GHSA-93XW-J965-9MX3
MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary file read/exfiltration via upload_attachment missing validate_safe_path()
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 0.22.0 | mcp-atlassian · -74 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-93XW-J965-9MX3 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The `upload_attachment` method in `confluence/attachments.py` reads and uploads arbitrary local files to Confluence without calling `validate_safe_path()`. Both download methods (`download_attachment` at line 223, `download_content_attachments` at line 272) correctly call `validate_safe_path()` before writing files, but the upload path at lines 35-79 skips this check entirely.
An AI agent connected via MCP (or an attacker influencing that agent through prompt injection) can read any file on the host and exfiltrate it by uploading it as a Confluence page attachment.
Vulnerable Code
File: `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py`, lines 62-79
# No validate_safe_path() call anywhere in this method
if not os.path.isabs(file_path):
file_path = os.path.abspath(file_path)
if not os.path.exists(file_path):
return {"success": False, "error": f"File not found: {file_path}"}
filename = os.path.basename(file_path)
attachment = self._upload_attachment_direct(
content_id, file_path, filename, comment, minor_edit
)The `validate_safe_path` function is already imported at line 9 of the same file, and used in the download methods. It was just not added to the upload path.
Proof of Concept
Tested with mcp-atlassian 0.21.1 on Python 3.11 (EC2, Amazon Linux 2023).
import inspect
from mcp_atlassian.confluence.attachments import AttachmentsMixin
# Confirm: no validate_safe_path in upload
source = inspect.getsource(AttachmentsMixin.upload_attachment)
assert "validate_safe_path" not in source # passes
# Confirm: validate_safe_path IS in downloads
assert "validate_safe_path" in inspect.getsource(AttachmentsMixin.download_attachment) # passes
assert "validate_safe_path" in inspect.getsource(AttachmentsMixin.download_content_attachments) # passesAn MCP tool call like this reads /etc/passwd and uploads it to Confluence:
{"tool": "confluence_upload_attachment", "arguments": {"content_id": "123456", "file_path": "/etc/passwd"}}Impact
Exfiltration of any file readable by the MCP server process: SSH keys, AWS credentials, .env files, /etc/passwd, application secrets. Data leaves the local machine and lands on a remote Confluence instance accessible to other users.
Suggested Fix
Add `validate_safe_path(file_path)` before the `os.path.exists()` check in `upload_attachment`, matching the existing pattern in the download methods. The function is already imported.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypimcp-atlassian |
Corregida | 0.22.0 | -74 d | 0.24.4 no afectada |
0.22.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77258https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-93xw-j965-9mx3https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassianhttps://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
