GHSA-C8P7-C9P3-8M99
@sigstore/verify allows tlogThreshold bypass by mutating top-level logIndex
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 4.1.3 | @sigstore/verify · -7 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-C8P7-C9P3-8M99 divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`@sigstore/verify` can be tricked into satisfying `tlogThreshold: 2` with only one authenticated transparency-log entry.
For inclusion-proof-only bundles, the Merkle proof authenticates `inclusionProof.logIndex`, but duplicate detection uses the separate top-level `logIndex`. The top-level value is not covered by the inclusion proof or the signed canonicalized body.
An attacker can duplicate a valid tlog entry and change only its top-level `logIndex`. Both inclusion proofs remain valid, but the verifier treats the entries as distinct.
Details
`packages/verify/src/tlog/merkle.ts` verifies the Merkle path using `entry.inclusionProof.logIndex`.
After verification, `packages/verify/src/verifier.ts` creates duplicate-detection IDs using:
{ logID: entry.logId.keyId, logIndex: entry.logIndex }No consistency or authenticity check binds the top-level `logIndex` to the authenticated proof identity.
The Sigstore bundle format intentionally distinguishes the top-level global log index from the inclusion-proof tree index, so those fields cannot simply be required to equal each other.
This bypasses the duplicate-entry protection added in `@sigstore/verify` 4.1.1.
PoC
Using a valid proof-only bundle with a valid timestamp:
const bundle = bundleFromJSON(validBundleJson);
const first = bundle.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries[0];
const verifier = new Verifier(trustMaterial, {
tlogThreshold: 2,
timestampThreshold: 1,
});
// Control: correctly fails because only one tlog entry exists.
verifier.verify(toSignedEntity(bundle, artifact));
// Throws: expected 2 tlog entries, got 1
// Duplicate the same authenticated proof while changing only the
// unauthenticated top-level global log index.
bundle.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries.push({
...first,
logIndex: String(BigInt(first.logIndex) + 1n),
});
// Vulnerable behavior: verification succeeds.
verifier.verify(toSignedEntity(bundle, artifact));The artifact, signature, canonicalized body, Merkle proof, checkpoint, and signing key remain unchanged.
Impact
Applications configuring `tlogThreshold >= 2` to require multiple transparency-log entries can accept a bundle containing only one authenticated proof.
This weakens the configured supply-chain verification policy. No artifact-signing key or Rekor private key is required; an attacker only needs to supply or modify a valid bundle.
The default threshold of 1 is not affected.
This is distinct from CVE-2026-48816, which concerns unauthenticated `integratedTime` handling.
Validation
Tested against `@sigstore/verify` 4.1.2 at commit `769a53d8713248a8bfedfc2a5d1955b0dcc24d`.
The original bundle fails the threshold check, while the modified bundle succeeds. Existing verification tests pass.
References
- Verifier duplicate-counting code
https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-js/blob/769a53d8713248a8bf49edfc2a5d1955b0dcc24d/packages/verify/src/verifier.ts - Merkle proof verification
https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-js/blob/769a53d8713248a8bf49edfc2a5d1955b0dcc24d/packages/verify/src/tlog/merkle.ts - Sigstore bundle format
https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/bundle/ - Sigstore threshold-verification requirement
https://github.com/sigstore/architecture-docs/blob/main/client-spec.md
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npm@sigstore/verify |
Corregida | 4.1.3 | -7 d | 4.1.3 no afectada |
4.1.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-js/security/advisories/GHSA-c8p7-c9p3-8m99Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
