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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-9F44-82R9-8878

An SSO user named "Admin" (another case) or "tp", "otv" or "api" is signed in to the built-in administrator or an internal account, which is converted to OAuth2

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CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.2.4.3
Exposición8 dDesde la divulgación, 13 nov 2026, 2:36 a. m.
Detección6 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
13 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
13 nov 26
15 nov 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-9F44-82R9-8878 divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

When OAuth2 single sign-on is enabled, a user of the identity provider whose login matches the built-in TeamPass administrator (`admin`, written with another case such as `Admin`) or an internal account (`TP`, `OTV`, `API`, in any case) is signed in to that account. The sign-in converts the account to OAuth2, replaces its password and opens an administrator session.

Details

Paths and line numbers are those of 3.2.4.2.

  1. The TeamPass login of an SSO user is the part of the provider's user name before `@`: the Microsoft Entra ID UPN, or `preferred_username` for a generic OpenID Connect provider (`app/core/login.php`). `Admin@contoso.com` signs in as `Admin`, `tp@contoso.com` as `tp`.
  2. The account is located with `u.login = %s` (`getUserCompleteData()`, `app/sources/main.functions.php:11313`). The `users` table uses the `utf8mb4_unicode_ci` collation, which ignores case, accents and trailing spaces: `Admin`, `ADMIN`, `ádmin` and `admin ` all locate the account `admin`, and `tp` locates `TP`.
  3. `shouldUserAuthWithOauth2()` (`app/sources/identify.php:3561`) excludes the administrator with a comparison on the submitted login, `if ($username !== 'admin')` (`:3590`). `Admin` passes it. The internal accounts are not excluded at all. The same applies to an `SSH` account where one exists; no installer creates it.
  4. These accounts are `local` accounts with the administrator flag. For a `local` or `ldap` account reached through an OAuth2 sign-in, the function writes `auth_type = 'oauth2'` (`:3610`) and returns `userPasswordVerified = true`.
  5. `checkOauth2User()` (`:3665`) then replaces `users.pw` with a hash of the value the login page derives from the user's object id (`:3812`), and calls `handleExternalPasswordChange()` (`:3819`). When the account holds a key recovery backup (the administrator account usually does), `attemptTransparentRecovery()` re-encrypts its private key with that value.
  6. The second factor is checked after these steps.
Impact

An attacker who holds an account at the identity provider, allowed to use the TeamPass application, with one of these user names:

  • `Admin` (other case), `ádmin`… gets the TeamPass administrator session: users, roles, folders and settings. The administrator can no longer sign in with their own password.
  • `tp`, `otv`, `api` (any case) gets an administrator session on the internal account. For `TP`, `users.pw` held the password the server opens the account's private key with, encrypted with the instance key. Once it is replaced, the server can no longer open that key: the key generation of new users, the encryption-key repairs and the password rotation (LAPR) stop working until an administrator rebuilds the key pair of the TP account (Tools page).

When administrators must use a second factor, the session is opened only if the attacker passes that step. The conversion and the password replacement have already happened by then.

With Microsoft Entra ID, user names are assigned by the directory administrators, so the attacker needs an existing account with such a UPN, for example a shared or service mailbox (`admin@`, `api@`). A legitimate user with such a UPN triggers the same conversion without any malicious intent. If the identity provider lets users choose their user name, the attacker can choose one of these names.

Proof of concept
  1. Configure OAuth2 with Microsoft Entra ID. Self-registration is not needed: the accounts already exist.
  2. In the tenant, create the user `Admin@<tenant>.onmicrosoft.com` and assign it to the TeamPass application.
  3. Sign in to TeamPass with the SSO button as that user. The TeamPass administrator session opens, and `SELECT auth_type FROM teampass_users WHERE id = 1` returns `oauth2`.
  4. The same with `tp@<tenant>.onmicrosoft.com` converts the account `TP` (id 9999997).
Patches

Fixed in 3.2.4.3. The decision now uses the account the login located: an OAuth2 sign-in that reaches the built-in administrator or an internal account is refused (`user_not_allowed_to_auth_to_teampass_app`) and written to the failed authentications of the Logs page. A unit test covers the case variants and the internal accounts.

Workarounds
  • Until you upgrade, make sure that no user allowed to use the TeamPass application at the identity provider has a user name whose part before `@` is `admin`, `tp`, `otv`, `api` or `ssh`, ignoring case and accents. With Entra ID, enable *Assignment required* on the enterprise application and review the assigned users.
  • Or disable OAuth2 on the OAuth page.

To check whether an account was converted, run `SELECT id, login, auth_type FROM teampass_users WHERE id IN (1, 9999991, 9999997, 9999998, 9999999)` (adapt the table prefix). Any `oauth2` value means the account was reached. Set `auth_type` back to `local`, then:

  • `admin`: set a new password;
  • `OTV`, `API`: set `pw` back to an empty string, otherwise the replaced password, which the attacker knows, opens these accounts from the login form;
  • `TP`: rebuild its key pair from the Tools page (available since 3.2.3.3).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
5.9/ 10Medio
Vector 5.9 (moderada) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≥ 3.1.2 < 3.2.4.3
3.1.2
3.2.4.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Corregida 3.2.4.3 — —
Versiones corregidas3.2.4.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-9f44-82r9-8878

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