llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

GHSA-C8R8-95HG-MP34

SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versióncommit 3542530
Exposición23 dDesde la divulgación, 27 oct 2026, 9:43 a. m.
Detección20 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
27 oct 26
5 nov 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
27 oct 26
2 nov 26
8 nov 26
14 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-C8R8-95HG-MP34 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`kernel/mcp/tools/file.go`'s `resolvePath()` includes an explicit comment stating its
sensitive-path blocklist is meant to align with the HTTP file API's established blacklist
(`refuseToAccess()` in `kernel/api/file.go`), following the remediation for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8
("Unauthenticated Administrator takeover exfiltrated via the MCP"), which specifically
recommended restricting this tool's scope. In practice, the MCP tool implements only 1 of the
4 static blocklist entries the HTTP API enforces.

Comparison

`kernel/api/file.go` `refuseToAccess()` blocks:
1. `conf/conf.json` (API token, cookie signing key, accessAuthCode)
2. `data/snippets/conf.json`
3. the entire `data/templates` directory
4. `data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json`
5. (dynamic, per-request) any path the current publish-mode session isn't authorized for

`kernel/mcp/tools/file.go` `resolvePath()` blocks only:

confPath := filepath.Join(util.ConfDir, "conf.json")
if abs == confPath {
    return "", fmt.Errorf("access to conf.json is forbidden")
}

Items 2, 3, and 4 are absent. The tool's own `list`/`read`/`grep`/`find` actions remain fully
functional against them.

Impact

An MCP client with access to the `file` tool (post-fix for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8, i.e. a properly
authenticated Administrator-level caller) can read `data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json` directly:

type PublishAccessItem struct {
    ID       string `json:"id"`
    Visible  bool   `json:"visible"`
    Password string `json:"password"` // plaintext; empty string = no password
    Disable  bool   `json:"disable"`
}

This exposes the plaintext access password for every publish-mode-shared notebook/document,
letting the reader bypass password protection on any publish-mode share. This is a serious
sibling issue given the volume of publish-mode access-control bugs already reported against this
codebase — the passwords protecting exactly that feature are directly readable through a tool
whose own description says "never use for workspace data."

`data/templates` and `data/snippets/conf.json` are lower-severity but still inconsistent with
the HTTP API's own precedent for what counts as sensitive.

Why this is a distinct finding, not a duplicate

GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8 was about *reachability* an unauthenticated Reader-tier JWT being forwarded
to admin-scoped paths including `/mcp`. That has been fixed. This report is about the *tool's own
scope* once reached by a legitimate, properly-authenticated caller, the remediation notes for
that same advisory explicitly called for restricting `resolvePath` to
`WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan/*.log`, which was not implemented; instead the tool retains
workspace-wide scope with only a single-file blocklist addition.

Suggested fix

Either replicate the full `refuseToAccess()` blocklist in `resolvePath()` (minimum fix, keeps
parity with the HTTP API going forward by extracting `refuseToAccess`'s path list into a shared
helper both call), or implement the originally-recommended allowlist restricting the tool to
`WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan/*.log` for read and disabling write/delete/rename/copy entirely unless
the caller is Administrator, matching the tool's own advertised "debugging/log reading only"
scope.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel< 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f
0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Corregida commit 3542530 — —
Versiones corregidascommit 3542530
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60083
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/3542530c505f13aa3fbd0343627409ca6c000dd2
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.8.0
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-incomplete-path-blocklist-via-mcp-file-tool

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.