 — —
Versiones corregidas3.2.0.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-8fg2-3gpc-x8m7

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.