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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · poweradmin/poweradmin

GHSA-9657-8VC2-7G2P

Poweradmin: The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout, so an attacker holding the password can brute-force it within the validity window

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
7.4
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versiones4.2.6 · 4.3.5 · 4.4.1
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 20 nov 2026, 9:52 a. m.
Detección1 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Más vale un parche a tiempo que un incidente de madrugada.Ojo con los rangos de versión, son traicioneros.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories +2
05:59 p. m.
09:52 a. m.
10:00 a. m.
02:22 p. m.
05:59 p. m.
05:05 a. m.
04:10 p. m.
03:16 a. m.
02:22 p. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-9657-8VC2-7G2P divulgada · CVSS 7.4 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout

The email second factor is a six-digit code drawn from `mt_rand()` and verified with no attempt limit, so an attacker who already has the password can brute-force it inside its validity window.

`lib/Domain/Service/MfaService.php`, in `generateEmailVerificationCode()`:

$numericCode = mt_rand(100000, 999999);

That is a 900,000-value space, and `mt_rand()` is a Mersenne Twister rather than a CSPRNG, so it is not appropriate for a security token in the first place. PHP provides `random_int()` for exactly this.

The bigger problem is that nothing limits guesses. `lib/Application/Controller/MfaVerifyController.php` calls:

$isValid = $this->mfaService->verifyCode($userId, $code);

and on failure the only action taken is:

$this->logger->warning('[MfaVerifyController] Verification failed for user ID: {user_id}', ['user_id' => $userId]);

I grepped that controller for any counter, lockout, throttle or rate limit and found nothing beyond log statements. So an attacker holding valid credentials submits codes until one lands. Against 900,000 values with no ceiling on attempts, the only thing standing in the way is the code's validity window and however fast requests can be issued.

That defeats the purpose of the second factor: it is meant to hold even when the password is known, and here it reduces to a race the attacker is likely to win with sustained requests.

Two separate fixes, and I would treat the second as the urgent one:

  1. Generate the code with `random_int(100000, 999999)` so it is not predictable from RNG state.
  2. Enforce a failed-attempt counter tied to the user and the pending MFA session, invalidating the code and requiring a fresh one after a small number of wrong guesses, plus a per-account and per-IP rate limit on the verify endpoint.

Scope: source-verified at `master`. I confirmed the generator, the verify call site, the log-only failure handling and the absence of any throttling construct in that controller. I did not stand up a Poweradmin instance and run a brute-force against a live code, so the rate at which the space can be covered in practice is not something I measured. If throttling is applied at a layer I did not look at, such as a web-server or reverse-proxy rule shipped with your deployment docs, then the second half of this weakens considerably and I would want to know that.

I used AI assistance while reading the code and preparing this report.

---

Confirmed, and thanks for the detail. I've widened the affected range: this reaches back to 4.0.0, where MFA was first added, and 4.4.0 still ships it, so the original <= 4.3.4 was too narrow. The 3.x line has no MFA at all and is unaffected. Fixes are in for 4.2.x, 4.3.x, 4.4.x and the development branch.

To answer your question about other layers, there is nothing. No middleware runs in front of that controller, so what you found missing in the controller is the whole picture.

I've adjusted the score down from 9.1 to 7.4. Walking 900,000 values inside the code's ten minute life needs sustained request rates, and MFA is off by default, so there are real preconditions beyond knowing the password. It is still a second factor that does not hold, which is the point of the report.

The mt_rand swap is in as well, though I would treat that as hardening rather than the bug. Recovering the generator state from these codes is not practical in this setup. The missing attempt limit was the actual problem.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.1/ 10Alto
Vector 7.1 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.0.0 < 4.2.6
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.3.0 < 4.3.5
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.4.0 < 4.4.1
4.0.0
4.2.6
4.3.0
4.3.5
4.4.0
4.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin
Corregida 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas4.2.64.3.54.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115463
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-9657-8vc2-7g2p
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/commit/021e5fea029cf8787247517cde752f9a6af1647c
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/commit/541e31fec32f0eae0d93a13de125a06ee19ecd92
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/commit/ce3ccace7e80f1c1424f1bb1d9ce63a33ee90f19
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/commit/d1c1f23ee27d4607efb616e2d935158b4fc21b61
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.2.6
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.3.5
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.4.1
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.5.0

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