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Advisory · GitHub · npm · directus

GHSA-8XP8-XRH2-88VR

Public registration sends the verification email to the submitted address instead of the matched account

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
5.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -8 d de la divulgación
Exposición79 dDesde la divulgación, 2 sept 2026, 10:07 a. m.
Detección77 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Revisa, agenda, parchea. El clásico de siempre.Se arregla en el próximo ciclo. Sin estrés.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 12.3.1
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
25 ago 26
2 sept 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
25 ago 26
16 sept 26
8 oct 26
30 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 12.3.1 directus · -8 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-8XP8-XRH2-88VR divulgada · CVSS 5.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Public registration resolves existing accounts with a case-normalized email comparison, but it builds the email verification token and selects the email recipient from the address exactly as submitted in the request. On MySQL and MariaDB, whose default collations are accent insensitive, an accented variant of an existing address matches that account's row while the verification link is delivered to the mailbox of the submitted variant. This separates the account that gets verified from the address that receives the verification link.

Details

Registration matches an existing account with a lowercased comparison against the stored email. When a matching account is found and its status is `unverified`, the request is treated as a verification resend rather than rejected. The token payload and the mail recipient are then taken from the submitted address rather than from the account that was matched, and the verification endpoint resolves the address in the token back to an account through the same collation-sensitive comparison.

Under an accent-insensitive collation, `vïctïm@example.com` and `victim@example.com` are the same row for the lookup and two different mailboxes for delivery. An attacker registers the victim's canonical address, which creates an unverified account with a password the attacker chooses, then registers an accented variant of that same address. The second request matches the account created by the first, takes the resend path because the account is still unverified, and mails a verification link addressed to the accented variant, which the attacker controls. Following that link resolves back to the account holding the victim's canonical address and activates it.

This was confirmed against MariaDB 11.8.8 with no collation configured, where the server default is `utf8mb4_uca1400_ai_ci` and the accented variant matches the stored canonical address. PostgreSQL, SQLite and SQL Server do not compare accented characters as equal under their default collations, so those deployments are not affected.

The related email canonicalization issue in password reset and invite was addressed in CVE-2024-27295. Public registration was introduced after that fix and did not adopt the same handling.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can obtain an active account whose stored email address is one they do not control, with credentials they set themselves. Any downstream behavior that treats the stored email as an identity, such as SSO account linking, notification routing, allowlisting by domain, or manual review of registered users, then points at the victim's address for an account held by the attacker. The account's permissions are those of the role configured for public registration.

The same mechanism also allows an attacker to complete verification for a pending registration that the victim started, activating the account without the victim's involvement.

Preconditions

Public registration and email verification must be enabled, and the database must be MySQL or MariaDB with an accent-insensitive collation, which is the default on both. The attacker must be able to receive mail at the accented variant of the target address, which they can host themselves.

Workarounds

Disable public registration, or disable email verification for registration, or configure an accent-sensitive collation for the email column on MySQL and MariaDB deployments.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
directus≥ 10.11.0 < 12.3.1
10.11.0
12.3.1
12.6.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmdirectus
Corregida 12.3.1 -8 d 12.6.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas12.3.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-8xp8-xrh2-88vr

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.