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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-8GR9-59P6-R488

Anonymous visitors can bypass the image pixel limit when image URL actions are enabled

Parche disponible
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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones1.7.53.5 · 2.2.2
Exposición45 dDesde la divulgación, 4 oct 2026, 8:54 p. m.
Detección44 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
5 oct 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
5 oct 26
16 oct 26
27 oct 26
8 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8GR9-59P6-R488 divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
When `system.images.url_actions` is enabled, the `system.images.max_pixels` limit only checked the width and height written in the query string, and only when both were present. A resize given one dimension or a percentage (`image.jpg?forceResize=46000`, `?forceResize=4600%`), a `zoomCrop` whose box is small but whose intermediate canvas is not (`?zoomCrop=46000,1`), or a chain of actions all passed the check. That let an anonymous visitor make GD allocate a canvas of up to about 2 billion pixels (roughly 8.6 GB) per request.

## Affected versions
Grav 2.0.0-rc.8 through 2.2.1, and 1.7.53 through 1.7.53.4, on sites that have turned on `system.images.url_actions`. It is off by default, but the migrate-grav plugin turns it on for migrated sites whose content uses query-string image transforms.

## Details
`Grav::fallbackUrl()` rejected a resize only when `width > 0 && height > 0 && width * height > max_pixels`. The image library derives a missing dimension from the source aspect ratio, resolves percentages against the source, and `zoomCrop()` enlarges to cover the requested box before cropping, so the canvas it allocates can be far larger than the query numbers. On PHP builds that link the system libgd, this memory is allocated outside PHP's `memory_limit`. Derivatives are cached, but every new size is a cache miss, and a failed allocation is never cached.

The original report described a `forceResize=1000000` payload. GD refuses that size outright; the working range tops out around 46000 per side, and the percentage and `zoomCrop` variants reach the same size.

## Impact
An unauthenticated visitor can exhaust memory on the web server with one short request per worker, taking the site down and, without per-pool memory limits, affecting other processes on the host.

## Patches
Fixed in Grav 2.2.2 and 1.7.53.5. The limit now measures the canvas each URL action actually allocates, including derived dimensions, percentages, zoomCrop's intermediate canvas and chained actions. As a workaround, turn `system.images.url_actions` off.

## Credits
Reported by @manus-pi.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 1.7.53 < 1.7.53.5
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.0-rc.8 < 2.2.2
1.7.53
1.7.53.5
2.0.0-rc.8
2.2.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 1.7.53.5, 2.2.2 — —
Versiones corregidas1.7.53.52.2.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-8gr9-59p6-r488

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