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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · craftcms/cms

GHSA-9WCJ-WQQH-CQVG

Remote Code Execution by non-admin authenticated user

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión5.10.12
Exposición89 dDesde la divulgación, 24 ago 2026, 7:23 p. m.
Detección85 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Hoy es tranquila, pero podría madrugarte.Huele a "ya lo veré". No la dejes así.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
25 ago 26
18 nov 26
22 nov 26
25 ago 26
16 sept 26
8 oct 26
30 oct 26
22 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-9WCJ-WQQH-CQVG divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
GitHub

Craft’s fix for CVE-2025-32432 closed one way into a dangerous function but left the function itself untouched, and it is reachable through another route. On the current release, a logged-in content editor with no admin rights who has access to a Volume can run arbitrary commands on the server.

The fix added a type check to a single controller action (`actionGenerateTransform`). The function it protects, `ImageTransforms::normalizeTransform()`, is called from roughly 8 places and hands attacker-shaped data straight to Craft’s object factory. One of the other callers is the element-index endpoint behind the control panel’s asset browser. It takes a request-supplied query and never checks it, so an editor who can browse an asset library reaches the sink and instantiates any class they name.

## Description
The fix for CVE-2025-32423 sits at the call site rather than the sink. It rejects a non-string `handle` before calling the normalizer:

if (!is_string($handle)) {
    throw new BadRequestHttpException('Invalid transform handle.');
}
$transform = ImageTransforms::normalizeTransform($handle);

The normalizer never changed. Given an array, it spreads it into Craft’s object factory:

// src/helpers/ImageTransforms.php:314
return Craft::createObject(['class' => ImageTransform::class, ...$transform]);

A later key in a PHP spread wins, so an attacker who controls `$transform` can set `class` and replace the intended `ImageTransform::class`. Craft’s `createObject` only rejects the case where both `__class` and `class` are present, so a lone `class` passes. None of this depends on the yii `__class` bug from CVE-2024-58136, which was fixed in the bundled yii 2.0.55. That is why the gap is still open on the current release rather than something a dependency bump already closed.

Reaching the sink without the type check is a matter of finding another caller. The element-index controller is one. It applies a request-supplied `criteria` array to the element query:

// src/controllers/ElementIndexesController.php:766
Craft::configure($query, Component::cleanseConfig(ElementHelper::cleanseQueryCriteria($criteria)));

`cleanseQueryCriteria()` drops a blocklist of keys but keeps `withTransforms`, and `cleanseConfig()` strips `as ` and `on ` behavior keys but keeps `class`. So `criteria[withTransforms][0][class]` survives into the query, and when the results are populated, the eager loader passes it to `normalizeTransform()`. The eager-loader runs only when the query returns at least one asset, which is why the attacker needs view access to a volume that contains one.

The terminal step uses a gadget that ships with the product. `yii\rbac\PhpManager` calls `require()` on its configured `itemFile` during init. Point that at Craft’s own request log, and the object injection becomes code execution. Craft writes the full request context, including the `User-Agent`, to `storage/logs/web-<date>.log` for any warning or error entry, regardless of `devMode`. The attacker sends a single request that triggers an error (a POST without a CSRF token returns 400), carrying a PHP payload in the `User-Agent`, then fires the trigger with `itemFile` set to that log. The payload runs. It has to avoid quotes and backslashes, which the log escapes and which would break parsing; backticks (\`id > ./pwned.txt\`) sidestep that.

The `admin/` path prefix is required, `source` has to name a viewable volume or the query returns nothing, `viewState[static]=1` avoids an exception, and `criteria[limit]` has to be set or the index short-circuits before running the query. The lowest privilege that works is a non-admin account with `accessCp` and `viewAssets` on a volume that contains an asset, a routine editor role.

Impact

A content editor, or anyone who obtains an editor’s session (`accessCp` + `viewAssets:{volumeId}`), gets remote code execution as the web process user. This runs against a production configuration (`devMode=false`, `allowAdminChanges=false`, `CRAFT_ENVIRONMENT=production`).

Report ID: 1577

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
craftcms/cms≥ 5.0.0-RC1 < 5.10.12
5.0.0-RC1
5.10.12
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistcraftcms/cms
Corregida 5.10.12 — —
Versiones corregidas5.10.12
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-9wcj-wqqh-cqvg

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