GHSA-935W-9G4M-P28P
vLLM: Harmony tool continuations drop `cache_salt` — restoring a cross-tenant prefix-cache membership oracle
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 0.30.0 | vllm · -14 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-935W-9G4M-P28P divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Affected
- Ecosystem / package: pip / `vllm`
- Affected versions: vLLM ≤ 0.25.1 (confirmed on 0.25.1, commit `752a3a504485`
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34). The lower bound predates 0.25.1; maintainers can confirm how far back the tool-continuation re-submission has omitted the salt.
Summary
On the GPT-OSS "Harmony" path (`POST /v1/responses`), a request that uses a built-in or MCP tool runs as a multi-turn loop: after each tool call vLLM re-renders the full next-turn Harmony prompt and re-submits it to the engine. Turn 1 correctly carries `request.cache_salt`, but the tool-continuation re-submission rebuilds the engine input via `tokens_input(token_ids)` with no `cache_salt`. The continuation prefix is therefore cached in the global *unsalted* namespace even though the caller opted into salting. A second tenant who can guess the low-entropy post-tool history submits the reconstructed continuation (unsalted) and reads exact per-turn cached-token counts from the Responses usage — restoring the prompt-membership oracle that `cache_salt` is documented to prevent.
Silently dropping a preserved salt *after* the supported tool workflow is enabled is a broken isolation control: the caller enabled salting and every turn should stay isolated, but continuation turns leak into the shared cache.
This is distinct from GHSA-4qjh-9fv9-r85r https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-4qjh-9fv9-r85r (CVE-2025-46570 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46570): that advisory is the prefix-cache membership oracle for which `cache_salt` is the documented mitigation, and its PR-17045 fix does not close this site — the Harmony tool continuation silently drops the preserved salt, caching in the unsalted namespace and leaking exact `cached_tokens_per_turn` counts from a different sink (the Responses serving continuation, not general TTFT timing).
Affected code
Links pinned to the confirmed commit `752a3a504485` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34 (v0.25.1):
- The drop (sink): `vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py#L712-L713`
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py#L712-L713— `token_ids = context.render_for_completion()` then `engine_input = tokens_input(token_ids)`, with no `cache_salt`. - Correct turn-1 call for contrast: `vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py#L755`
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py#L755— `tokens_input(prompt_token_ids, cache_salt=request.cache_salt)`. - `tokens_input` stores the salt only if passed: `vllm/inputs/engine.py#L51-L66`
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/inputs/engine.py#L51-L66(`if cache_salt is not None: inputs["cache_salt"] = cache_salt`). - The engine request copies only the current input's salt: `vllm/v1/engine/input_processor.py#L380`
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/engine/input_processor.py#L380(`cache_salt=decoder_inputs.get("cache_salt")` → `None` for the continuation). - Prefix-cache hashing keys on the salt only when present: `vllm/v1/core/kv_cache_utils.py#L560-L561`
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/core/kv_cache_utils.py#L560-L561(`[request.cache_salt] if (start_token_idx == 0 and request.cache_salt) else []`). - The oracle the attacker reads: `vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py#L909`
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py#L909(`cached_tokens_per_turn`). - The documented control being defeated: `vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L235`
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L235(`cache_salt` field).
The tool-continuation re-submission rebuilds the engine input with no `cache_salt`:
# vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py Lines 711-715
if isinstance(context, HarmonyContext):
token_ids = context.render_for_completion()
engine_input = tokens_input(token_ids)
sampling_params.max_tokens = max_model_len - len(token_ids)Contrast with the correct turn-1 call, which does preserve the caller's salt:
# vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py Lines 754-755
prompt_token_ids = render_for_completion(messages)
engine_input = tokens_input(prompt_token_ids, cache_salt=request.cache_salt)`tokens_input` stores the salt on the engine input only when it is passed, so the continuation input carries none and lands in the unsalted namespace:
# vllm/inputs/engine.py Lines 51-66
def tokens_input(
prompt_token_ids: list[int],
*,
prompt: str | None = None,
cache_salt: str | None = None,
) -> TokensInput:
"""
Construct [`TokensInput`][vllm.inputs.engine.TokensInput]
from optional values.
"""
inputs = TokensInput(type="token", prompt_token_ids=prompt_token_ids)
if prompt is not None:
inputs["prompt"] = prompt
if cache_salt is not None:
inputs["cache_salt"] = cache_saltImpact
An authenticated tenant of a shared deployment can recover whether a guessed post-tool prompt or history was processed by another tenant, with exact cached-token counts rather than noisy latency — the exact prompt-membership oracle `cache_salt` is documented to prevent. It defeats the multi-user prefix-cache isolation guarantee for salted Harmony tool sessions.
Preconditions: a GPT-OSS Harmony model on `/v1/responses`; prefix caching enabled (default); an operator-enabled built-in or MCP tool server; the victim sets `cache_salt` and triggers at least one tool continuation; and the attacker can reconstruct the post-tool history closely enough to match the token prefix. The `AC:H` metric reflects that guessable-history precondition.
Suggested Fix
Propagate `request.cache_salt` into every Harmony (and Parsable) tool-continuation re-submission — at the continuation call site call `tokens_input(token_ids, cache_salt=request.cache_salt)`, mirroring the correct turn-1 call. Carry the salt on the `HarmonyContext` (thread the originating `request` into the context) so no continuation path can omit it:
# vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py
if isinstance(context, HarmonyContext):
token_ids = context.render_for_completion()
- engine_input = tokens_input(token_ids)
+ engine_input = tokens_input(
+ token_ids,
+ cache_salt=(
+ context.request.cache_salt
+ if context.request is not None
+ else None
+ ),
+ )with `HarmonyContext.__init__` gaining a `request: ResponsesRequest | None = None` parameter (stored as `self.request`) that `_create_responses` passes when constructing the context. The continuation prefix is then cached in the victim's salted namespace, mirroring turn 1.
Suggested regression test: assert `cached_tokens_per_turn == 0` for a different-salt probe against a salted victim continuation (the four-way control from the proof of concept).
Credit
Reported by: Patch the Planet (Trail of Bits + OpenAI collaboration)
This vulnerability was discovered using GPT-5.5-Cyber as part of the Patch the Planet security initiative.
---
Proposed fix: a fix for this issue is proposed in a public pull request: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51818
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypivllm |
Corregida | 0.30.0 | -14 d | 0.34.0 no afectada |
0.30.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-935w-9g4m-p28phttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/50195https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51818https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/6a2a2bb02b563b83f946012959fd3927984d072ahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllmhttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.30.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
