GHSA-9QW7-J9XW-FV9C
isomorphic-git: Arbitrary file write outside of working tree via directory symlink during checkout (potential RCE)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 1.38.6 | isomorphic-git · -132 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-9QW7-J9XW-FV9C divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
### Summary
`git.checkout` writes working-tree files through a directory symlink without checking the leading path, so a malicious repository can write outside the intended working directory. The defect is in isomorphic-git's checkout logic itself and is therefore independent of the `fs` provider. The *impact* depends on the configured filesystem; worst case is arbitrary file write on the host, e.g. injecting an attacker key into `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` → remote login / code execution.
### Details
A single git tree can't hold a name as both a symlink and a directory, so the attack uses two states:
Commit N: config (mode 120000, symlink → ../.ssh)
Commit N+1: config/ (mode 040000, tree)
authorized_keys (mode 100644, attacker public key)Checking out commit N writes `config` as a directory symlink. Checking out commit N+1 sees `config/authorized_keys` as a new path: isomorphic-git `mkdir`s the parent (`config`, already a symlink → `EEXIST`, ignored) then `writeFile`s the file, which the OS resolves through the symlink to outside the working directory. A *file*-level symlink swap is caught (the `120000`→`100644` mode change triggers an `rm`), but the directory-level variant is not — the payload is always a new child path, a plain `create`, so the parent symlink is never removed.
The symlink target is attacker-chosen. Besides `~/.ssh`, pointing it at the repo's own control directory — `hooks → .git/hooks` then `hooks/pre-commit`, or `x → .git` then overwriting `.git/config` (`core.hooksPath` / alias / `core.fsmonitor`) — yields RCE on the next native `git` command without depending on `~/.ssh` existing, since `.git/` is always present in a fresh clone.
#### Canonical git behavior (divergence)
git refuses to do this: `has_symlink_leading_path()` (symlinks.c) checks each leading path component during checkout and will not follow a symlink — the hardening behind CVE-2021-21300 and CVE-2024-32002. isomorphic-git has no equivalent check.
### PoC
`https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av1-symlink-hook-rce` — open in a Codespace; it builds the malicious repo, serves it locally, and runs a victim. Output on Linux:
[AV-1] Directory symlink on disk: …/config → ../.ssh (→ /home/node/.ssh)
[AV-1] *** SSH KEY INJECTION CONFIRMED ***Trigger: minimal realistic path is `clone` (commit N) + a later `pull` (commit N+1) — ordinary sync of an already-trusted repo. It also collapses to a single `clone` when the consuming app reads or writes into the cloned tree, or when a symlink already exists on disk.
Impact
isomorphic-git is filesystem-agnostic, so exploitability and blast radius depend on the active `fs` provider — specifically whether it creates a symlink and follows it on a later write:
- Node `fs` on Linux/macOS (servers, CI, CLIs, Electron/desktop tooling — the common server-side use): real OS symlinks → the write lands anywhere the process can reach → arbitrary file write on the host → RCE (the PoC above). Highest impact.
- Node `fs` on Windows: `fs.symlink` typically requires privilege and throws `EPERM`, so the symlink-plant step usually fails — not exploitable by default. (A property of the OS/provider, not of isomorphic-git.)
- In-memory / browser providers (memfs, ZenFS, lightning-fs, custom `fs`): there is no host filesystem to escape to, so the worst case is writing outside the intended clone directory but within that virtual filesystem — i.e. corrupting other repos/app data the same provider holds. Bounded by the sandbox, and only if the provider implements symlink creation + following.
The CVSS above reflects the worst-case (Node `fs` on a POSIX host). Browser/in-memory-only deployments are lower severity (sandboxed integrity impact).
### Suggested fix
Before each working-tree write, `lstat` every leading path component and refuse to traverse a
symlink (mirrors git's `has_symlink_leading_path()`); optionally honor `core.symlinks=false`.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmisomorphic-git |
Corregida | 1.38.6 | -132 d | 1.44.17 no afectada |
1.38.6Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63395https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/security/advisories/GHSA-9qw7-j9xw-fv9chttps://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/pull/2370https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/commit/823843d1cd19182df79bc907c767f5bcecb39a0bhttps://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-githttps://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/releases/tag/v1.38.6Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
