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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

GHSA-9H23-53F4-Q947

Nginx UI: Bundled reverse proxy can bypass IP allowlists and enable shared login lockout

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición41 dDesde la divulgación, 9 oct 2026, 3:57 p. m.
Detección38 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
9 oct 26
19 oct 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
9 oct 26
20 oct 26
30 oct 26
10 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-9H23-53F4-Q947 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

In Nginx UI versions 2.2.0 through 2.5.x, the official bundled reverse-proxy topology did not preserve the external client identity used by Gin. The backend treated the local proxy peer as the client because no trusted proxy was configured, while the proxy supplied the actual address in forwarding headers.

Impact

This has two distinct effects in bundled-proxy deployments:

  • IP allowlist enforcement: management API requests forwarded by the bundled proxy were identified as loopback and could pass the loopback exception even when the external source was not in the configured allowlist. Protected management operations still required valid credentials; this did not grant unauthenticated administrator access.
  • Login availability: failed login attempts from different external sources were attributed to one loopback address. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore trigger the shared temporary login-ban threshold and deny password or OTP login to other users behind the proxy until the ban expired. Existing authenticated sessions were not invalidated.

Remediation

Upgrade to Nginx UI 2.6.0 or later. The fix explicitly trusts only the intended bundled proxy, validates configured trusted proxies, uses the resolved client address consistently, and fails closed when an IP allowlist is enabled but the client address is invalid.

Fix commit: https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/e30e331303fc21cf077a2bea724bd79e66892eaf

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI≥ 1.9.10-0.20251005005631-6de168c9454 < 1.9.10-0.20260904075558-e30e331303fc
v1.9.9
1.9.10-0.20251005005631-6de168c9454
1.9.10-0.20260904075558-e30e331303fc
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Sin parche — — v1.9.9 no afectada
Versiones corregidascommit e30e331
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107804
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-9h23-53f4-q947
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/e30e331303fc21cf077a2bea724bd79e66892eaf
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.6.0

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