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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd

GHSA-9F75-5FJW-5JVV

Incus broadcasts OVN ACL log events with an empty project, leaking them across projects

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
5.0
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónv7.6.0
Exposición21 dDesde la divulgación, 29 oct 2026, 5:15 p. m.
Detección20 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
29 oct 26
19 nov 26
29 oct 26
4 nov 26
9 nov 26
14 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-9F75-5FJW-5JVV divulgada · CVSS 5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

OVN ACL syslog events are broadcast with an empty project string. The event server only applies its project-binding filter and per-project permission checker to events that carry a non-empty project, so empty-project events skip both. As a result, any authenticated client with event-view access to a single project receives every project's OVN ACL verdict logs — source/destination IPs, ports, protocols and allow/drop decisions — defeating the project isolation the restricted-certificate model advertises.

Details

On a cluster member with `core.syslog_socket=true`, the syslog listener forwards OVN `acl_log` records to the event server with an empty project:

internal/server/syslog/listener.go:136   eventServer.Send("", api.EventTypeNetworkACL, event)

The broadcast routine skips both authorization checks whenever the event's project is empty:

internal/server/events/events.go:197   if event.Project != "" && !listener.allProjects && event.Project != listener.projectName { continue }
internal/server/events/events.go:202   if event.Project != "" && !listener.projectPermissionFunc(auth.ObjectProject(event.Project)) { continue }

`network-acl` is not a privileged event type, so a restricted TLS or OIDC client can subscribe to it on any one project it can access:

cmd/incusd/events.go:25   eventTypes           = []string{..., api.EventTypeNetworkACL}
cmd/incusd/events.go:26   privilegedEventTypes = []string{api.EventTypeLogging}   // network-acl absent

A project-restricted client issuing `GET /1.0/events?project=P&type=network-acl` therefore receives OVN ACL logs from every project, not just `P`. The owning project cannot be recovered at the syslog layer — the listener only has the raw OVN log text — so the events are inherently server-wide, like `logging` events, but were not gated like them.

Proof of concept

Verified against the unmodified production broadcast path (`go test`, real `AddListener`/`Send`/`broadcast`): a listener bound to project `default`, and an all-projects listener whose permission checker denies every project except `default`, both still received empty-project `network-acl` events.

$ go test ./internal/server/events/ -run TestProjectLeakAudit -v -count=1
=== RUN   TestProjectLeakAuditEmptyProjectNetworkACLEventsBypassRestrictions
    VULN-CONFIRMED [single-project listener bound to project=default]: received
      empty-project event: {"message":"ACL-DROP src=10.40.0.9 dst=10.10.0.5 proto=tcp",...}
    VULN-CONFIRMED [all-projects listener, permission checker denies all but
      project=default]: received 2 empty-project event(s)
--- PASS: TestProjectLeakAuditEmptyProjectNetworkACLEventsBypassRestrictions (0.40s)

The two control cases in the same test confirm that properly project-tagged events are correctly filtered — only the empty-project path bypasses the checks.

Impact

A project-restricted client can observe other projects' OVN firewall verdict logs — internal IP pairs, ports, protocols, and allow/drop decisions — breaking the cross-project confidentiality the restricted-certificate model is meant to enforce. Exploitation requires an authenticated client with event-view access on at least one project, and a cluster member configured with `core.syslog_socket=true` receiving OVN ACL logs.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd< v7.6.0
v7.6.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd
Corregida v7.6.0 — —
Versiones corregidasv7.6.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-9f75-5fjw-5jvv

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.