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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav-plugin-api

GHSA-94Q7-VRQR-CX5V

Scoped API key can act on super-admin accounts across seven user-management endpoints

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión1.0.18
Exposición100 dDesde la divulgación, 11 ago 2026, 6:28 p. m.
Detección98 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
11 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
11 ago 26
6 sept 26
1 oct 26
26 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-94Q7-VRQR-CX5V divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

requireNotSuperTarget() in UsersController.php guards seven of the most
sensitive endpoints in this plugin against being used as an escalation path
against super-admin accounts. It checks isSuperAdmin($current), the acting
account's own super status, rather than whether the specific API key used for
the request carries super authority. Every one of its callers already has
$request available in scope, but it is never threaded through to this shared
helper.

The established pattern this breaks

This codebase has a documented convention, visible directly in its own code
comments elsewhere: raw isSuperAdmin()/hasPermission() calls do not apply the
API-key scope cap on their own, and using them directly for an authorization
decision has already produced at least two real, fixed vulnerabilities in
this exact plugin (GHSA-p57v-xhv3-mf2w, GHSA-435x-66r2-jwv2). A scope-aware
equivalent, isSuperWithinScope($request), already exists in this codebase for
exactly this purpose.

Root cause

// classes/Api/Controllers/UsersController.php
private function requireNotSuperTarget(UserInterface $current, UserInterface $target): void
{
if ($current->username === $target->username) {
return;
}

if (!$this->isSuperAdmin($current) && $this->accessGrantsSuper($target->get('access'))) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Only super-admins can manage super-admin accounts.');
}
}

The function's own docblock states its exact purpose:

  • mutators -- create()/update()/delete() -- already carry this guard; these
  • siblings target /users/{username} too and must not become an escalation
  • path (e.g. minting an API key for, or stripping 2FA from, a super-admin).

That is precisely the scenario this gap enables.

Confirming $request is available at every call site

grep -n "requireNotSuperTarget(" classes/Api/Controllers/UsersController.php

417: rowAction(ServerRequestInterface $request) -> requireNotSuperTarget($currentUser, $target)
1190: uploadAvatar(ServerRequestInterface $request) -> requireNotSuperTarget($currentUser, $user)
1274: deleteAvatar(ServerRequestInterface $request) -> requireNotSuperTarget($currentUser, $user)
1313: generate2fa(ServerRequestInterface $request) -> requireNotSuperTarget($currentUser, $user)
1416: disable2fa(ServerRequestInterface $request) -> requireNotSuperTarget($currentUser, $user)
1469: createApiKey(ServerRequestInterface $request) -> requireNotSuperTarget($this->getUser($request), $user)
1526: deleteApiKey(ServerRequestInterface $request) -> requireNotSuperTarget($this->getUser($request), $user)

Every enclosing controller method already receives $request as a parameter.
There is no architectural reason it could not be passed through; it simply
is not.

Impact

An API key scoped to something less than full super authority, but belonging
to an account that is itself a super-admin, can act against a different
super-admin's account through any of these 7 endpoints: disable another
super-admin's 2FA, delete their avatar, mint a new API key under their
identity, or delete one of their existing API keys. The scope cap this
codebase otherwise enforces consistently (per GHSA-p57v-xhv3-mf2w and
GHSA-435x-66r2-jwv2) is bypassed here specifically, because the check asks
"is this account a super-admin" rather than "does this specific credential
carry super authority."

Suggested fix

private function requireNotSuperTarget(ServerRequestInterface $request, UserInterface $current, UserInterface $target): void
{
if ($current->username === $target->username) {
return;
}

if (!$this->isSuperWithinScope($request) && $this->accessGrantsSuper($target->get('access'))) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Only super-admins can manage super-admin accounts.');
}
}

Update all 7 call sites to pass $request through, mirroring the fix already
applied for mayWriteUsersScope().

Affected component

  • classes/Api/Controllers/UsersController.php, requireNotSuperTarget() and its
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav-plugin-api< 1.0.18
1.0.18
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-api
Corregida 1.0.18 — —
Versiones corregidas1.0.18
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-94q7-vrqr-cx5v

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.