GHSA-C6JJ-W8JM-W235
Remember-me cookies survive password change via self-service, admin, and forgot-password reset (CWE-613)
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Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-C6JJ-W8JM-W235 divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
After a password change, a previously issued remember-me cookie (pmf-remember-me) still logs in fully. This was verified for all three password-change paths in phpMyFAQ 4.1.11: self-service password change, administrator change of another user's password, and email forgot-password reset. Logout, administrator disable, and administrator deletion all correctly invalidate the cookie, so only the password-change paths miss revocation.
Details
## Summary
In phpMyFAQ 4.1.11, changing a user's password does not invalidate that user's previously issued remember-me cookie (pmf-remember-me). The cookie continues to log in fully after the password has been changed. This was verified in a local lab for three password-change paths: (1) self-service password change, (2) administrator change of another user's password, and (3) email forgot-password reset. In each case the old password no longer works for login and the new password works, while the pre-change remember-me cookie still authenticates.
## Steps to reproduce (local lab)
1. Log in as a normal user with 'remember me' enabled and record the pmf-remember-me cookie.
2. Change the user's password through any of the three paths above (self-service change, administrator change of another user, or email forgot-password reset).
3. Present the pre-change pmf-remember-me cookie again. It still logs in fully.
## Observed behaviour
- After each of the three password-change paths, the pre-change remember-me cookie still authenticates, and the stored remember-me value is unchanged.
- Old password login fails and new password login succeeds, confirming the password itself was changed.
- The self-service path was reproduced with a second remember-me value and a second password rotation, with the same result.
## Controls that work correctly
- Proper logout clears the remember-me value and the cookie no longer logs in.
- Administrator disable blocks the cookie.
- Administrator deletion removes the account and the cookie no longer logs in.
- An unrelated user's cookie is unaffected by another user's password change.
## Scope and limits (please note)
- This report covers only the pmf-remember-me cookie. Web sessions are not claimed: phpMyFAQ uses a single-slot session model, so a second login replaces the prior session.
- API/OAuth tokens were not tested and are not claimed.
- The window is the client-side 2-week remember-me lifetime; there is no server-side expiry check on the cookie. This is not claimed to be permanent.
- The precondition is that an attacker already holds a valid pre-change remember-me cookie. There is no unauthenticated path and no privilege escalation from this alone; it is stale-credential persistence after a legitimate credential change.
## Related work (different mechanisms, disclosed for deduplication)
- GHSA-6r2c-694w-24qv / CVE-2026-85591 (CWE-420, password change without verifying the old password) is a different mechanism; its 'password change revokes sessions' wording is session-scoped and does not cover the remember-me cookie.
- GHSA-7554-gx6g-xx77 (email change step-up) is a different mechanism.
- The October 2026 phpMyFAQ CVE cluster fixed in 4.1.9-4.1.11 covers different mechanisms; this finding was tested on the already-fixed 4.1.11 as a new angle.
No public CVE or GHSA for this same remember-me mechanism was found, but private reports are not visible to the reporter, so this is not claimed as an absolute first discovery.
## Suggested hardening
On every password-change path, clear the user's stored remember-me value (the same clearing already used on logout), so a password rotation also rotates the remember-me credential. Thank you for considering this report; happy to help verify a fix.
Proof of concept
In a local lab, a pre-change pmf-remember-me cookie presented after a password change still returned an authenticated user page, and the stored remember-me value was unchanged in the database. The old password failed to log in and the new password succeeded, confirming the password rotation. The self-service path was reproduced with a second cookie value and a second password rotation, with the same result. By contrast, logout, administrator disable, and administrator deletion each invalidated the cookie. No lab passwords, cookie values, or internal lab paths are included.
Impact
An attacker who stole a remember-me cookie before the victim changed their password keeps full account access until the cookie's 2-week client-side lifetime ends, even though the victim rotated their password precisely to lock out a stolen credential. The code itself describes the remember-me value as a password-equivalent credential. No unauthenticated access and no privilege escalation beyond the victim account.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Versiones afectadas
4.1.11Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistphpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-c6jj-w8jm-w235Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
