GHSA-94F5-6J6W-R3RH
SAML SSO login as any user via attacker-controlled session store keys
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-94F5-6J6W-R3RH divulgada · CVSS 9.9 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Fleet's SAML SSO callback looked up the in-progress SSO session using a client-supplied identifier without validating its format or confining it to the session namespace. As a result, the identity provider metadata used to verify the SAML response could be taken from data an attacker was able to place in Fleet's session store, letting them present a response signed with their own certificate.
Two kinds of principal could place such data: an authenticated Fleet user with permission to run live queries (observer+ or higher, global or team-scoped), and, with lower reliability, a holder of a reusable enroll secret with no Fleet account.
Impact
On Fleet servers with SAML SSO turned on, any user who can run live queries, even a team-scoped observer+, could become a global admin. Someone holding an enroll secret could sometimes do the same. A global admin has full control of Fleet: scripts, software, and MDM actions on every host, plus user and organization settings. If Premium just-in-time provisioning is on, the attacker could also create a new admin account.
Fleet instances without SAML SSO are not affected.
Patches
Fleet now prefixes SSO session keys and checks that the session ID has the expected server-generated format before looking it up. The fix is in:
- v4.92.3
- v4.91.2
- v4.90.3
- v4.89.3
- v4.88.2
Fleet v4.93.0 and later also include the fix. There is no backport for versions 4.71.0 through 4.87.x. Upgrade to v4.88.2 or later.
If you run more than one Fleet replica, the issue stays open until every replica is patched. Upgrade all of them.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away, turn off SAML SSO for the Fleet console and end-user MDM flows until all replicas are upgraded.
Credits
Thanks to Amy Burnett and Jamie Brim of OpenAI Codex Security for reporting this issue, including working proofs of concept, provenance records, and a reference patch.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Email us at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)
Join #fleet in osquery Slack https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/fleetdm/fleet |
Corregida | 4.88.2, 4.89.3, 4.90.3, 4.91.2, 4.92.3 | — | — |
4.88.24.89.34.90.34.91.24.92.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-94f5-6j6w-r3rhLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
