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Advisory · GitHub

GHSA-8PR3-Q3CW-Q234

029 LDAP login silently reactivates blocked local accounts without logging the state change

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CVSS 3.1
8.2
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición108 dDesde la divulgación, 4 ago 2026, 1:03 p. m.
Detección108 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Esto huele a PoC esperando su momento.Si sale un exploit, la subo de categoría. Atento.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 ago 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 ago 26
31 ago 26
28 sept 26
25 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8PR3-Q3CW-Q234 divulgada · CVSS 8.2 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

When LDAP authentication is enabled, `AuthLdap::create()` calls `User::setStatus('active')` unconditionally after a successful LDAP bind — even when the local phpMyFAQ account has been administratively blocked. This silently overwrites the `account_status` column from `blocked` to `active`, bypassing the admin's block. The state transition produces no log entry, so administrators have no way to detect that their security control was overridden.

Details

phpMyFAQ's LDAP login flow in `AuthLdap::checkCredentials()` calls `$this->create($login, ...)` after a successful LDAP bind. Inside `create()`, the code attempts to create a local user via `User::createUser()`. For pre-existing accounts (including blocked ones), `createUser()` calls `getUserByLogin()` — which populates `$this->userId` and `$this->status` via `extractUserFromResult()` — and then throws an exception because the login already exists. The exception is silently caught and logged at `info` level. After the catch, `setStatus('active')` runs unconditionally, issuing `UPDATE faquser SET account_status = 'active' WHERE user_id = <blocked_user_id>`.

`AuthLdap::checkCredentials()` — calls `create()` after LDAP bind, discards its return value (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Auth/AuthLdap.php`):

if (!$this->ldapCore->bind($bindLogin, htmlspecialchars_decode($password))) {
    throw new AuthException($this->ldapCore->error ?? 'LDAP bind failed.');
}

// ... AD group membership restriction checks ...

$this->create($login, htmlspecialchars_decode($password));

return true;

`AuthLdap::create()` — catches the duplicate-user exception, then unconditionally sets status to active (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Auth/AuthLdap.php`):

$result = false;
$user = $this->createUser();

try {
    $result = $user->createUser($login, '', $domain);
} catch (\Exception $exception) {
    $this->configuration->getLogger()->info($exception->getMessage());
}

$this->connect($this->activeServer);

$user->setStatus('active');                                      // ← unconditional
$user->setAuthSource(AuthenticationSourceType::AUTH_LDAP->value);

`User::createUser()` — `getUserByLogin()` populates `$this->userId` before throwing (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User.php`):

if ($this->getUserByLogin($login, false)) {     // side-effect: sets $this->userId
    throw new Exception(self::ERROR_USER_LOGIN_NOT_UNIQUE);
}

`User::getUserByLogin()` — calls `extractUserFromResult()` which sets `userId`, `status`, etc. (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User.php`):

$this->extractUserFromResult($result);   // sets $this->userId = blocked user's ID
$this->userData()->load($this->getUserId());
return true;

`User::setStatus()` — issues an UPDATE against the now-populated `userId` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User.php`):

$update = sprintf(
    "UPDATE %sfaquser SET account_status = '%s' WHERE user_id = %d",
    Database::getTablePrefix(),
    $this->configuration->getDb()->escape($status),
    $this->userId,     // ← points to the blocked user's row
);

The full chain: `getUserByLogin()` sets `$user->userId` to the blocked user's database ID → `createUser()` throws → the exception is silently caught → `setStatus('active')` overwrites the blocked row → `checkCredentials()` returns `true` → login succeeds.

The `setStatus('active')` call produces no log entry. The only related log message is the `info`-level exception `"The Login name already exists."`, which mentions nothing about an account status change. Administrators reviewing logs have no indication that a blocked account was reactivated.

