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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

GHSA-C23C-RP3M-VPG3

Envoy's global rate limit may crash when the response phase limit is enabled and the response phase request is failed directly

Parche disponible
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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a 1 d de la divulgación
Exposición255 dDesde la divulgación, 10 mar 2026, 1:31 p. m.
Detección251 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v1.37.1
Monitoreo
Detectada
10 mar 26
11 mar 26
13 mar 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
10 mar 26
13 may 26
16 jul 26
18 sept 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-C23C-RP3M-VPG3 divulgada
Remediación Parche v1.37.1 github.com/envoyproxy/envoy · 1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

At the rate limit filter, if we enabled the response phase limit with `apply_on_stream_done` in the rate limit configuration and the response phase limit request fails directly, it may crash Envoy.

Details

When both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled, the safe gRPC client instance will be re-used for both the request phase request and response phase request.

But after the request phase request is done, the inner state of the request phase limit request in gRPC client is not cleaned up. When we send the second limit request at response phase, and the second limit request fails directly, we may access the previous request's inner state and result in crash.

PoC

This need to mock the network failure. But we have reproduced by unit test locally.

Impact

This only happens when both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled in the rate limit filter, and requires the request to rate limit service fails directly (For example, if from Envoy's perspective, no healthy endpoint for rate limit service may result the request fails directly). That's say, not easy to trigger this.

To workaround

This could be worked around by splitting the rate limit filter. That is, if there is a rate limit filter that contains normal rate limit configuration (request phase limit, without `apply_on_stream_done`) and also rate limit configuration with `apply_on_stream_done` (response phase limit). Splitting them into two rate limit filters and ensure one filter only contains normal rate limit configuration (without `apply_on_stream_done`), and one only contains rate limit configuration with `apply_on_stream_done` could avoid this problem.

Credit

Mandar Jog (mandarjog@gmail.com)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/envoyproxy/envoy≥ 1.36.0 ≤ 1.36.4
1.36.0
1.36.4
v1.40.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/envoyproxy/envoy
Corregida v1.37.1 1 d v1.40.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidasv1.37.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26330
Otrahttps://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3
Otrahttps://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

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