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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @sigstore/verify

GHSA-C8P7-C9P3-8M99

@sigstore/verify allows tlogThreshold bypass by mutating top-level logIndex

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -7 d de la divulgación
Exposición7 dDesde la divulgación, 12 nov 2026, 11:41 a. m.
Detección7 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.1.3
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
5 nov 26
12 nov 26
20 nov 26
5 nov 26
9 nov 26
13 nov 26
16 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.1.3 @sigstore/verify · -7 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-C8P7-C9P3-8M99 divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`@sigstore/verify` can be tricked into satisfying `tlogThreshold: 2` with only one authenticated transparency-log entry.

For inclusion-proof-only bundles, the Merkle proof authenticates `inclusionProof.logIndex`, but duplicate detection uses the separate top-level `logIndex`. The top-level value is not covered by the inclusion proof or the signed canonicalized body.

An attacker can duplicate a valid tlog entry and change only its top-level `logIndex`. Both inclusion proofs remain valid, but the verifier treats the entries as distinct.

Details

`packages/verify/src/tlog/merkle.ts` verifies the Merkle path using `entry.inclusionProof.logIndex`.

After verification, `packages/verify/src/verifier.ts` creates duplicate-detection IDs using:

{ logID: entry.logId.keyId, logIndex: entry.logIndex }

No consistency or authenticity check binds the top-level `logIndex` to the authenticated proof identity.

The Sigstore bundle format intentionally distinguishes the top-level global log index from the inclusion-proof tree index, so those fields cannot simply be required to equal each other.

This bypasses the duplicate-entry protection added in `@sigstore/verify` 4.1.1.

PoC

Using a valid proof-only bundle with a valid timestamp:

const bundle = bundleFromJSON(validBundleJson);
const first = bundle.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries[0];

const verifier = new Verifier(trustMaterial, {
  tlogThreshold: 2,
  timestampThreshold: 1,
});

// Control: correctly fails because only one tlog entry exists.
verifier.verify(toSignedEntity(bundle, artifact));
// Throws: expected 2 tlog entries, got 1

// Duplicate the same authenticated proof while changing only the
// unauthenticated top-level global log index.
bundle.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries.push({
  ...first,
  logIndex: String(BigInt(first.logIndex) + 1n),
});

// Vulnerable behavior: verification succeeds.
verifier.verify(toSignedEntity(bundle, artifact));

The artifact, signature, canonicalized body, Merkle proof, checkpoint, and signing key remain unchanged.

Impact

Applications configuring `tlogThreshold >= 2` to require multiple transparency-log entries can accept a bundle containing only one authenticated proof.

This weakens the configured supply-chain verification policy. No artifact-signing key or Rekor private key is required; an attacker only needs to supply or modify a valid bundle.

The default threshold of 1 is not affected.

This is distinct from CVE-2026-48816, which concerns unauthenticated `integratedTime` handling.

Validation

Tested against `@sigstore/verify` 4.1.2 at commit `769a53d8713248a8bfedfc2a5d1955b0dcc24d`.

The original bundle fails the threshold check, while the modified bundle succeeds. Existing verification tests pass.

References
  • Verifier duplicate-counting code https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-js/blob/769a53d8713248a8bf49edfc2a5d1955b0dcc24d/packages/verify/src/verifier.ts
  • Merkle proof verification https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-js/blob/769a53d8713248a8bf49edfc2a5d1955b0dcc24d/packages/verify/src/tlog/merkle.ts
  • Sigstore bundle format https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/bundle/
  • Sigstore threshold-verification requirement https://github.com/sigstore/architecture-docs/blob/main/client-spec.md

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@sigstore/verify< 4.1.3
4.1.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@sigstore/verify
Corregida 4.1.3 -7 d 4.1.3 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.1.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-js/security/advisories/GHSA-c8p7-c9p3-8m99

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.