Suggested fix — add a guard and a log entry in `create()` before `setStatus('active')`:

     $this->connect($this->activeServer);

+    if (!$result && ($user->getStatus() === 'blocked' || $user->getStatus() === 'protected')) {
+        $this->configuration->getLogger()->warning(
+            sprintf('LDAP login attempt for %s account "%s" denied.', $user->getStatus(), $login)
+        );
+        throw new AuthException(
+            sprintf('Local account "%s" is %s and cannot be activated via LDAP.', $login, $user->getStatus())
+        );
+    }
+
     $user->setStatus('active');
     $user->setAuthSource(AuthenticationSourceType::AUTH_LDAP->value);
PoC

Prerequisites:
- A phpMyFAQ instance (any supported version) with LDAP authentication enabled and Composer dependencies installed.
- A local phpMyFAQ user account that has been set to `blocked` by an administrator, whose login matches a valid LDAP account.

Step 1: Install dependencies.

cd /path/to/phpMyFAQ-repo
composer install --working-dir=phpmyfaq --no-dev

Step 2: Run the exploit against the vulnerable source.

REPO_ROOT=$(pwd) php poc_029/exploit.php

The exploit calls the real `AuthLdap::create()` method from the project source, backed by a live SQLite database created via phpMyFAQ's own `Installer` class. A stub `LdapCore` is injected via Reflection to avoid requiring a real LDAP server — no vulnerable logic is reimplemented.

Expected output (vulnerable version):

=== phpMyFAQ LDAP Account Unblock — AuthLdap::create() PoC ===

Repo under test: /path/to/phpMyFAQ-repo

Inserted user 'victim_user' (ID=99) with status: blocked

Calling AuthLdap::create('victim_user', 'anypassword') ...
(simulates the call made after a successful LDAP bind in checkCredentials)

Status before AuthLdap::create(): blocked
Status after  AuthLdap::create(): active

[VULNERABLE] AuthLdap::create() unblocked 'victim_user': blocked → active

Exit code `2` = vulnerable, `0` = safe (fix applied), `1` = environment error.

Step 3: Apply the fix and re-run.

git apply poc_029/fix.patch
REPO_ROOT=$(pwd) php poc_029/exploit.php

Expected output (fixed version):

Status before AuthLdap::create(): blocked
Status after  AuthLdap::create(): blocked

[SAFE] 'victim_user' remains 'blocked' after AuthLdap::create() — fix is effective.
       AuthException was thrown: Local account "victim_user" is blocked and cannot be activated via LDAP.
Impact

The `account_status` field is the primary mechanism administrators use to revoke access for individual users. Because `AuthLdap::create()` unconditionally overwrites this field to `active`, any user whose local account was blocked but whose LDAP credentials remain valid can bypass the block by simply logging in. The reactivation persists in the database and is not logged as a security event, so the bypass can go undetected indefinitely.

  • Who is impacted: Any phpMyFAQ deployment that uses LDAP authentication and relies on local account blocking to revoke user access.
  • What an attacker can do: Regain full access to an account that was explicitly blocked by an administrator, without any admin re-approval or notification.
  • Authorization bypass (CWE-863): The unconditional `setStatus('active')` overrides an admin-imposed block without checking the current account status.
  • Insufficient logging (CWE-778): The security-critical state transition (`blocked` → `active`) produces no log entry, making the bypass undetectable to administrators. This falls under OWASP A09 (Security Logging and Alerting Failures).
Affected versions

>= 3.1.0, <= 4.1.6 (latest stable release; no fix exists in any released version)

The unconditional `setStatus('active')` call was introduced in commit `baa3a39ce` ("refactor: renamed methods for Auth classes and cleanup"), first released in version `3.1.0`. The vulnerable pattern remains in every subsequent release through `4.1.6`, which is the latest stable release at time of writing. The current development HEAD (`main` branch, commit `122700921`) is also affected. Per `SECURITY.md`, versions 4.1.x and 4.2.x are supported for security fixes; versions < 4.1 are end of life.

Pavel Kohout
Aisle Research

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

La fuente no informa paquetes ni versiones corregidas.

Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8pr3-q3cw-q234

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.