llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · surrealdb

GHSA-C8JX-96C9-8XRP

SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via indexed COUNT fast paths

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -36 d de la divulgación
Exposición141 dDesde la divulgación, 1 jul 2026, 3:22 p. m.
Detección138 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
26 may 26
1 jul 26
4 nov 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
26 may 26
10 jul 26
23 ago 26
7 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.1.0 surrealdb · -36 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-C8JX-96C9-8XRP divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

A record user could learn the value of a hidden field by counting how many records match a guess.

When `DEFINE FIELD ... PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE ...` hides a field's contents from a caller, and that field is indexed, running `SELECT count() FROM t WHERE hidden_field = "guess" GROUP ALL` returned a count greater than zero whenever a record actually had that value — even though the caller was never allowed to read the field directly. The query planner used an indexed-COUNT shortcut (`Index::Count`, `IndexCountScan`, or the legacy `Iterate Index Count` / `Iterate Index Keys` paths) that counts matching index entries and skips the permission check that would normally hide the value. The same query with `WITH NOINDEX` correctly returned `[]`, confirming the gap.

By repeating the count query with different guesses, an attacker can confirm or recover the contents of any restricted field they could not read through a normal `SELECT`.

Impact

What an attacker can do:

  • Confirm or recover values of a field protected by field-level SELECT permissions on any table they hold table-level SELECT on, provided the field is indexed.
  • Repeat the query with different guesses to read restricted field contents one value at a time.

What it can't do:

  • Read fields that are not indexed (the shortcut only fires when an index covers the predicate column).
  • Cross table, database or namespace isolation boundaries.
  • Modify data, escalate privileges, or affect availability.
Patches

The legacy planner (`surrealdb/core/src/idx/planner/tree.rs`) and the streaming planner (`surrealdb/core/src/exec/planner/select/mod.rs`) now both refuse the indexed fast path when the WHERE / ORDER tree references a field governed by a non-`Full` SELECT permission:

  • `resolve_indexes` skips any B-tree / unique index whose columns are governed by such a permission.
  • A new `cond_touches_restricted_field` flag is propagated; `eval_count` refuses a dedicated `Index::Count` when set.
  • The streaming planner adds `cond_touches_restricted_select_field`, a `RestrictedIdiomChecker` visitor that matches each idiom against the table's field-permission prefixes (loaded via the plan-time txn), and gates `IndexCountScan` emission on it.
  • The fast paths are preserved for root / owner sessions via `should_check_perms_for_view`.

Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.

Workarounds

Users unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds:

  • Avoid `DEFINE INDEX` on fields whose values are protected by field-level SELECT permissions. The class of attack is specific to the indexed fast paths.
  • Restrict the ability of record users to issue arbitrary `SELECT count() … GROUP ALL` queries against tables containing field-protected columns.
  • Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
surrealdb< 3.1.0
3.1.0
4.0.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iosurrealdb
Corregida 3.1.0 -36 d 4.0.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp
Otrahttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/pull/240
Otrahttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/0c6dd021bb55b32a78a553c72bb9c0cdd414825f
Otrahttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.